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ABSTRACT
This research provides a maturity model for information security for
healthcare organizations in the United States. Healthcare organizations are faced
with increasing threats to the security of their information systems. The maturity
model identifies specific performance metrics, with relative importance measures,
that can be used to enhance information security at healthcare organizations allowing
them to focus scarce resources on mitigating the most important information security
threat vectors. This generalizable, hierarchical decision model uses both qualitative
and quantitative metrics based on objective goals. This model may be used as a
baseline by which to measure individual organizational performance, to measure
performance against other organizations, or to monitor changes in the information
security environment over time.
Information security incidents cause significant harm, both financial and
reputational, to individuals and organizations across the globe. The cybersecurity
threat is pervasive and continues to grow at an alarming rate.

This harm is

heightened in healthcare organizations because human lives may also be at risk in the
event of an information security incident. Healthcare organizations have also become
a popular target with cybercriminals due to the rich trove of personal information
entrusted to them. Existing information system security frameworks are complicated,
difficult and time intensive to administer and monitor, and rarely provide relative
importance of key performance metrics. Understanding the most important levers in
i

improving information security by introducing a generalizable model can help close
a gap in the existing literature.
Using a comprehensive literature review, objectives, goals, and outputs were
identified and linked together in a four-level hierarchical decision model (HDM). At
level 1, the purpose of the HDM is to determine the degree to which the organization
meets the mission of providing a secure information security environment by
evaluating a broad set of metrics. Level 2 specifies five objectives, based on industryand domain-relevant research, for the promotion of a secure information security
environment. Level 3 identifies twenty-two goals with associated measurable
outputs, characterized by desirability functions, to create level 4. A structured model
is developed using these linked concepts with the help of subject matter experts to
validate the content and construct of the model. The model is further tested by
measuring for inconsistency and disagreement.
Using case studies, actual industry data are used to demonstrate how the
model calculates a score to create a performance measure for each case study
organization. Results are discussed to illustrate how the case study sites might
increase their performance in future assessments against the model.
This research project contributes to the field by introducing a generalizable
model and measurement system that compares information security performance in
healthcare organization to an ideal state. Healthcare organizations provide critical
resources to millions every day and must remain operational despite information
ii

security threats. Understanding where healthcare organizations can best direct their
limited resources to support stability of their information systems is essential to
leaders of these organizations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The healthcare sector has increased implementation of information systems
dramatically since the advent of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) of 2009. Formerly a laggard in the utilization of technology to support
enhanced efficiencies and improved business operations [1], ARRA [2] enabled the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide financial incentives for
the effective use of health information technology (HIT), and beginning in 2015,
financial penalties for not implementing HIT that demonstrated “meaningful use” [3].
Largely as a result of this law, HIT has become ubiquitous in the United States.
The proliferation of HIT has also created a new and significant risk to health
organizations; protecting the privacy and integrity of large caches of protected health
information (PHI). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
of 1996 requires healthcare organizations, known as “covered entities,” to ensure the
protection of individual identifiable information [4][5]. The Department of Health
and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) serves to monitor compliance of
covered entities with the provisions of HIPAA.

In recent years the OCR has

dramatically increased their compliance monitoring and auditing of covered entities.
This increased monitoring and auditing has led to a significant increase in both the

1

number and cost of fines to covered entities. The U.S. Department of HHS OCR web
site reporting breach activity [6] has become known as the “wall of shame.”
Settlement fees paid to the OCR totaling nearly $20 million for PHI violations
were reported in 2016 alone [7]. These settlement fees are a small portion of the
expense associated with ensuring security of protected health information.
Organizations can easily invest millions more in securing their information systems
and, of course, there can be significant reputational harm incurred when a breach of
protected health information occurs. For example, Oregon Health & Science
University paid a one-time settlement fee of $2.7M in 2016 for a breach that occurred
in 2013[8]. As a result of their resolution agreement and three-year corrective action
plan with the OCR they invested an additional $8M per year in information security
initiatives for the duration of the corrective action plan. This same level of investment
was required to maintain security operations after the corrective action plan was
resolved.
As a result of the increased risk factor for information security in a world with
large collections of protected health information being created, stored, and
transmitted, many healthcare organizations are making additional efforts to improve
their information security risk profile. Healthcare organizations, especially those of
smaller size, struggle to understand the best use of their limited resources to address
this issue. There are many well established cybersecurity frameworks to draw upon
2

for guidance - NIST, HITRUST, CIS Critical Security Controls to name a few [9]. These
frameworks can be unwieldy and most fail to provide guidance on which
cybersecurity strategies provide the most value. While there is increasing literature
examining the problem of the cybersecurity threat in healthcare, there are few
examples of program evaluation through quantitative methods based on elements
identified in traditional cybersecurity frameworks or qualitative case-based methods.
This study examines the literature to explore the current state of the
information security environment at healthcare organizations. It provides value by
creating a measurement system that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative
metrics. A generalizable model is created and validated by subject matter experts
which produces a score to evaluate overall performance in cybersecurity for
healthcare organization. Through a criterion-based validation process, experts agree
the model may also be used to understand the relative importance of individual
metrics to aid organizations in understanding which cybersecurity strategies may
provide the most value in increasing overall performance. Subject matter experts
agree that the model accurately reflects performance results and case studies confirm
this assessment.
Including this introduction, the paper is organized into 8 chapters. Chapter 2
reviews the academic literature on information security in healthcare organizations.
Cybersecurity breach and incident types and rates are discussed. Cybersecurity
3

mitigation strategies are identified, as are cybersecurity frameworks. Research gaps
are noted, highlighting the need for a maturity evaluation model.
Chapter 3 further clarifies the problem and provides information about the
approach that is taken to provide structure to model development. Many multicriteria decision-making methods are reviewed and the decision to utilize the
Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) is discussed. Due to the reliance on subject
matter experts for validation of the model, important elements of working with
experts such as formation of research instrument and identification of experts are
discussed.
Chapter 4 describes how the hierarchical decision model was developed.
Initiated by a literature review, and then modified through a validation process
involving subject matter experts. The validated four-level model links objectives,
goals and outputs. At level 1, the purpose of the HDM is identified as development of
a healthcare information security maturity model. Level 2 specifies five objectives:
organizational support, policies and standards, awareness and training, information
security technical hygiene, and mitigation of external threats. Twenty-two goals
populate level 3 with measurable outputs characterized by desirability curves to fill
level 4 of the model.
Chapter 5 discusses how the generalizable model was finalized. Subject matter
experts first quantified the criteria through a series of pairwise comparisons,
resulting in a weighting of each criterion within the model. Key analysis was
4

performed to check for individual expert inconsistency followed by an assessment for
disagreement among experts. The finalized generalizable model is presented.
Chapter 6 describes how the model is used to demonstrate information
security maturity within healthcare organizations.

The results are validated by

subject matter experts. The model is used to calculate performance in case studies at
a variety of healthcare organization types. Scores and metric values are analyzed to
provide recommendations to a select case study site.
Chapter 7 reviews the results of the model development as related to the
problem statement are discussed as well as practical implications of findings. In
addition, the generalizability of the model is analyzed. Expert feedback responses
during the model validation process support concerns identified in literature
regarding severity of threat and need for prioritization of cybersecurity strategies
given limited resources. Subject matter experts were in agreement of the validity of
the model.
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the discussion, notes contributions to
the field as well as limitations of the study. Future research opportunities are also
noted.

5

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
A comprehensive review of information security within healthcare
organizations was conducted. The body of literature reviewed was selected through
a variety of methods. First, literature searches using EBSCO, PubMed/Medline,
Elsevier, and Science Direct were conducted using key words Information Security,
Data Breach, Healthcare, PHI, Training, and Organization Culture. These searches
were joined in several instances to narrow the results as a means of identifying the
most relevant literature. When an article cited a particularly significant prior work,
that referenced article was also studied. Search was primarily conducted on articles
from 2007 to present, but several articles dating as far as 2000 were utilized as
relevant as well as one article from 1982. Over 200 relevant articles are cited.
The rest of this chapter contains six sections.

Section 2.1 identifies

information security incidents and breaches, highlighting the impact of unsecured
information. Section 2.2 reviews information security environments and practices,
noting the practices generally employed to improve the security of information;
taking a deeper dive into governance, training, management process controls and
technical controls utilized to improve information security. Section 2.3 delves into
the information security environment in healthcare organizations specifically.
Section 2.4 focuses on existing information security models, frameworks and metrics.
Section 2.5 focuses on maturity models in healthcare and the benefits of certification.

6

Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the discussion by summarizing the findings and
presenting the research gaps.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the areas considered in this
literature review.
Figure 1: Literature Review Areas

2.1

Information Security Incidents and Breaches

Information security incidents and breaches have grown exponentially in
recent years and have made headlines across the globe. These threats affect all types
of organizations large and small, across all industries and across geographic
boundaries. During the 2013 Christmas shopping season, a cyberattack on Target
Corporation’s retail store netted millions of customer’s credit card information [10].
In the United Kingdom, a government-sponsored survey found that 87% of small
businesses had detected and reported cyberattacks [11]. In June of 2015, The United
States Office of Personnel Management discovered that the background records for
current, former and prospective Federal employees had been stolen, including the
7

records of over 21 million individuals [12]. In June of 2021 FBI Director Christopher
Wray compared ransomware challenge to 9/11 [13]. This is a mere sampling of the
incidents that have hit the press in recent years. This sample serves to illustrate the
significant risk and vulnerability posed by cybercriminals. Of further note, healthcare
is persistently ranked as the number one target of cybercriminals, followed by
education, government, retail, financial sectors in varying orders, due to the richness
of the data available in the healthcare sector [14][15][16].
The reported volume of financial damage caused by cybercrime has grown
dramatically across all industries. Figure 2 below provides details of this loss as
reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center
[17].
Figure 2: Total reported losses by year in U.S. dollars as reported to U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center

Total reported losses in U.S. dollars
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2500000
2000000
1500000
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Several key factors have driven this growth. First, there are many more
systems at organizations, large and small, that store information, than there have ever
been before.

Second, some of the information stored in this proliferation of

information systems is highly valuable and as a result the number of cybercriminals,
and networks of cybercriminals has grown substantially [18]. Third, managing the
security controls required to protect the information stored electronically is
expensive, rapidly changing [19], and complex [20]. As a result, many organizations
across most industry sectors have not, or are simply unable to, establish a strong
information security environment [21]. Culbertson notes that the volume of threats
to healthcare organizations is steadily growing, and that mitigating risk to an
acceptable level will be a massive undertaking [22]. When looking specifically at
healthcare organizations it should be noted that patient health records contain all the
information a thief needs to perpetrate identify theft [23]. Agrawal claims that
continuous data breaches targeting these invaluable medical records have become a
nemesis for healthcare organizations [24]. Finally, according to HIMSS Analytics over
80 percent of the security breaches in the healthcare sector since the enactment of
HIPAA trace back to people within the organization [25][26]. Human behavior and
simple mistakes, regardless of industry, are a large factor in data loss [27].
Information security risks are presented to organizations through multiple
vectors – system transmission paths, hardware, software, or the internet for example.
Cybercriminals utilize a variety of nefarious tools to gain access to sensitive data,
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systems, or people (e.g., phishing, malware, zero day exploits, denial of service
attacks, SQL injections, ransomware, man-in-the-middle attacks) [11][28]. This
collection of vectors and approaches is rapidly changing and is difficult for most
organizations to remain responsive to.
Healthcare organizations need to be mindful not only of patient privacy
concerns but also of the negative business impacts such as billing theft, identity theft
or interruption of critical business functions posed by cybercriminals. The negative
impact of breaches in healthcare organizations is extreme. Not only are these events
costly, routinely reaching beyond seven-figure price tags, but the reputational harm
can be difficult to recover from.

Most importantly, some information security

incidents could prohibit the healthcare organizations from providing critical patient
care activities. In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware incident not only shutdown
transportation systems and other governmental systems across the globe, but also
forced Britain’s public health systems to turn away patients even though no patient
data was compromised [29]. These incidents not only have the potential of causing
financial loss to individuals and organizations, but also pose a very real threat to
healthcare organizations in serving their critical mission of treating patients.
Clinicians rely on electronic medical records, infusion pumps, and many other tools
in order to provide the current standard of care [30]. In September of 2020, the first
patient death attributed to cybercriminals occurred when a woman did not survive a
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transfer between healthcare facilities that had been necessitated as a result of a
cyberattack at Düsseldorf University Hospital [31].
2.2

Information Security Environment and Compliance

The environment of the organization in support of information security has
tremendous importance in the effectiveness of information security compliance.
While there are a number of definitions for organizational culture/environment, the
definition provided by Deal (1982) has often been cited as particularly relevant in the
evaluation of information security environments. This specific definition identifies
the follow key characteristics: 1) shared values, which define the expected behavior
in the workplace; 2) heroes who have earned distinction by living the organizational
values; 3) rituals and ceremonies, which are physical expressions of the
organizational culture/environment; and 4) the cultural social network within the
organization, which perpetuates the culture/environment and guards against
deviations [32]. Creating an environment where information resources are protected
is a necessary component of a successful information security strategy. The
characteristics identified by Deal are readily mapped to the key criteria of effective
information security programs as noted below:
•

Technical controls (reinforcing shared values and rituals);

•

Management process controls (reinforcing shared values, rituals,
cultural network);

•

Training; (reinforcing shared values, heroes, cultural network) and
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•

Governance programs (reinforcing shared values, heroes, cultural
network).

These criteria are described in greater detail below.
2.2.1 Technical Controls
Technical controls are hardware or software solutions that provide automated
protection from unauthorized access and misuse of systems and related institutional
data. The number and variety of technical controls is vast. Some may be used to
mitigate the threat of access to protected data by provisioning and monitoring who
has access to information across the enterprise (e.g., access/identity management
and control), others prohibit certain types of information from leaving the
organization through unauthorized channels (e.g., data loss prevention).

Many

healthcare organizations deploy data loss prevention (DLP) tools in order to ensure
that protected health information (e.g., medical record number, diagnosis, social
security number) does not leave the organization unless they are sent through a
secure channel. Other technical control technologies may protect data at rest (e.g.,
encryption technologies). For example, many institutions both within and outside of
healthcare, have implemented mobile device management (MDM) solutions to ensure
that only cell phones, or other mobile devices, that are encrypted access their secure
networks and that any data on those devices is encrypted and therefore very difficult,
if not impossible, to access. Still other technical controls help to facilitate detection
and diversion of external threats (e.g., firewalls, anti-virus software). Organizations
12

are more likely to implement technical controls than they are to provide financial
support for other information security risk mitigation strategies (e.g., training) [33].
In many organizations, information security has largely been considered a
technology issue [34]. However, despite the technology-based measures that are
generally implemented, there is often little improvement in information security
compliance behavior [23] and as a result information security remains a problem.
Organizations tend to design information security solutions by defining a strong
technical perimeter and keeping intruders out [35]. For best results, technology
controls must be combined with human solutions in order to create a strong
environment and defense for information security [36][37]. Technical controls are
never one hundred percent effective in eliminating information security threats.
2.2.2 Management process controls
Management process controls for information security consist primarily of
policies and sanctions designed to guide, and where appropriate, modify user
behavior.
Policies in support of information security cover a broad range of topics from
appropriate use of computing resources within an organization to specific guidelines
regarding supported equipment and applications. Policies often fall short of meeting
organizational objectives if they are not married with procedure level documentation
to support the “how” of policy compliance or execution. For example, information
security best practices would support a security review of all new applications or
13

hardware that was to be introduced to an organization, and many organizations have
policies requiring such security reviews. If this policy was not matched with clear
instructions (procedure level documentation) regarding how an individual would go
about obtaining such a security review it is likely that employees within the given
entity would not comply with the policy. Some regulatory agencies have been known
to issue fines and/or sanctions (e.g., temporary loss of accreditation) when an
organization has a policy that is not followed by members of the organization. It is
essential that policies are combined with procedures to aid in compliance.
Maintenance of the large volumes of policies required to provide guidance at complex
healthcare organizations can be overwhelming, and many organizations are unable
to commit the resources required to regularly update their policies and procedures
as frequently as necessary to ensure they remain relevant in the dynamic
environment of information technology and healthcare regulations. When policies do
not maintain relevancy, or are not properly vetted within the organization, they lose
their efficacy and may even cause greater confusion, thereby increasing the threat of
unintended information security breaches or policy violations.
Sanctions are the documented consequences of failure to comply with
organizational policies. Sanctions are generally aligned with the intent associated
with non-compliant behavior. For example, a policy violation may be accidental or
inadvertent, due to carelessness or negligent behavior, intentional but without
harmful intent, or intentional with harmful intent. In the event of an inadvertent or
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careless mistake it is likely that the appropriate sanction for violation could be a
“letter of discipline or warning” delivered to the individual who was non-compliant.
In the event of a more purposeful or ill-intended policy violation, termination of
employment status could be called for. It is important that sanctions be applied
appropriately in order to provide proper incentives to employees to drive compliant
behavior. Organizational members must believe “the punishment fits the crime” so
to say. It is equally important that there be no perception of preferential status in
application of sanctions. For example, in a healthcare setting a physician must be
subject to the same applications of sanctions as the nursing staff. Failure to apply
sanctions consistently and fairly would result in an ineffective and potentially
harmful compliance tool.
When used properly, policies, procedures and sanctions become a powerful
aid to drive an environment of information security compliance. Creating a strong
environment around information security is crucial as users are the largest source of
breaches despite technical controls [38]. The Online Trust Alliance stated in 2014
that 29 percent of data breaches were a result of employee actions, either accidental
or intentional [39]. Further, in many organizations end users are viewed as the
“weakest link” in information security management [27][40], creating an information
security gap. In many healthcare organizations, there is minimal awareness of the
information security threat, and as a result, staff pose a significant threat to
information security [41].
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User perception of information security is often a barrier in creating a strong
environment of information security compliance. Many users are concerned that the
task overhead imposed by complying with information security measures is
burdensome and therefore see these measures as a threat.

Users often view

information security measures as work stressors, privacy invasions, constraining and
inconvenient. They feel compelled to maintain their operational performance while
including information security tasks in their daily work [42][43][44]. Employee
compliance behavior is critical to ensuring the information resources of the
organization are protected [18][38].
Information security is as much about managing people as it is about
managing technologies [45][46][47] and access control and authentication systems
must be simple and easy to use or users will bypass them [48]. It must be recognized
that there is a tradeoff between usability and information system requirements, and
this balance must be actively managed [49] if information security systems are to be
successful. Combining technical controls with human controls provides a strong
framework for improving and maintaining an environment that values high levels of
information security. Information security environments influence security
compliance, security effectiveness, security awareness, and most importantly,
security behavior [50][51][52][53].

People controls combined with technical

controls lead to an improved information security environment and a strong
information security program is critical to creating a strong information security
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environment[51][54].

Information security is not merely the responsibility of

information technology (IT) teams, it is the responsibility of everyone at the
organization [55]. Even though there is agreement that technological and managerial
(people) process are both required to be successful, there is a general lack of a welldeveloped techno-managerial structure in healthcare [56]. Organizations that have
employees with a higher propensity for compliance beliefs, as well as a high level of
executive engagement, and enforcement, are more likely to have a high level of
information assurance compliance [56][57][58]. It is noted that user attitudes
toward

compliance

are

affected

when

they

consider

compliance-related

consequences [59]. Management controls govern the behavior of people and become
stronger over time. In addition, they become the information security solution with
the highest value [60] over time as they are cheaper to implement and maintain than
technical solutions [61].
2.2.3 Training
Policy and sanctions alone are not sufficient and organizations need to employ
other means such as training to ensure individuals internalize information security
policies and best practices [62]. Training about information security has become a
cornerstone of creating an environment that supports information security [63]. The
creation of an information security environment by educating users about
information security risks and their responsibilities is essential [64]. As individual’s
understanding and awareness of information security increases, compliance
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improves remarkably [65]. Karjalainen and Siponen [63] describe effective training
as being made up of three components: (a) provide elementary characteristics of
information security; (b) explain how these characteristics support the information
security training; and (c) create models on how to evaluate training.
Some of the elementary characteristics of information security which users
must be aware of are the need for data integrity, authentication and confidentiality
requirements. Data integrity, simply put, is trust in the information that is being
presented to users in the conduct of their daily tasks. That information, or data, must
be not only trusted as a valid source of record, but also be consistently available when
access is needed. Authentication and confidentiality are also key components in
information security, ensuring that only those individuals who should have access to
data are provided that access. These elementary characteristics are the “what”
component of the training – as in “what is it that we want to talk about?”
The next key component of effective training programs is the “how.” Providing
employees with information about specifically how their actions can improve
information security within the organization is essential. For example, a common
threat vector to information system integrity and confidentiality is phishing. Phishing
is the action of sending an email, either broadly to all potential victims within an
organization or specifically targeting high-profile/high access individuals (spearphishing) within an organization. Phishers design their emails with the intent of
getting their intended victims to either download a malicious file to their computing
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devices or to otherwise provide their personal information or credentials to them.
They do this by masquerading as trusted conveyers of the request for information
(e.g., institutional information technology department, financial institutions). While
there are some technical tools that can minimize the volume of phishing emails, there
will certainly be some phishing emails that get past those technical controls. When
that happens, it is critical that individual users know what characteristics are
common of phishing emails so that they do not become victims of phishers.
Organizations must therefore train their employees to mitigate this risk which can
negatively impact both the organization as well the individual user.
Training programs should be multi-dimensional in order to be successful.
Individuals have different learning styles, and effective training programs respect and
cater to those differences.

Multiple delivery channels and venues are needed.

Computer-based training is an effective tool for many and it provides fairly reliable
mechanisms for tracking training comprehension, through testing embedded within
the training, as well as tracking of training at the individual level across the
organization (i.e., who has completed the training and who has not). However,
computer-based training is not always the best training for increasing a deep level of
understanding or for evoking understanding at an emotional level. Many individuals
are more likely to understand the content being delivered it they are able to do so in
interactive ways such as in-person training or group-based training.
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There is some evidence that greater success in information security awareness
can be found with small group training workshops and discussion activities as
opposed to more standard top-down messaging or large presentations with no
opportunities for interaction [65][66][67]. Further, positive motivators may be more
effective in attaining information security compliance than stringent enforcement
[23]. In addition, positive peer influence on compliance [44], security values and
attitudes of the users are re-informed by the consistent behavior of senior
management and their peers toward these security values [68]. It’s possible that
these peer attitudes would become more pronounced in the small group
environment. For these reasons, and many others, a diverse and multi-dimensional
training program is key to success.
Training and education will be more effective if it outlines not only what is
expected of individuals and how to prevent information security breaches, but also
provides an understanding of why it is important, thereby influencing attitude
[69][70][71][37]. Without the knowledge of why information security is important
introducing stringent information security measures could be perceived and
attributed to a lack of trust toward the users which could significantly increase
internal user information system abuse [72]. Conveying information about the
impacts of breach of patient’s medical records or other personal information about
employees or affiliates of the organization is required. Employees must understand
the reputational damage that can be inflicted on the institution, as well as the ways
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that criminals may use the information to cause harm, both reputational and financial,
to individuals.

Security practices should be supported by an organizational

environment that not only improves security awareness but also enhances the
individuals' motivation to act responsibly and in accordance with policies [73][74].
Finally, the success of information security training programs must be
measured as a key component of the overall success of information security
compliance. Due to the complicated nature of combining technology solutions and
human management solutions as the framework of an effective overarching
information security program, isolating the success of training program alone may be
a challenge.

Certainly, competency-based testing is one avenue of measuring

knowledge gained and therefore the success of training programs.

However,

measuring employee performance in the conduct of practicing effective information
security is quite another. The overall interest in measurement of information security
training has increased significantly in recent years, although no definitive model for
doing so has yet been identified.
2.2.4 Governance
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines
information security governance as the process of establishing and maintaining a
framework to provide assurance that information security strategies are aligned with
and support business objectives, are consistent with applicable laws and regulations
through adherence to policies and internal controls, and provide assignment of
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responsibility, all in an effort to manage risk [75]. Typically information security
governance programs have the following foundational criteria: 1) governing the
ongoing operations of the organization’s information security technology framework;
2) governing the conduct of employees in ensuring compliance with information
security policies and procedures; 3) ensuring adequate funding is available for the
execution of information security programs; 4) ensuring compliance requirements
are met, often through monitoring by outside or unrelated organizational entities;
and 5) protecting organizational reputation.
Most information security governance programs obtain feedback and report
results across multiple levels within the organization. Given the large reputational
and financial damage than can be wrought by poor information security management
practices it is important that the highest levels within the organization are informed
of the risks and mitigation programs related to information security.

Equally

important is a “boots on the ground” understanding of the business impact of
decisions related to implementation of information security solutions.

The

technologists must understand workflows within the enterprise well enough to
deliver solutions that will not severely hamper the ability for individuals to conduct
their daily tasks in the interest of improving information security. In addition,
information security best practices suggest a separation of duties between the
owners of the technology solution operations and the auditing of performance against
information security standards. As such, these two specific functions often follow
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distinct reporting channels within an organization.

For example, information

security engineering might sit within the information technology department, while
information security auditing might sit within the compliance or legal department of
a given organization. These multi-level and multi-channel approaches are key criteria
of successful information security governance programs.
2.3

Assessing Information Security Environment in Healthcare

There has been significant research documenting the volume of breach
activity and likely threat vectors. Figure 3 below illustrates the increase in volume of
healthcare breaches of more than 500 records from 2009 to 2020 as reported to the
HHS Office for Civil Rights [76]. In 2020 those breaches resulted in over 268,189,693
records being inappropriately disclosed [76].
Figure 3: Healthcare Data Breaches of 500 or More Records
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In addition, there is a fair amount of research on which specific industries are
being impacted by breaches and the cost associated with those breaches. Figure 4
[77] below illustrates the average total cost of a data breach by industry for 2020 in
U.S. dollars. The average cost of a healthcare breach is $7.13M, higher than the
average total cost of a data breach in any other sector, and nearly double the global
average cost regardless of industry. The research cited below in Figure 4 excluded
very small and very large breaches, capturing only those that ranged in size between
3,400 and 99,730 compromised records and included costs associated with detection
and escalation, notification, post data breach response and lost business.
Figure 4: Average total cost of a data breach by industry for 2020 in US$ millions.
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This cost data, when combined with information about the number of
healthcare breaches noted in Figure 3 exceeds an annual cost above $4.5B and this
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number underestimated the total cost as it excludes the cost of very small and very
large breaches.
Clearly the threat is rising, especially in the healthcare sector, and the cost of
breaches is disproportionately high for healthcare organizations. The problem is well
documented, but more research is needed in identifying solutions to better manage
the risk. There is little research addressing the promotion of compliance behaviors
within organizations [23] and more research is required in the health profession to
understand motivating behaviors for adoption of an information security
environment [78].
An understanding of organizational environment related to information
security compliance can significantly aid in the execution of a successful information
security program. The following measures have been identified as being helpful in
assessing information security environments:

security awareness, security

ownership, top management support and influence, information policy enforcement
and security training [79]. There appear to be mixed findings in the research related
to environments of information security awareness and compliance in healthcare
systems. Alumaran, Bella and Chen found that human behavior toward protection of
medical information is one of the main threats to information security; and that the
current environment in healthcare falls short in protecting health information due to
"values and norms" toward information security [80]. However, Hasib [81] and
Brady [50] surveyed leaders at healthcare organizations in the United States and
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Canada and found fairly high levels of confidence in a high level of information
security compliance and environment. This dichotomy of opinion serves as the
context for further inquiry into the question of how to measure information security
compliance effectiveness and attitudes, and further the impact of organizational
environment in shaping the adoption of a strong information security practices.
Organizations that recognize the value of committing resources, and enhancing
capabilities and cultural value in the face of organizational issues can enhance their
performance [82].
2.4

Information security models and metrics

In order to prepare for, and respond to, information security threats models,
also known as cybersecurity frameworks, have been developed and refined over the
years in order to identify information security best practices. Information security
models and metrics were recognized on the Hard Problem List of the United States
INFOSEC Research Council in 2005, a situation confirmed by the United States
National Science and Technology Council in 2011 and further supported as one of the
five hard problems in Science and Security in 2015 [83]. The next few pages explore
existing models and associated metrics and suggests how those models could be used
as a foundation for creation of an information security maturity model for healthcare
organizations in the United States.
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2.4.1 Information Security Models
Information security’s key objective is the protection of Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability of data, often referred to as the CIA triad, without impinging
on organizational productivity [84]. In order to best serve this objective in a
systematic way, the development of information security models and metrics began
in the 1980s and has continued to evolve since that time. The Information Security
and Control Association (ISACA) has defined the following key outcomes
for information security governance [85].
•

Strategic Alignment – Security requirement defined by the business
enterprise.

•

Value Delivery – Baseline security following best practices.

•

Risk Management – Delivering to agreed-upon risk profile.

•

Performance Management – A defined set of metrics that are
consistently measured.

There are numerous information security models currently in use with similar
but not identical desired outcomes documented and similar, but not identical,
methodologies proposed. There are a great number of models that assess
information security risk. Some of these models are qualitative in nature and others
are more quantitative [86][87]. A few have become standards, however there is no
definitive maturity model that could be used for reference benchmarking
[88][89][90].
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Maturity models are instruments that define an evolutionary path to
increasingly meeting the defined objective. General maturity models have been
widely used in information systems research [91]. Maturity models have also been
used in the healthcare domain specifically in the information system sector
[92][93][94]. In the case of information security, the defined objective would be
defined as an environment that has robust controls to mitigate information security
risk as aligned with organizational business objectives. Models must be simple
enough that organizations of all sizes can measure their maturity as well as develop
action plans to improve maturity levels. This is a significant challenge with
existing models. Listed below is a brief description of the most prevalent information
security models that are considered standards.
Information Security and Control Association (ISACA) COBIT 5 for
Information Security [95] – The Information Security and Control Association
(ISACA), an international association of professionals focused on information
technology governance, developed the Control Objectives for Information and
Related Technologies (COBIT) in 1996. The original model was largely focused on
governance and processes associated with technology delivery. In 2012 ISACA
released an add-on for COBIT 5 specifically related to information security. The
model is high level and is largely audit and compliance focused with an accreditation
process available.

28

International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27000 series (also
known as ISO/IEC) [96] – The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
is a consortium of national standards institutes across more than 150 countries. ISO
has developed an information security framework and associated code of practice
documentation in their 27000 series. ISO’s 27000 series was first published in
2005 and was based on the United Kingdom Government’s Department of Trade and
Industry standard for information security, referred to as BS 7799. Most recently
updated in 2014, it can be viewed as an overall program that combines risk
management, security management, governance and compliance. The standard is
largely compliance focused and has an associated certification process available.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

800 series

including CyberSecurity Framework [97]– The National Institute of Standards and
Technology is a non-regulatory federal agency within the United States Department
of Commerce. NIST has developed information security standards and guidelines to
increase

the

planning,

implementation

and

management

of

information

security. NIST’s 800 series was first published in 2002 and the most recent
cybersecurity framework document was published for feedback in 2017. Developed
to support private sector organizations, it does not offer a certification program but
rather is a self-assessment tool.
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Assessment
(OCTAVE) [98]– created by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie
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Mellon University for the United States Department of Defense, OCTAVE was first
published in 1999.

OCTAVE is primarily a high-level risk assessment

methodology designed for organizations with more than 300 employees. The focus
of OCTAVE is on identifying threats and vulnerability and then developing strategies
to mitigate those threats. OCTAVE does not offer a certification process and is free to
use.
Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) CyberSecurity Framework
(CSF) [99]- The Health Information Trust Alliance is a not-for-profit collaborative of
healthcare, technology and information security leaders in the United States. In
2009 HITRUST developed the Common Security Framework in an attempt to
harmonize the multiple existing standards and respond to regulatory requirements
associated with healthcare organizations. HITRUST is compliance focused and
available free of charge, although the certification process is fee-based.
Each of these models were developed to meet specific objectives [86]. While
most of the models have common themes their specific objectives, steps, structure
and level of application vary considerably. Table 1 below provides a summary of the
risk phases/processes, and framework components of each model noted above.
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Table 1: Comparison of Information Security Standards

Model

Risk Model Phases/Process

Framework
Components

COBIT [95]

1. Align, Plan, Organize
2. Build, Acquire, Implement
3. Monitor, Evaluate, Access

1.
2.
3.
4.

Principles
Policies
Procedures
Requirements
Documents

Subcategories in
Framework

7

N/A

18

124

22

108

&

ISO 27001 [96]

1. Define Methodology
2. Identify Assets
3. Identify
Threats
&
Vulnerabilities
4. Qualify Risk
5. Mitigate Risk
6. Document Risk Report
7. Review, Monitor, Audit

NIST 800 series

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

System Characterization
Threat Identification
Vulnerability Identification
Control Analysis
Likelihood Determination
Impact Analysis
Risk Determination
Control Recommendations
Results Documentation

1.
2.
3.
4.

Establish Drivers of Risk
Profile Assets
Identify Threats
Identify and Mitigate Risks

N/A

10

N/A

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Prioritize and Scope
Orient
Create a Target Profile
Conduct a Risk Assessment
Create a Current Profile
Perform Gap Analysis
Implement Action Plan

N/A

14

47

[97]

OCTAVE 5 for
Info Sec [98]

HITRUST [99]

N/A

Categories
in
Framework

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identify
Protect
Detect
Respond
Recover
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As illustrated in Table 1 above, the variety and depth of the models covers a
broad spectrum, from light-weight to very detailed. This variety is also apparent in
the approach each of the standard models uses when considering definitions of
maturity as illustrated in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Comparison of Maturity Model Levels

Model

Maturity Levels

COBIT Model [95]

1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

ISO 27001 [96]

Not documented

NIST 800 * [97]

1.
2.
3.
4.

OCTAVE [98]

Not documented

HITRUST CSF 2009 [99]

1.
2.
3.
4.

Non-existent
Initial/ad hoc
Repeatable but intuitive
Defined process
Managed and measurable
Optimized
Partial
Risk Informed
Repeatable
Adaptive
Basic
Aspirational
Developing
Integrated

* Identifies tiers but also explicitly states “does not necessarily represent maturity level” [97]

NIST [97] notes that “organizations will continue to have unique risks –
different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances.” This interest in
flexibility is common in the models described above; however, the lack of
consistency of approach, evaluation and measurement across the models creates
confusion among information security practitioners and leaves the industry as a
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whole searching to fill the gaps left by each respective model and without a common
nomenclature or benchmarks. As a result, there has been significant independent
research on model variants or completely new models developed in the past several
years. Figure [5100] below provides a snapshot of the increase in systemic review
of cyber-resilience assessment frameworks from 2006 through 2019.
Figure 5: Standard Risk Assessment Process

This increase in development of new models, despite existing standards is
largely driven by two key factors. First, increased utilization of technology
has heightened the visibility and importance of information security. Second,
frustration with existing models due to their gaps and complexity has driven
individuals to create new models that better suit their specific needs. Table 3 below
provides a summary of information security models that were identified in the
literature outside of the standards noted above.
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Table 3: Information Security Models Identified in Literature Outside of Standard Models

Existing models, while somewhat divergent as illustrated in Table 1,
generally follow a risk assessment theme with an approach as noted in Figure 6 [121]
below; however, they largely lack the detailed action level objectives for
measurement in a prioritized manner.
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Figure 6: Standard Risk Assessment Process

The healthcare sector, while recognizing the need for flexibility, is in need of
more specific guidance related to information security [99]. Barlette [122] notes that
many organizations may be skeptical about information security effectiveness due to
the difficulty in evaluating the benefits. In addition, most if not all existing standard
models lack any metrics associated with changing information security culture [70]
or human behavior [123], which is a significant gap given the prevalence of security
incidents associated with human error. Compliance is evolving from a focus on
technical controls to one that includes the human element in the context of coherent
business

practices

[124]. Finally, most

current

models

are quite

complex,
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lack certainty [125][126] and may be difficult for small organizations to utilize [122]
due to lack of expertise.
2.4.2 Information Security Metrics
Metrics can be used to provide performance indicators for organizations
against some defined goal. They may also be used to compare and differentiate
performance across different organizations. Effective utilization of metrics can help
organizations in measuring and monitoring their performance outcomes.
Information security metrics should tell organizations how well they are
doing in keeping institutions safe from harm, how they can improve their security
posture, and how they compare with others in the field when it comes to information
security. According to Brotby [127] contemporary metrics largely fail in this
regard. Most information security metrics are focused on technical controls
[86][128] and say little about overall security. While technology is important, it is far
from the only element that is necessary in providing an environment with high levels
of information security [20][129]. Due to the confidential nature of information
security, very few organizations are willing to share information about their
information security profile with others [129], making comparison of standards and
maturity exceedingly challenging.
Metrics are more than a list of things to be counted or boxes to be checked
off. In the case of information security, they should be used to tell a story about
performance of people, technology, and processes. Security metrics strive to provide
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a quantitative and objective basis for security assurance [126]. Their main uses fall
into the following broad categories:
•

Strategic planning – assessment to support decision making and
program planning.

•

Quality Assurance – product development lifecycle and vulnerability
management.

•

Tactical Oversight – monitoring for compliance and improvement
opportunities.

It is critical that organizations define specific objectives if they are to create
meaningful metrics. Nearly all current models measure risk components as “red”,
“yellow”, and “green”. They often do this by assessing each risk element against two
key factors – probability of event occurring and impact of event should it
occur. While this bucketing of risks and measurement provides flexibility for
organizations, it does not always provide quantitative, specific and actionable
information. Healthcare organizations specifically have difficulty prioritizing the
work that may be required to remediate risks [124]. As noted by Black [130] one
problem with the current metrics is that they lack specificity of definition. For
example, if the information security metric is defined as “percentage of systems
patched” would that mean only operating system patches or would it include service
and application patches? NIST notes that the concepts of fundamental units,
scales, and uncertainty measures that are prevalent in scientific metrics have not
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been applied to information technology [126].

Difficulty in measurement is a

common challenge in information security metrics which makes benchmarking
challenging as well. Another common problem with existing model metrics is the
accuracy of qualitative measures. In many instances, especially those involving
metrics related to information security culture [102][131][105] self-evaluation
surveys are employed for measurement over time. Such surveys often produce
inaccurate or skewed results, depending on the nature of questions asked [130].
Good metrics are SMART – Specific, Measurable/Manageable, Actionable,
Relevant, and Timely/Trending as illustrated in Table 4 [132][133]below.
Table 4: SMART Metrics

Specific
Measurable/Manageable
Actionable
Relevant
Timely/Trending

Clearly define target and area of
measurement.
Data can be obtained consistently and
efficiently.
Provides information that is easy to
understand and provides direction
about improvement opportunity.
Measurement is related to objective
and importance.
Can be compared over time.

SMART metrics are lacking in current models for information security. Black
[130] notes that current models provide many suggestions for the types of metrics
that should be collected for information security but no definitive list has been
created. NIST has provided very good templates for defining metrics and
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documenting measurement, however they have only provided a few examples of
what these measures and metrics might be [121]. Further, little work has been done
to determine the value of the metrics in operational environments [134] nor have
specific measures been defined for the metrics that have been suggested.
2.5

Maturity Models in Healthcare and the Benefits of Certification

Lacking consistent and effective maturity models for information security, we
look to maturity models that have been developed in healthcare for other
purposes. The HIMSS Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model (EMRAM) is such a
model. HIMSS EMRAM was designed to identify the various stages of maturity in the
area of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) for hospitals. The maturity model, shown
below in Figure 7 [135], consists of 8 stages and provides a recommended adoption
model for increasing the maturity of utilization of EMRs.
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Figure 7: HIMSS Analytics US EMR Adoption Model

Beginning with Stage 0, where the EMR alone is installed, to full maturity at
Stage 7 which includes characteristics such as Continuity of Care Documents
(CCD) readily available. The model offers a certification process that ensures that the
next higher level is only reached upon completion of clearly documented measures
within each stage.
The model was developed in 2005 and has been refined over time. It, along
with government incentives, has driven the market to increase adoption and
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optimization of EMRs rapidly. The model has provided a clear path for the logical
evolution of EMR adoption, providing not only a roadmap for hospitals of all sizes, but
also a means of benchmarking best practices across the country [136]. The model is
now used in many countries around the globe and the benefits of this model have
been widely reviewed and include increased efficiencies in clinical staff quality
performance [137] as well as improved patient safety [138]. There are similar
models in support of maturity in healthcare analytics [139], but neither of these are
appropriate for measurement of healthcare information security maturity.
Models that offer a certification process, such as ISO, COBIT, and the HIMSS US
EMR adoption model noted above, offer numerous benefits to industry and well as
independent organizations.

The following key benefits of certification have

been noted [140][141][142]:
•

87% of respondents stated that ISO 27001 had a “positive” or “very
positive’ outcome on their information security.

•

82% of those surveyed noted an increase in quality control of
information.

•

39% reported a decrease in down-time of IT systems and the same
number a decrease in the number of security incidents.

•

78% reported an increased ability to meet compliance requirements.

•

44% reported increased sales or competitive advantage.

•

51% reported increased customer satisfaction.
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2.6

Findings, Recommendations and Gaps in Literature

The literature reviewed confirms that information security is a significant risk
to healthcare organizations.

Further, when organizations understand their

information security maturity they are better positioned to ensure protection of
confidentiality, integrity and availability of their data, avoiding costly information
security incidents which cause both financial and reputational harm.
The role of user motivation and attitude in information security, while
recognized, has not been treated seriously [143]. Despite user training, information
security compliance remains problematic [144] and more research should be done to
explore what types of learning are most effective. Additional research must also be
done to determine what instills a strong information security environment in
organizations [145][146]. Further, not all groups within an organization will react
similarly to the same initiatives for promoting security awareness [147]. Studies
which specifically examine the human component of information security are needed
[148]. All to these factors distill to a core theme around a neccesity for further
research in defining the current state of information security environment within
organizations and ways in which that environment might be improved.
There is a significant gap in information security models that provide a
maturity score, clearly defined metrics, and recommendations that may be used as a
roadmap for healthcare organizations. Many authors suggest the need for new
information security models that address the gaps of existing models
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[142][149][150]. There is a specific need in the industry to provide a maturity model
that is easy to understand and provides clear direction regarding prioritization for
investment of information security resources. A new model is required that, while
not replacing existing models or comprehensive risk assessments, would provide a
framework of best practices for healthcare organizations of any size. Such a model
could serve as a benchmark for comparing security profiles across the industry.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH APPROACH
3.1

Research Problem

Healthcare

organizations

are

faced

with

increasing

challenges

in

implementing and sustaining high-functioning information security environments.
These challenges will continue to increase as regulatory monitoring increases and
information security threats persist. Focusing on improving the information security
environment within these organizations is likely to help provide protection of
protected health information (PHI) and personal information as well as support the
continued operations of critical business functions including the very critical mission
of providing urgent life-saving care.
Consistent performance evaluation and management leads to increased
performance – what is measured matters. Current information security evaluation
programs exist, but are complicated, resource intensive, difficult to use and as result
are not used [151][152]. The ability to adequately measure information security
performance against peers or manage performance over time in a quantitative way is
a significant challenge.
Healthcare organizations have limited resources and must be diligent in the
execution of funding decisions. Given the growing investment in information security
at healthcare organizations, decision support tools that clearly define the tactics that
will have the biggest impact on improving performance would allow for objective and
transparent decision making. The best decision support tools also provide the ability
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to measure performance over time, answering the question “was the promised value
achieved?”
An easy to use, generalizable model, that provides a holistic set of metrics with
performance scores for information security maturity is much needed.
3.2

Research Scope and Objectives

This study presents a new holistic approach in the evaluation of information
security maturity at healthcare organizations. This index can help organizations in
developing strategic, practical and effective methods for improved information
security behaviors. Once deployed within an organization, a baseline compliance
score would be created. The index score could then be used to compare maturity with
an ideal, with other organizations, or to monitor progress toward an enhanced
maturity of the information security environment over time. Further, it could be used
to deepen understanding of the mechanisms that will improve the environment of
information security. In this way, organizations may learn not only from the conduct
of an individual assessment, but may also have a means of learning from others in
similar or diverse organizations, experiencing the same information security
challenges.
A number of diverse healthcare organizations are used to test and analyze the
model’s ability to calculate a valid and appropriate performance evaluation score.
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This research has four objectives:
1.

Define a set of outputs that create a balanced and comprehensive image
for information security maturity;

2.

Develop a framework and metrics that gauge performance evaluation
related to these outputs;

3.

Evaluate performance of a variety of healthcare organizations using
this framework;

4.

Introduce a new method for healthcare organizations to measure
performance, extending the literature.

Figure 8 maps the gaps to research questions that were developed leading to
research objectives noted above.
Figure 8: Research Gaps, Goals, Questions
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3.3

Multi Criteria Decision Problem

Providing a solution to the complex issue of improving information security in
healthcare organizations is clearly a problem that requires a multi criteria approach
to decision making. In order to understand the best method for evaluating the
maturity level of information security environments, many well documented
approaches to multi criteria decision analysis were considered prior to selection of
Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM).
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is often used to analyze complex
problems when a single optimal solution does not exist. MCDA is defined as “a set of
methods and approaches to aid decision-making, where decisions are based on more
than one criterion, which make explicit the impact on the decision of all the criteria
applied and the relative importance attached to them” [153]. Often time the criteria
may be related to one another and decision making may require trade-offs. The
typical process for MCDA begins with definition of the problem at which time the
objective and types of decision are identified. Next a number of criteria are defined
for the conduct of evaluating alternatives.

This is followed by validation and

weighting of both the criteria and model itself. The process is concluded with
performance of sensitivity analysis and ultimately a prioritization of alternatives.
Figure 9 [154][155] below provides a visual representation of this process.
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Figure 9: Idealized Multi Criteria Decision Analysis Process

According to Thokala [154], Adunlin [156], and Drake [157] there has been an
increase in utilization of MCDA methods in healthcare as it provides a sound and
rigorous approach to decision making. There are numerous examples of research
that has used MCDA to address healthcare questions [154][156][157][158][159]
[160] and volumes have been increasing since 2011. As a specific example, Marsh
used MCDA as a decision support tool for determining fields of approval, assessment,
pricing and utilization of new drugs and medical technologies [161]. In addition
MCDA has recently been used to address information security questions
[162][163][164][165].
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MCDA Modeling Approaches MCDA approaches can be broadly classified into
value measurement models, outranking models, and goal programming models.
Value measurement models require construction and comparison of numerical
scores, representing value, to identify the degree to which one decision is preferred
over another. The use of individual weighted scores of criteria to create an overall
score for each alternative solution is provided. Outranking methods generally involve
pairwise comparison of alternative criteria which are then combined to create a rank
order set of alternatives. Goal programming entails searching for the alternative that
most closely matches minimum levels of performance acceptance [166]. Below the
methods in each broad classification are discussed in more detail.
3.3.1 Value measurement methods
Value measurement methods require the construction and comparison of
numerical scores (individual and total value) to represent how one alternative is
preferred over another [161][167]. The aggregation rule for these models usually
uses a weighted sum approach. As shown by Marsh [161] and colleagues [167], value
measurement is the most common MCDA approach. Examples of these methods are
described below.
Additive Aggregation - Additive Aggregation is simple linear aggregation and
is a common MCDA approach. In this approach each score on each criterion is
multiplied by its weight and then the weighted scores are summed for the overall
score of that option and possibly compared with other options [153].
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Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) – AHP uses expert knowledge to create a
hierarchical structure for systematic alternative selection and justification problems.
AHP decomposes a difficult MCDA problem into a systematic hierarchy procedure
[168] then utilizes experts to prioritize the importance of individual criteria. AHP
assumes each criterion evaluated as independent of other criteria. AHP askes experts
to use an eigenvector method , where a linear transformation is created stretching
the X-Y line chart, during the prioritization process. Decision-makers are usually
more comfortable giving interval judgments than absolute value judgments. Using
feedback from experts, a matrix is prepared, indicating the relative importance of
criteria and alternatives for consideration.
Analytical Network Process (ANP) – ANP is a general form of AHP. The key
differentiator between AHP and ANP is that unlike AHP, ANP allows for consideration
of interdependence among criteria.
Hierarchical Decision Modeling (HDM) - HDM is a well-known tool that helps
provide a framework for quantifying subjective information so that effective
qualitative judgements may be made for decision-making purposes [169][170][171].
HDM breaks down complex issues into key components that can be singularly
identified and measured at the individual level with respect to criteria across multiple
levels of the hierarchy. Components are broken down into pairwise comparisons
segments, where industry experts can evaluate their relative preference of one
criterion over another as opposed to declaring an absolute preference. The constant
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sum approach requires experts to provide a numeric and relative value among
options to largely qualitative questions. The researcher can then validate each
expert’s opinion with other experts, thereby validating the evaluations. The key
differentiator between AHP and HDM is that AHP uses the eigenvector method for
creating values whereas HDM uses the constant-sum method.
Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) – MAUT considers additive value for
multiple objectives [172] considered “bundles”. AHP and HDM are sometimes
considered MAUT methods [173]. The MAUT process considers the perspective of a
decision maker through the use of utility functions or desirability curves. One of
MAUT’s strengths is that it accounts for uncertainty.
Program Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA) – PBMA is a framework
that helps decision-makers to reallocate resources so that benefits are maximized
[174]. Developed specifically for healthcare decision analysis, PBMA has eight stages:
choose a set of meaningful programs; identify current activity and expenditure in
those programs; identify improvements; weigh incremental costs and benefits;
prioritize; consult and consider changes; effect the changes; and evaluate progress
[174]. The decision maker is providing as much information as possible related to
the relative size of gains and losses related to reallocation and divestment of
resources. PBMA addresses the issue of allocation efficiency, maximizing the benefits
of available resources [175].
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3.3.2 Outranking methods
Outranking methods are based on a general concept of dominance using an
outranking relationship. Using pairwise comparison to prioritize criteria [154] for
the purposes of determining which alternative outranks another in relative
importance. Strict dominance, where one criterion is rigidly preferred over another
given criterion, is a requirement within these methods. Examples of these methods
are described below.
Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE) – ELECTRE is a method
for selecting the best choice, the choice with the greatest advantage and the lowest
level of conflict among criteria [176][177][178]. Sometimes known as the French
school of decision making, it was originally developed in 1965 by Bernard Roy.
Different versions of ELECTRE have been developed over time including ELECTRE I,
II, III, IV and TRI. ELECTRE I is intended for problems of selection, ELECTRE II, III,
and IV are intended for problems of ranking, and ELECTRE TRI is intended for
assignment problems. All methods follow the same basic concepts however they
differ according to type of problem and operational execution. ELECTRE requires
construction of one or more outranking relationships by first comparing pairs of
actions followed by coordination of indices based on information obtained in the first
phase. During the process some alternatives are eliminated which don’t meet the
defined minimum value.
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Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment of Evaluations
(PROMETHEE) – PROMETHEE is an outranking method that provides a framework
for decision making focused on conflicts and synergies and clusters of specific actions
[179]. PROMETHEE uses generalized criteria to facilitate inclusion of uncertainty.
According to Hyde [180] PROMETHEE is executed by identification of stakeholders,
selection of criteria, formulation of alternatives, weighting the criteria, assessment of
the performance of alternatives against the criteria, selection of the generalized
criterion function and associated indifference and preference values for each
criterion, sensitivity analysis, leading to a final recommendation.
Geometrical Analysis for Interactive Aid (GAIA) – GAIA is an extension of
PROMETHEE which provides graphical representation of the problem [181]. GAIA
strives to provide decision makers with information about the relationship between
criteria and alternatives [182].
3.3.3 Other Methods
Other methods aim to identify the alternative that best meets a predefined
level of achievement [183][161].

Using a mathematical formulation of the

satisfactory heuristic, a model that may not be optimal but is generally acceptable
[158]. The satisfaction model is focused on achieving a defined level of satisfactory
performance for each criterion by considering the preference of criteria in their order
of importance. The levels represent the ‘goals’, while an algorithm is used to identify
the alternatives that satisfy the goals in priority order [184]. These models may be
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thought of as an extension of linear programming that handles multiple, and
sometimes conflicting measures.
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solutions (TOPSIS) TOPSIS is based on the concept that the chosen alternative should have the shortest
geometric distance from the positive ideal solution (PIS) and the longest geometric
distance from the negative ideal solution (NIS) [185][186][187].

A series of

comparisons of these relative distances provides the preference order for the
alternatives. FUZZY TOPSIS method is sometimes used to evaluate the criteria in each
region and then all the criteria may be ranked based on the region [188].
3.3.4 Advantages and Limitations of Predominant MCDA Methods
The above listed MCDA methods have been applied widely across many
industries and for diverse problems. The Table 5 below illustrates a summary of the
most popular methods and their advantages as well as limitations.
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Table 5: Advantages and Limitations of Predominant MCDA Methods

The table above identifies classification of MCDA methods as derived from
Thokala and Duenas [184], Ishizaka and Nemery [189], and Belton and Stewart [190].
Other less popular methods are found in literature related to MCDA. Only
predominant methods have been identified in the preceding pages.
Most methods have seen improvement and evolution over time. Utilization of
outranking methods, like ELECTRE and PROMETHEE, which were prevalent early on
in the development of the MCDA field, have waned as use of value measurement
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approaches such as AHP and MAUT have increased. Recently combining different
methods has become commonplace in MCDA. The combination of multiple methods
addresses deficiencies that may be seen in certain methods [191]. Specific user needs
and decision problems must be evaluated to determine which MCDA approach is
most appropriate to use [161].
3.3.5 Appropriateness of HDM Combined with Delphi for Research
When considering the appropriateness of HDM for the proposed research the
following questions were considered:
•

Is the proposed methodology an effective method for assessing the
findings in literature related to information security programs in
healthcare such that a maturity index could be created?

•

Is the proposed methodology appropriate for assessing the multiple
criteria that are necessary for development of a mature information
security environment?

•

Does the proposed methodology allow for criteria with varying levels
of importance?

•

What level of effort is required to obtain necessary information to
build the model and is access to the necessary resources attainable?

•

Has the proposed methodology been proven successful in conducting
similar research or varied research in the same or similar industries?

•

Could the model be used for industries outside of healthcare?
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HDM is a way of documenting the framework for analysis of a given system.
There are several benefits to using HDM for analysis and decision-making purposes.
HDM permits complex issues to be presented to key stakeholders in understandable
ways by illustrating relationships among key criteria in a given decision. In the case
of HDM, the model allows for an easily understood aggregation of literature reviewed
and expert feedback, presented in a quantified manner with the intention of
presenting viable options to decision makers.
Strengths of HDM as a research method are as follows:
•

Provides a comprehensive abstraction of problem under
consideration;

•

Illustrates multi-level relationships among elements of model;

•

Aggregates the opinions in an easy to digest way for decision
makers;

•

Structures both qualitative and quantitative data in a single view;

•

Allows for variability of value for each criterion within the model;

•

Allows experts to express relative preference as opposed to
ultimate preference;

•

Constant sum model with scoring 0-100 is easily understood by
experts;

•

Experts can be engaged at a moderate effort level; and

•

Proves a reasonable tool for predicting outcomes.
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The mixed research methodology combining Hierarchical Decision Modeling
(HDM) and Delphi Method is well-suited to the proposed research.

Obtaining

validated sources of data related to information security is challenging due to both
limited prior research in this field as well as the confidential nature of information
security work in general. Information security professionals and organizations do
not freely discuss their risks and vulnerabilities for fear that those weaknesses will
be exploited.

Similar challenges have been faced by others in the emerging

technology space. Gerdsri and Kocaoglu applied Delphi method to collect data from
industry experts in order to validate strategic information about emerging
technologies [192]. The Delphi method is used when basic demographic, economic or
historical information is inadequate to conduct desired research [193][194]. Delphi
is a way of structuring communication among a group of experts such that they are
able to contribute their expertise independent of one another, so as not to be unduly
be influenced by one another. The key characteristics of Delphi are as follows:
•

Anonymity – members of the group are not aware of the specific
composition of the group.

•

Iteration – members of the group are asked questions in several
stages and are often allowed to change their opinions in each stage.

•

Group Analysis – at each iteration the group’s responses are measured
in aggregate providing information such as mean, median and
variability.
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Using this blended approach allows for dynamic discussion panels to be used
in constructing the original hierarchy and defining criteria as findings of literature
review are validated by mutual agreement of experts, followed by Delphi, a means of
providing anonymous feedback, which aids in mitigating the potential bias created by
strong personalities for actual quantification of the criteria within the HDM. Phan
states that “…this process (HDM) makes the experts more comfortable because their
decisions are based on the relative preference of one criterion over another rather
than an absolute preference” [195]. Further, HDM is an effective method for this
specific research in that it allows for both qualitative as well as quantitative data to
be incorporated in the model [196]. HDM is effective at illustrating multi-level
relationships and posing alternatives in a systematic and quantitative way [197].
HDM has demonstrated success as an appropriate methodology for evaluating
multi criteria decisions [195][197][198]. HDM has been used to provide frameworks
for solving research questions in strategic planning [197][199][200][201], healthcare
[202][203][204][205][206], organizational change [207] and technology fields
[208][209][210][211][212][213][214][215][216][217][218].

In a recent and

relevant example Phan used HDM to calculate an innovation index for sustainable
technology [195].
Given the well-documented success of HDM across industries and problem
types, the complex nature of the research problem and the effective mitigation
strategies for limitations of the model, HDM is an effective method for application to
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the issue of creating a maturity index for information security in healthcare
environments.
3.4

Expert Judgement

Utilization of expert panels in creating models for complex decision making,
where limited quantitative data is available, is broadly supported in the literature
across many industries [154][158][159] and specifically in the healthcare industry
[155][219][220].
Experts are individuals who have deep knowledge of a specific skill or area
and are not likely to be challenged by others.

Fink [221] defines experts as

“representative of their profession, have power to implement findings…not likely to
be challenged as experts in the field…”. McKenna [222] defines as “a panel of informed
individuals’, therefore the “expert” title is applied. It is important to identify the
criteria by which you determine the composition of the expert panel prior to the
conduct of research [223]. ISC2 , an international organization that provides the
industry standard in information security credentials, defines an information security
expert as having the following qualifications [224]:
•

Advanced theoretical knowledge proven by international
certifications;

•

Practical experience in applying security;
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•

Ability to communicate with all levels, according to their level of
understanding, from board level to end-user;

•

Ability to find solutions which are not in books and prioritize them;

•

Ability to view the risks beyond the obvious and act upon - be
proactive and not reactive; and

•

Ability to choose a solution which represents a fair trade-off between
security and usability.

3.4.1 Validation
Expert panels are used to validate the constructs, content and relative
importance of criteria within multi-criteria decision models as shown in Table 6
below [225].
Table 6: Summary of Expert Panel Application to Model

Validity

What is measured

Construct

The degree to which a measure
relates to expectations formed
from theory for hypothetical
construct

Content

Degree to which the content of the
items adequately represents the
universe of all relevant items under
study
Degree to which the criterion can
capture the true value of the
variable

Criterionrelated

Methods
Judgmental
Correlation
Convergent-discrimination
Factor analysis
Multi-trait/multi-method
Judgmental

Judgmental
Correlation
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3.4.2 Selecting Experts
Careful consideration is required selecting experts to ensure that they will be
relatively impartial when providing feedback as well as be up-to-date on current
knowledge and perceptions in their field of expertise [226]. The relationship among
experts as well as the relationship of experts to particular organizations should be
carefully considered when developing expert panels. By definition, experts are
intimately familiar with the given topic and as such may be biased, or perceived to be
biased, based on their industry relationships.

As an example, in the case of

information security experts, an expert that worked for a particular software vendor
could be perceived as providing feedback through the research process that if enacted
would drive business back to the organization that employed them. Bias may also be
introduced if experts are permitted to discuss research questions with one another.
Strong voices or personalities in the community may influence the thinking of a panel
of experts thereby skewing the feedback received. Additionally, experts must be
provided some level of flexibility in their ability to provide feedback. A rigid feedback
structure (e.g., structured survey without option for additional feedback) could be
limiting and as such would not take full advantage of the experts’ knowledge. Finally,
the ability to access experts in some fields, especially emerging fields, and the
willingness of those experts to participate in research activity may be limited.
When identifying experts and forming panels it is important to recognize that
different levels of the research model may require different kinds of expert feedback.
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As such a variety of expert panels, with varying perspectives and skills sets, may be
required for a single model. For example, in the case of researching the development
of an information security maturity model for healthcare organizations, it might be
appropriate to have the highest level of information privacy and security experts (e.g.,
Chief Information Officer or Chief Integrity Officers) be on the panel that validates the
mission level of the hierarchy. Responding to questions like, “Does this mission
statement make sense?”, “Is this question worthy of research?” A second panel could
be identified to validate the objectives that are most likely to measure information
security maturity. This panel might consist of Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs). Further, a number of smaller panels could be developed that would focus on
each of the goal level criteria, and yet another to focus on strategic level criteria. It is
likely that some of these smaller panels would consist of Certified Information
Security Professions (CISSPs) who have deep knowledge of technical solutions.
The size of expert panels should also be considered when developing research
models. There are varying opinions on optimal panel size. Okoli and Pawlowski [227]
propose that a panel of 10 to 18 members produce the best results, while others [228]
suggest that 6 to 12 member panels produce optimal results. Small expert panels
have been shown to effectively produce valid results using Delphi method
[229][230][231]. Delphi method is especially helpful when the pool of experts is
limited.
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Information may be gathered from experts through a variety of methods.
Common approaches are surveys, interviews, group processes, individual meetings
and Delphi. Regardless of method, researchers need to provide experts with a
comprehensive and easily understood research background, clear instruction on
perspective or parameters of the questions being posed, and instructions related to
measurement of response, as well as any other information that might ensure reliable
responses from experts.
3.4.3 Inconsistency in Expert Judgements
As part of the model modification process inconsistency and disagreement
among experts must be considered. While experts provide valuable insight to criteria
selection and evaluation, their input is subjective, and as such, the opinions of specific
experts may change or vary over time resulting in inconsistency in expert
feedback. Inconsistency can be defined as disagreement within an individual’s
responses. For example, suppose an expert was asked to compare three modes of
transportation when going to the grocery store: (a) riding a bike, (b) walking, and (c)
driving. The expert responds that he prefers riding a bike to walking (a>b) and
walking to driving (b>c). If the expert later responded that he preferred driving to
riding a bike (c>a) this would demonstrate an inconsistent response.

In this

illustration the inconsistency would be labeled ordinal, the general order of
preference. Ordinal consistency does not take into account the level of preference
among available choices. Experts are often asked to provide measures of preference
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when responding to prioritized choices. For example, an expert might be asked how
much they prefer riding a bike when compared with walking (e.g., 2X), and how much
they prefer walking to driving. (e.g., 3X). In this example, if asked, the expert would
have to respond that they preferred riding a bike to driving by 6X otherwise cardinal
consistency, or the level of preference, would be violated. It is worth noting that if
cardinal consistency is satisfied, then ordinal consistency is satisfied as well, but the
inverse is not true.
The importance of measuring and managing consistency in Hierarchical
Decision Models (HDM) is critical. Kocaoglu’s research [219][232][233] provides a
clear definition of inconsistency and uses a variance-based approach for calculation
of inconsistency in HDMs. Further, Kocaoglu recommends a 10% limit above which
the reliability of expert feedback would be considered questionable. At the 10% level
or greater expert feedback may be unreliable, as consistency of response is a critical
factor in acceptance of feedback into the model. This recommendation is consistent
with Saaty’s [198] proposed consistency ratio with an upper limit of 10% for
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) models. Portland State University’s Department
of Engineering and Technology Management has created ©HDM software [234]
which calculates inconsistency in experts compared against the 10% threshold
discussed above, using the arithmetic mean of the standard deviation as shown
below.
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𝑛

1
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = ∑ 𝜎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1

Any value which exceeds the 10% threshold would be worthy of deeper
examination.
A new model for measurement of inconsistency in HDM was recently
proposed by Abbas [235].

This new model provides a more flexible and less

conservative approach to the standard 10% threshold recommended by Saaty and
Kocaoglu. Abbas posits that the 10% threshold is overly conservative and that
acceptable levels of inconsistency can be measured using the Root Sum Variance
(RSV) method illustrated below. In Abbas’ model the number of decision elements
and alpha (α) level are linked for the purposes of evaluating the soundness and
validity of the judgment.
𝑛

𝑅𝑆𝑉 = √∑ 𝜎𝑖2
𝑖=1

where:
𝜎𝑖2 is the variance of the mean of the ith decision element,
n is the number of decision elements:

𝑛!

1
𝜎𝑖 = √ ∑(𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥̅ 𝑖𝑗 )2
𝑛!

∀ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛

𝑗=1

66

where:
𝑥𝑖𝑗 is the normal relative value of the variable i for the jth orientation in
nth factorial orientations;
𝑥̅ 𝑖𝑗 is the mean of the normalized relative value of the variable I for the
jth orientation:
𝑛!

1
𝑥̅ 𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛!
𝑗=1

When inconsistencies are identified in expert opinion the most important
mitigation strategy is to carefully review the process by which the research is
administered as well as review of the research instrument itself to ensure quality,
clarity and consistency of information presented [236].

For example, if an

inconsistency were identified for a specific expert, the researcher might re-run the
analysis without that individual expert’s contribution to determine if the overall value
of the criteria changed. If the overall value of the criteria did not change then it would
be appropriate to assume the expert’s inconsistency did not negatively impact the
model. Utilization of Delphi method also helps provide a measure of control such
that any single expert’s opinion would not have a significant negative impact on the
model.
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3.4.4 Disagreement Among Experts
In addition to the potential risk for inconsistency in expert feedback when
using HDM, it is also possible that there will be disagreement among the experts. It is
not altogether uncommon for experts to disagree. This could be due to a number of
factors including professional or personal experiences of individuals. There are also
issues that could cause disagreement among experts based on research design. Some
disagreements may simply be the outcome of misunderstandings of individual
experts. It is important to understand the key drivers leading to disagreement and to
clarify any potential misunderstanding. Clarity and level of detail provided in the
questions posed to experts is critical in mitigating the risk of disagreement. The risk
of disagreement may also be mitigated by ensuring that each expert panel is assigned
at the appropriate level in the decision model.
In order to determine if disagreement among experts exists two statistical
methods are commonly used: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC or ric) and F-test
with hypothesis testing. ICC provides an assessment of the degree to which all
experts agree by comparing the means among the judgements of experts to determine
high or low disagreement between the range of zero (0) and one (1). Zero represents
absolute disagreement and one represents ultimate agreement. A value of >.07 is
considered strong agreement [238][239]. The formula for ICC is provided below:
𝑟𝑖𝑐 =

𝑀𝑆𝐵𝑆 − 𝑀𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐵𝑆 + (𝑘 − 1)𝑀𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑛 (𝑀𝑆𝐵𝐽 − 𝑀𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 )
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where:
MSBS is the mean square between decision elements,
MSres is mean residual square,
MSBJ is the mean square between experts,
k is the number of experts,
n is the number of decision elements
𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝐵𝑆

𝑀𝑆𝐵𝑆 =

𝑛

𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑆 = ∑ [
𝑖=1

(∑ 𝑆𝑖 )2
(∑ 𝑋𝑇 )2
]−
𝑘
𝑛𝑘

𝑑𝑓𝐵𝑆 = 𝑛 − 1
𝑀𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 =

𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑑𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠

𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑆𝑆𝑇 − 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐽 − 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠 = (𝑛 − 1)(𝑘 − 1)
𝑆𝑆𝑇 = ∑ 𝑋𝑇2 −
𝑀𝑆𝐵𝐽 =

𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐽
𝑑𝑓𝐵𝐽
𝑘

𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐽

(∑ 𝑋𝑇 )2
𝑛𝑘

2

(∑ 𝑋𝑇 )2
(∑ 𝑋𝑗 )
= ∑[
]−
𝑛
𝑛𝑘
𝑗=1

𝑑𝑓𝐵𝐽 = 𝑘 − 1
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In order to increase confidence of assessment of disagreement Shrout and
Fleiss [240] propose conducting a hypothesis testing procedure (F-test) as well. The
null hypothesis (H0) would indicate significant disagreement among experts. Each Fvalue is calculated and compared against the F-critical value to determine if the null
hypothesis can be rejected. If H0 is rejected, it can be concluded that no significant
disagreement is present among experts. F-value and F-critical values are computed
readily using the ©HDM Software created by the Engineering and Technology
Management Department at Portland State University.
Is disagreement among experts is identified using the techniques described
above, the Hierarchical Clustering Method (HCM) may be used to identify individuals
or groups that are similar. Analyzing these grouping can help to determine the cause
of disagreement and in some cases identify groupings of experts that create better
alignment. Hogaboam [220] used HCM techniques to create sub-groups within her
expert panels that diminished disagreement on specific panels while leaving model
alternatives unchanged.
The techniques described above allow for disagreement to be identified and
analyzed by comparing similarities and differences among sub-groups of experts.
Analyzing the cause of disagreement can provide valuable information to inform the
research process and outcomes.
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3.5 Research Approach
It is clear from the literature review that due to the complexity of the issue a
multi-criteria approach to decision making and evaluation of effectiveness of
information security environments is required. It is also important to note that much
of the information available to evaluate this issue is not publicly available due to the
inherent risk associated with sharing information security knowledge relative to
individual organizations. Further, current evaluation of the criteria that are typically
identified as important to a strong environment of information security have been
judged so through a qualitative process and have not been quantified.
The structured process illustrated in Figure 10 below was designed to guide
this research.
Figure 10: Structured Research Process
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Key steps of this process are discussed below:
Model Development and Validation – Conduct a comprehensive literature
review to define the key objectives, goals and outputs related to information security
maturity and develop a generalizable model which represents appropriate
relationships among these elements. Use panel of industry experts to validate model
for information security maturity.
Data Collection and Analysis – Utilize validated model to design research
instrument to quantify data and create desirability curves by obtaining expert
judgement. Analyze data for inconsistency and disagreement levels.
Validate and Test – Validate and test research instrument by conducting case
studies to obtain metrics from representative healthcare organization. Analyze and
document results.
3.5.1 HDM as a framework
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was introduced by Saaty [198] as
multi-criteria decision model (MCDM) capable of deconstructing a problem into
hierarchical levels of linked components. The Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) is
similar to AHP in providing a hierarchical approach to problem solving but differs in
using a constant sum approach to quantifying judgements as opposed to the
eigenvector approach used by AHP. HDM is well-known for providing a framework
for quantifying subjective information so that effective qualitative judgements may
be made for decision-making purposes [169][170][171]. A key capability of HDM is
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the ability to quantify expert judgement thereby incorporating both structured and
unstructured data into the model. HDM breaks down complex issues into key
components that can be singularly identified and measured at the individual level
with respect to criteria across multiple levels of the hierarchy. Components are
broken down into pairwise comparison segments, where industry experts can
evaluate a level of preference of one criterion over another as opposed to declaring
an absolute preference. The constant sum approach requires experts to provide a
numeric and relative value among options to largely qualitative questions. The
researcher can then verify each expert’s opinion with that of other experts, thereby
validating the proposed model and documenting values across multiple opinions.
HDM models have been broadly used to compare technology options for decades.
Phan [171] used HDM to create a framework of determining the level of
innovativeness within organizations in the semi-conductor industry. Gibson [240]
utilized HDM to create a measurement system for evaluating the performance of
engineering and science research centers. Tran [225] used HDM to develop an index
to measure the effectiveness of a technology transfer office based upon fulfillment of
the stated mission. Estep [241] developed a technology transfer score for evaluating
research proposals using HDM. These researchers effectively used the HDM method
to construct measures of effectiveness in fields where data is both qualitative and
quantitative.
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Introduced by Cleland and Kocaoglu [232] in 1981, HDM is well-suited for
evaluation of a problem based on mission, objectives, goals, strategies, and
activities/actions (MOGSA). Figure 11 [219] below is a generalized form of the
MOGSA framework typically utilized in developing HDMs.
Figure 11: Generalized Hierarchical Decision Model

The purpose of the model is placed at the top of the hierarchy at the “mission”
level. Organizational “objectives” associated with the mission are located at the next
lower level in the model. “Goals” associated with each objective are documented in
the third level of the model, followed by “strategies” related to the defined goals.
Measurement of the desirability of strategies leads to the creation of a number of
actions or alternatives that might be considered to meet the stated mission. In the
case of developing an index for measuring information security maturity, various
alternatives will ultimately be identified that align with defined maturity levels. Some
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strategies will certainly contribute more than others to the overall maturity index.
The relative value of each strategy will be determined by experts.
Experts will be utilized at various stages of the research process. When
collecting expert feedback to validate the model’s content and construct a structured
Delphi process will be used.
3.5.2 Delphi
The Delphi method in an iterative multi-step process designed to elicit expert
opinions and achieve group consensus from different stakeholder perspectives
[242][243][244]. Delphi is a popular method used in healthcare research
[222][223][245]. The initial research instrument used for model validation will
include the opportunity for experts to provide qualitative feedback, which will then
be fed back to the experts in subsequent assessment [223]. The Delphi method is
used when basic demographic, economic or historical information is inadequate to
conduct desired research [193][246]. Delphi is a way of structuring communication
among a group of experts such that they are able to contribute their expertise
independent of one another, so as not to be unduly influenced by one another. The
Delphi method and the HDM are frequently combined when using expert panels to
validate model construct and content [240][220].
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3.5.3 Desirability Curves
A comprehensive review of literature identified objectives, goals and
strategies as key elements required to measure the maturity of information security
within any given organization. A generalizable model was developed and presented
to experts for validation of content and construction.
Estep, Gibson, Phan and Tran [195][26] [240][241] all used desirability curves
in the conduct of their research. The purpose of desirability curves is to identify how
“desirable” or valuable a specific metric is to decision makers. Estep [241] used the
mathematical representation below when incorporating the influence of desirability
curves in creating a healthcare information security maturity score:

Desirability curves will be used in conduct of future research when a
comprehensive model is prepared.
3.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, two measures of sensitivity analysis must
be conducted when validating HDMs – inconsistency and disagreement.
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Inconsistency is related to individual expert’s responses when responding to
quantification of the model. In general, inconsistency should be measured at less than
10% for valid results. Disagreement among experts must also be measured. Experts
are likely to have some variability in responses across expert populations, but there
should be general consistency to validate the model. If disagreement is identified, a
deeper analysis must be conducted to determine the cause of disagreement and
appropriate mitigation efforts should be employed.
3.5.5 Challenges and Mitigation Strategy
There are two notable challenges associated with the proposed application of
HDM. First, as the number of criteria for evaluation increases, quantification of each
criterion can become difficult. Second, as new technologies are identified the whole
series of judgement measurement may need to be repeated. In order to mitigate this
challenge a composite index, sometimes called a “technology value”, will be
developed by combining the relative values of each strategy along with desirability
scores for each strategy. In doing so, a semi-absolute value for each strategy’s impact
on the named objectives will be created and utilized instead of a relative value [247].
3.5.6 Limitations of Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) with Delphi
The research uses a Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) to assess the ways in
which an information security maturity index is created for healthcare organizations.
HDM relies on expert judgement to validate the criteria relevant to the model and
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apply weighting to said criteria. In this way, HDM provides a comprehensive view of
the issue under consideration in a way that is easily understood by decision makers.
Like any multi criteria decision model, HDM has both strengths and
weaknesses. The key limitations of HDM are noted below.
Risk of using experts to validate and quantify model. While utilization of
experts can be extremely valuable where quantitative data is hard to obtain, there is
risk of both inconsistency in expert feedback and disagreement among experts. This
risk can be mitigated with sensitivity analysis and the strategies identified previously.
In addition, results of expert opinion are highly subjective and experts are sometimes
difficult to access. Careful selection of experts and reliable access to industry experts
is required to mitigate this limitation.
Risk associated with pairwise comparisons. The number of pairwise
comparison required to describe the issue in a comprehensive way can be significant.
This can not only be a deterrent to expert participation, but can also cause fatigue in
experts leading to rushed or not well considered feedback [248][249]. This risk was
mitigated by careful structure of the expert panel groups and by limiting the number
of comparisons in each iteration. In addition, the framework of collecting data (e.g.,
pairwise comparisons) can be considered restrictive. This risk was mitigated by
careful validation of the criteria of the hierarchical model prior to quantification of
the model, including providing paths for experts to provide unsolicited feedback at
the model development stage.
78

Risk of overgeneralization. There is a tendency for HDM to be thought of as a
solution rather than a model to be used to inform decisions. It must be made clear
that the model is not a specific answer to a given problem but rather a tool to be used
by decision makers.
Durability of model over time. HDM is well suited to complex issues in
emerging fields. However, that specific fit also poses a risk as these emerging fields
may be rapidly changing. This model will need to be revisited over time to ensure it
remains relevant.
3.5.7 Identification of Information Security Experts for Panels
Experts are a valuable resource to the research community. There are a
number of well-known methods for identifying industry experts. Some of those
methods are identified below.
Snowball sampling uses a small pool of initial contacts to identify other
participants who meet the eligibility criteria and could potentially contribute to a
specific study [250]. The term "snowball sampling" reflects an analogy to a snowball
increasing in size as it rolls downhill. This method of acquiring experts is best used
where it is difficult to identify experts but has limitations in that it is non-random and
has a high incidence of community bias.
Citation analysis is a method of identifying experts based on an analysis of
citations of published documents [251]. This popular and long used method of
identifying academic experts works well in identifying academic experts on a given
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subject, but it is less valuable when there may be a limited number of experts
published in emerging fields or when operational industry knowledge is required.
Social network analysis is a method of identifying experts by mapping
relationships among individuals, web pages, organizations and other connected units
of measure [252].

Nodes in the network analysis are individuals and groups

associated with key identifying labels (e.g., information security). While effective at
identifying relationships that may not be readily apparent, it can also present
anomalies and as a result is sometimes less reliable and requires additional validation
[219].
National expert databases may be purchased from a variety of sources. These
databases are culled from numerous sources and generally sold for the purpose of
sales leads. While they may be used as a source of information to define industry
experts they are often out of date, non-granular and expensive to acquire.
Professional organizations are yet another source for identifying subject
matter experts that may serve as resources in expert panels. Most professional
organization rosters have the benefit of self-affiliation. In other words, individuals
identify themselves as experts in a given field and seek to join these organizations in
order to be part of a community of interest to share best practices, access to one
another, and up-to-date industry information. It can be challenging to gain access to
a list of members if one is not a member of said organizations. Many professional
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organizations do not provide lists of their members to others, some do provide access
to list of members but often this is provided at a substantial fee.
For the conduct of this research, this researcher has the benefit of access to a
number of professional organizations in both the information security and healthcare
information technology fields. Below is a list of some organizations that could be
accessed to identify experts in information security.
CompTIA is a non-profit trade association, dedicated to advancing the
interests of IT professionals and IT vendor organizations. They provide education,
certifications, advocacy and philanthropy as well as networking opportunities for IT
professionals. https://www.comptia.org/
EC-Council is a member-based organization dedicated to providing resources
to information security professionals. The organization provides training standards
for

education

and

certifications

as

well

as

forensic

resources.

https://www.eccouncil.org/#
GIAC – Global Information Assurance Certification is a professional
organization

focused

on

certification

of

information

professionals.

https://www.giac.org/
ISACA is a non-profit organization committed to providing information on
development and adoption of information security best practices to professionals in
the field. http://www.isaca.org/about-isaca/Pages/default.aspx
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(ISC)2 – International Information System Security Certification is an
organization that specializing in providing certification to information security
professionals. Their Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP) is the
industry standard. https://www.isc2.org/
ISSA – Information Systems Security Association is a non-profit, memberbased organization dedicated to providing a community of best practice for
information security professionals. They provide educational forums, publications
and peer interaction opportunities. http://www.issa.org/
In addition to the professional organizations identified above, focused broadly
on information security, there is also a single professional organization specifically
focused on information security professionals in the healthcare industry.
AEHIS – Association for Executive in Health Information Security
http://www.issa.org/ was founded in 2014 and offers a professional development
and networking forum for Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), and other topranking information security leaders, in the healthcare sector.

AEHIS provides

educational resources, networking opportunities and other resources related to both
information security and information privacy. Although it has a brief history, it was
created by CHIME, the College of Health Information Management Executives
https://chimecentral.org/ , an organization that brings 25 years of experience as the
industry leading professional organization for healthcare information technology
professionals. Through membership in CHIME, individuals are permitted access to
82

send member-to-member surveys to CHIME and AEHIS members. CHIME currently
has more than 3,000 members.
CHIME and AEHIS members are ideal candidates in the development of expert
panels for the conduct of research associated with developing a maturity model for
information security in healthcare organizations. As such, due to researcher’s access
to CHIME and AEHIS database as a member of CHIME, these organizational
membership lists served as the foundation of all expert panels. In addition, a number
of panel members were identified through social networks of the researcher.
3.5.8 Expert Panel Development
This study used a multi-stage process where a total of fifty-one selected
experts formed six discrete panels to validate, and then quantify, model elements.
Many experts met the criteria to serve on multiple panels and agreed to participate
in such. A seventh panel was created to validate and quantify metrics of desirability.
An original candidate pool of 214 potential experts was culled from the CHIME
members (3,337) and AEHIS membership (900) lists as noted above. Care was taken
to ensure that no more than one person from any given healthcare organization was
identified as a potential participant, that all experts held a title of either Chief
Information Officer, Chief Privacy Officer, or Chief Information Security Officer, and
that they remained employed in the field of health information security. In addition,
experts were selected from a variety of healthcare organization types: academic
medical centers, critical access hospitals, small stand-alone community hospitals,
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mid-size stand-alone community hospitals, large healthcare systems and integrated
delivery networks.

Finally, experts were selected with the objective of broad

geographic representation across the United States in mind.
An invitation was sent to all candidates requesting participation in the
research study. The invitation identified the researcher as both a student and a
colleague in order to obtain greater likelihood of participation. Those that agreed to
participate received consent forms, a summary of

the proposed research and

targeted research collection instruments. A copy of all research instruments is
provided in Appendix A.
Of the fifty-one consenting subject matter experts, thirty-five were Chief
Information Officers (CIO), five were Chief Privacy Officers (CPO), and eleven were
Chief Information Security Officers (CISO). A comprehensive list of experts, identified
by organization type but not specific affiliation in order to protect confidentiality, can
be found in Appendix B-2. Each panel was created taking into consideration the
specific skill set of the given subject matter expert. For example, expert panel P1 was
used to validate the literature based HDM. CIO, CPO and CISO experts were selected
for participation in this panel due to their broad knowledge of information security.
These experts assessed the overall landscape of information security and the
objectives and goals that have influence on the stated mission of the model. As
illustrated below in Figure 12 overlap in panels occurs as some experts serve support
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roles for multiple functions: validation, quantification, and development of
desirability curves.
Figure 12: Expert Functions

A comprehensive list of each panel is provided in Appendix B-1.
3.5.8 Data collection and analysis approach
As noted earlier in this chapter, Delphi method was used to facilitate data
collection for the conduct of this research. This method uses a series of surveys to
obtain feedback at controlled intervals in a structured way from a variety of
perspectives. This method was used to validate the construction and content of the
HDM model. For example, in phase 1 of this research expert opinion was obtained
using well-defined yes/no acceptance to validate model criteria. Agreement rate of
80% is acceptable [234]. This model’s strength is a transparency which leads to
consensus; however, it can inhibit unique feedback. In order to mitigate this concern,
an open text box was provided to experts to facilitate collection of additional feedback
related to the model. Results of this process are provided in Appendix C.
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Once the model has been validated each element must be quantified. For this
second phase of research experts were presented with pair-wise comparisons
through a carefully designed online quantification instrument provide by Portland
State University Engineering Management Department’s HDM software. The HDM
software uses a constant-sum method for allocating 100 points between two model
elements. Distribution of the 100 points provides a relative importance under the
parent element. The values are then normalized relative to each related element. The
process results in an overall value rating for each element with respect to the linked
objective in the decision model.
The HDM software also provides analysis for inconsistency and disagreement
as discussed previously. Research instruments and data collection are provided in
Appendix D.
3.5.10 Case studies
Five case studies were developed to illustrate how the model calculates a score
and how these scores can be used to conduct a comparative analysis and develop a
roadmap for improvement of the information security environment. The following
organization types were identified as case study candidates in order to confirm the
maturity model was appropriate for both small and large healthcare organizations.
•

Critical Access Hospital

•

Stand-alone Community Hospital
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•

Integrated Delivery Network

•

Large Healthcare System (more than one hospital and over 500 beds)

•

Academic Medical Center

Case studies were conducted through interviews with highest level
information technology executive at each site. The results of case study were
presented to experts to determine the degree to which the model effectively reflected
the actual performance of each site. Ideally an external evaluation of case study
results would be conducted, however the confidential nature of information security
and the lack of publicly available data related to information security makes such an
assessment infeasible at this time. Gibson successfully utilized the approach of expert
self-assessment in her study related to the development of a measurement system for
collaborative research centers [240].
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CHAPTER 4: HDM DEVELOPMENT

The hierarchical decision model (HDM) provides a flexible and stratified
structure for decision making. The purpose of the model is to determine the maturity
level to which a given healthcare organization has created a strong information
security program. It is a generalizable model that outputs a performance evaluation
score for a healthcare organization by evaluating a comprehensive set of metrics.
At the top of the model, the objective is the organizational maturity score. At
the second level, objectives represent areas or categories of information security
protection. At the third level, goals are identified which relate to each information
security objective. Finally, desirability curves are used to measure each goal. The
remainder of this chapter documents the model elements, their links to one another,
and shows how the generalizable model is constructed.
4.1 Objectives
The following five information security objectives were identified:
1.

Organizational support for information security;

2.

Information security policies and standards;

3.

Information security awareness and training;

4.

Information security technical hygiene; and

5.

Mitigation of external threats.
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These objectives were derived by exhaustive review of existing literature
related to cybersecurity, feedback from experts and by review of the cybersecurity
frameworks themselves such as NIST [97], HITRUST [99], CIS [253], ONC [5]. Each of
the five objectives is discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
4.1.1 Organizational support for information security
Organizational support is a key pillar of successful information security
programs and can be defined as a high level of support for information security,
including support at the Board level of the organization. Support is demonstrated by
engagement and understanding of information security risk by modeling behaviors
and by provision of financial support. The original model was modified from
“leadership support” to explicitly named “Board of Directors” level support based on
feedback from subject matter experts.

As seen in broadly publicized recent

information security incidents at healthcare organizations, such as the incident at
Scripps Health [254], the potential for reputational harm to organizations who
experience information security incidents is high.
4.1.2 Information security policies and standards
Information security policies and standards are of critical importance to any
cybersecurity framework and are especially important in highly regulated healthcare
organizations [5]. Organizations who document their information security policies
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and procedures, update them routinely, and make them available to all users of
technology are likely to have a more robust information security environment.
4.1.3 Information security awareness and training
Human behavior is a significant factor in information security environments
[27]. When workforce members possess an understanding and acceptance about the
need for all organizational members to protect information assets, organizations are
better positioned to have a mature information security environment. Through
diverse training and awareness events, organizations can share information with
organizational members about the risks and risk mitigation strategies related to
information security and thereby improve their performance. During the model
validation process two subject matter experts called out the need to reinforce the
notion of “shared accountability”- i.e., information security is not a singular IT
responsibility but rather it is everyone’s responsibility. This is a common theme in
speaking with information security professionals.

In order to incorporate this

feedback into the model this objective definition was modified to reflect this interest.
4.1.4 Information security technical hygiene
Information systems require active system maintenance in order to prohibit
information security vulnerabilities. Organizations that implement technology and
process controls to maintain system health are well positioned to minimize their
information security risks and improve their information security maturity. Routine
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technical hygiene is the foundation of information security best practices, as is well
documented in all cybersecurity frameworks [96][97][99][253].
4.1.5 Mitigation of external threats
External information security threats are pervasive [255], as recent
cybersecurity incidents in healthcare organizations [29][31] illustrate. Organizations
with mature information security programs implement technical controls to mitigate
external threats.

These tools help organizations understand when restricted data

may have left the organization, minimize incoming spam, which may be phishing
attempts, and prevent and detect unauthorized users from accessing an
organization’s network.
The original HDM model consisted of a single goal related to technology
controls; however, given the high volume of expert feedback received, the original
goal of “technical controls” was split into two goals 4.1.4 and 4.1.5, information
security technical hygiene and mitigation of external threats respectively. The high
volume of feedback is unsurprising given the vast number of technical controls
available and the technical orientation of the subject matter experts.
4.2 Goals and Outputs
Each of the five objectives noted above has either four or five associated
measurable goals. As the model was finalized the Delphi method was extremely useful
in validating the goals associated with each objective, clarifying goal definitions, as
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well as identifying new goals where it is required to ensure a comprehensive model.
Each of these goals is documented below with appropriate details where the model
changed over time to response to the feedback of subject matter experts.
4.2.1 Organization Support - Governance
Established governance processes are key components of existing
cybersecurity frameworks [97] and are critical in shining a spotlight on the risks
associated with poor information security in healthcare organizations including
compliance risk [50][55]. Robust governance systems also aid in assuring that
information security solutions are mindful of needs of the business to continue to
operate. A framework to provide assurance that information security strategies are
aligned with business objectives as well as applicable laws and regulations is
fundamental to a successful information security program.
All subject matter experts agreed that a comprehensive governance structure
is required, with the exception of one SME who did not think governance was
required upon initial evaluation of model. Follow up was provided by this expert
which indicated that they believed that governance, while “not unimportant, was the
least important of the goals identified under the organizational support objective”.
4.2.2 Organization Support - Leadership and management
Information security professionals have long faced the challenge of engaging
organizational leadership and management in support of a strong information
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security culture. Often information security is thought of as the responsibility of
technology professionals as opposed to the responsibility of all at the organization.
Technology alone will not provide the level of protection required. Strong support
from leadership and management, including organizational Board members, who are
engaged in understanding information security risk [75] and model behaviors to
protect organizational assets is an important driver in culture change and
sustainability of effective information security programs. A regular review of key
performance indicators by leadership ensures that the philosophy of consistent
improvement is embedded in information security programs [50][65].
Subject matter experts uniformly agreed to the importance of this goal and
requested the definition be explicit about the importance of board engagement.
4.2.3 Organizational Support - Resource availability
Information security programs require diverse resources in order to be
successful – people, tools and community engagement [50][53]. Most healthcare
organizations are woefully under-resourced to respond to the current cyberthreat
landscape [256]. Successful programs must have assurances that adequate financial
resources are available to support information security [256], including dedicated
information security resources. While closely linked to governance and leadership
support, provisioning of adequate resources

is a discrete need of successful

programs.
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Subject matter experts agreed that resource availability was worthy of a
discrete goal within the model. Two experts noted that dedicated information
security resources were required and as a result the goal description was revised to
include this clarity in definition.
4.2.4 Organizational Support - Risk assessment, risk management,
disaster recovery and incidence response
Regular risk assessments are a foundational element of existing cybersecurity
frameworks [79][253] and are specifically called out by the office of the national
coordinator for health information technology’s guide to privacy and security of
health information [5]. The companion product to the risk assessment is a risk
management plan, providing the ability to manage known organizational risks [257].
Subject matter experts broadly agreed with the inclusion of risk assessment
and risk management plan as a model criterion. They also suggested that disaster
recovery and associated incident response plan where appropriate to include within
this portfolio of assessment and response tools. The model and associated definition
were revised to include these interests.
In summary, the suite of tools required to support a mature information
security environment within the context of organization support are an unbiased
information security risk assessment performed on a regular basis and used to
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commit to the development and execution of a risk management plan as well as a
disaster recovery and associated incident response plan.
4.2.5 Policies and Standards - Policy documentation and awareness
Policies are used to define the rules by which an organization agrees to operate
and are important in the realm of information security programs. A set of policies
issued and updated regularly by the organization to ensure that all members
understand requirements related to information security is a baseline expectation for
information security programs [37][55][79] to ensure that not only are shared
interests understood but also to enable compliance with federal and state laws..
Policies should be accessible [52] and well communicated to organizational members.
Compliance with policies should be routinely audited.
All subject matter experts agreed with inclusion of this criterion in the model,
with the exception of one SME who did not think policy documentation and
awareness was required. Four subject matter experts suggested that auditing of
compliance with policies was also necessary. This audit interest was included in the
final definition of the model element.
4.2.6 Policies and Standards - Procedure documentation and awareness
Information security procedures are the companion to information security,
essentially providing the “how” of compliance related to procedures.

A set of

procedures that are updated regularly and provide guidance to members about how
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to ensure compliance with information security policies are needed [38][52][54][55].
Procedures should be accessible and well communicated to organizational members
and compliance with procedures will be routinely audited.
Subject matter experts agreed with the inclusion of this criterion in the model.
4.2.7 Policies and Standards - Technical standard documentation and
awareness
Technical standards (e.g., hardware standards, configuration standards, patch
management standards [96][97][253] should be documented and updated regularly
by the organization to ensure all organization members (as appropriate) understand
requirements related to information security.

Technical standards should be

accessible and well communicated. Compliance with standards will be routinely
audited.
Technical standards were not originally defined as a discrete goal within the
model as they are generally a part of the overall policy and procedure documentation.
Five subject matter experts provided feedback that their importance was such that
they should be specifically noted independent of other policies and procedures so the
model was revised to reflect this feedback, which is also supported by the literature.
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4.2.8 Policies and Standards - Sanction documentation and awareness
Sanctions are defined as a set of repercussions associated with noncompliance related to information security policies. Non-compliance may be the
result of a simple mistake, may be intentional and associated with harmful intent, or
fall somewhere between those ends of the spectrum. Employees must believe that
sanctions are appropriate to the behavior and must believe that they will be
consistently applied across an organization regardless of role in order to have a fully
functional

information

security

program

[38][79][257][258].

Sanction

documentation should be accessible and well communicated to organizational
members. Compliance with sanction guidance should be routinely audited.
While most subject matter experts believed that sanction documentation was
important, five experts indicated they were unsure of its importance or that they
thought it less important than other model elements. This is not surprising as
sanction documentation is not always included in existing cybersecurity frameworks;
however, the literature strongly supports the inclusion of this criteria from a culture
perspective so the criterion remains part of the overall model.
4.2.9 Awareness and Training - Communications
Broad communication about information security is a cornerstone of
successful information security programs. The creation and internal delivery of
collateral, such as articles in newsletters, blogs, posters and other internal
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communication venues are valuable in raising awareness and changing behaviors
[41][50][65][259].
Subject matter experts uniformly agreed to the importance of communications
related to information security as part of an effective information security program.
4.2.10 Awareness and Training - Awareness events
Awareness events are planned occasions designed to raise awareness of
information security knowledge throughout an organization and have been
determined to improve information security programs and the culture related to
information security [65][79][260].
Subject matter experts uniformly agreed to the importance of awareness
events related to information security as part of an effective information security
program.
4.2.11 Awareness and Training - Information portal
An information portal is defined as an easily accessible internal source that
provides a knowledge base of security related information [260]. As part of the broad
information toolkit [259], this could include information both about how to be aware
of security threats, how to be secure when working from anywhere, and how to report
information security incidents [65]. It would also likely serve as a source for
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information security policies and procedures. Information portals are common in
most organization, built out to varying degrees.
While subject matter experts generally agreed to the importance of an
information portal in support of a strong information security program, six subject
matter experts did not believe an information portal was important on first review.
Upon further investigation it became clear that the experts were considering this
information portal, in isolation, as if an information portal might be the only way to
communicate information about training or awareness. Given this feedback, the
definition of this goal was re-written to be more explicit about an information portal’s
importance as part of a broader toolkit of information security training and
awareness tools.
4.2.12 Awareness and Training - Training
Information security training may be delivered either by computer, in-person,
or both. One-on-one training could be in the form of seminars, departmental
meetings, or one-on-one sessions. Some training may be mandatory while other
training may be optional. Training, while sometimes discounted by trainees, is a
powerful tool in creating a culture which supports strong information security
practices [37][55][63][146][261].
Subject matter experts universally agreed that training was appropriate for
inclusion in the model.
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4.2.13 Awareness and Training - Behavioral and real-time teaching
Behavioral testing and real-time teaching, used appropriately, are effective
tools in testing work force member's compliance behavior in an attempt to
demonstrate the common schemes to penetrate information security defenses
[52][65]. It is important that behavioral and real-time teaching be conducted in such
a way that individuals are not embarrassed or shamed if they initially fail these tests
[37][259].

Rather these events should focus on the learning opportunity and

improvement over time. Common tools in this arsenal are related to teaching about
phishing and USB drive drops (e.g. if you find a USB drive you should not stick it in
your computer to see what is on it).
Subject matter experts generally agreed that behavioral testing and real-time
teaching were appropriate for inclusion in the model.
4.2.14 Technical Hygiene - Physical controls
Physical access controls which limit access to technology infrastructure
(equipment/media) or confidential information are essential. Typical controls
generally include, but are not limited to, locked barriers, badged access, and security
cameras. This information security element can be found not only in predominant
cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253] but also as guidance from the office of the
national coordinator for health information technology [5].
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While this element was not part of the original model it was included based on
subject matter expert feedback.
4.2.15 Technical Hygiene - Asset management
Under the theory that you can’t protect what you don’t know about, all major
cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253], as well as the office of the national
coordinator for health information technology [5] recommend robust asset
management systems as part of a comprehensive information security program.
Asset management systems are defined as technology that supports life cycle
management related to physical and virtual technology assets.
While this element was not part of the original model it was included based on
subject matter expert feedback.
4.2.16 Technical Hygiene - Routine security updates
Mature information security programs are characterized by processes and
technical tools that facilitate routine security updates for software, endpoints,
biomedical devices, and other systems. These security updates are a key element in
minimizing security vulnerabilities that are often exploited by cybercriminals and are
often incorporated in existing cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253].
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this model
element and suggested the inclusion of biomedical devices in the definition. This is
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most appropriate for healthcare organizations and was included in the definition. If
this generalizable model was used outside of healthcare the reference to biomedical
devices should be removed but could be replaced with references to the “internet of
things” – other devices often out of the span of control of classic information
technology operations but vulnerable nonetheless.
4.2.17 Technical Hygiene - Protection of stored information and
information in transit
Most modern information security programs include technology (e.g.,
encryption technologies) that ensures data at rest and data in transit are not
vulnerable to misuse.. All major cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253], as well as
the office of the national coordinator for health information technology [5]
recommend protection of stored information and information in transit as a key
criterion in a strong information security program.
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element
in the model.
4.2.18 Technical Hygiene - Identity, authentication, access management
and monitoring
Technical tools that ensure only those individuals and systems that need
access to sensitive data and systems are able to do so. Identity, authentication, access
management and monitoring are components of comprehensive information security
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programs as well as major cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253], In addition, they
are recommended by the office of the national coordinator for health information
technology [5] as components of strong information security programs.
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element
in the model.
4.2.19 External Threats - Data loss prevention
Monitoring data as it leaves an organization provides a yellow flag of sorts to
potential compromise of information security integrity within an organization.
Technology tools that monitor data as it leaves the organization help ensure
appropriate levels of security for sensitive information. Data loss prevention tools
are components of comprehensive information security programs as well as major
cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253], In addition, they are recommended by the
office of the national coordinator for health information technology [5] as
components of strong information security programs.
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element
in the model.
4.2.20 External Threats - Anti-spam and malware protection
In recent years technologies that minimalize incoming spam and mitigate the
threat of malware infection have become ever more important as nefarious phishing
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campaigns have flooded both personal and business environments. These tools are
consistently components of comprehensive information security programs as well as
major cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253]. In addition, they are recommended
by the office of the national coordinator for health information technology [5] as
elements of strong information security programs.
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element
in the model.
4.2.21 External Threats - Intrusion detection and prevention
The most mature information security programs include 24x7 intrusion
detection and prevention (a.k.a. Managed Detection Response) programs utilizing
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tools. This information security
element has received more attention in recent years and is included in both the NIST
cybersecurity framework [97] as well as the Center for Internet Security framework
[253].
This element was not included in the initial model but was added based on
feedback from nine subject matter experts. In one case, an expert noted that if they
had a managed detection response program in place they would not have been the
victim of a recent cyberattack which cost the organization both significant financial
loss as well as reputational harm.
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4.2.22 External Threats - Protection of network
Some of the most fundamental and long standing elements of information
security relate to protection of an organization’s network. Technical tools that
minimize threats from outside the network (e.g., network access control, network
segmentation, firewalls, routine vulnerability scanning) are key elements of an
effective information security plan. This element is found in nearly all cybersecurity
frameworks [97][99][253].
Subject matter experts consistently agreed on the importance of this element
in the model and two experts called for a clearer definition that included network
access control and routine vulnerability scanning. The definition of this goal was
modified to reflect this interest which is also supported in the literature.
In conclusion, each element in the model was evaluated by subject matter
experts using the Delphi process. Experts were asked the binary yes/no question
related to appropriateness of individual element to be included in the model. The
results of those responses all exceeded the 80% or greater agreement threshold
[234].
4.3 Metrics
Measurement of information security metrics is more art than science, due to
the complexity of the information security environment and the ever changing
information security threat landscape.

Existing cybersecurity frameworks lack
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specificity of measurement [130] and should strive to provide a quantitative and
objective basis for security assurance [126]. As noted in Chapter 2, information
security metrics were recognized on the Hard Problem List of the United States
INFOSEC Research Council in 2005, a situation confirmed by the United States
National Science and Technology Council in 2011 and further supported as one of the
five hard problems in Science and Security in 2015 [83].
Metrics were established for the output associated with each goal in the model
and presented to experts for validation. Following validation, experts were utilized
to develop desirability curves for each goal level criteria within the model in order to
quantify the output. Specific metrics and their associated desirability curves are
provided in the next section of this document.
4.4 Desirability Curve Development
As noted above, expert judgement is used to quantify desirability curves for
each metric.

Development of desirability curves is a method which converts

qualitative or quantitative data for a given element in the model to a scaled
quantitative value. Using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is the least desirable state and
100 is the ideal state, a scale with normalized values is developed. The concept is
clarified by Kocaoglu [232] as a method to utilize expert judgement to create values
about how good or desirable an output is to decision makers. It is important that the
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experts identified to aid in the development of desirability curves are decision makers
as the model will rely on these metrics to define “goodness” of output.
Metrics and desirability curves relative to each of the twenty-two goals within
the model are presented below. Figures 13-34 show their respective desirability
curves. Appendix E-1 provides an example of the tool that was shared with experts
in the development of desirability curves and Appendix E-2 provides the metric
definition and values used to create the curves.
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4.4.1 Desirability Curves Associated with Governance
Information security governance metrics consist of measures associated with
established governance structure, defined roles and responsibilities, monitoring and
measurement of information security performance, and alignment of information
security strategies with business objectives. As noted below experts determined the
ideal state as one that included a comprehensive governance structure which
includes aligning information security strategies with business objectives. There is a
notable increase in desirability from node 2 to 3 in the curve below associated with
the move from a general structure to defined roles and responsibilities.
Figure 13: Desirability Curve for Governance Goal

4.4.2 Desirability Curves Associated with Leadership and Management
Support
Information security leadership and management metrics consist of measures
associated with awareness, understanding, and engagement related to information
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security, up to and including, modeling of best practices and engaging in alignment of
business practices associated with information security, as well as routine review of
information security performance. Experts determined the ideal state as one that
included all of these characteristics, with a significant increase in desirability between
nodes 2 to 3 where leaders begin to model information security best practices.
Figure 14: Desirability Curve for Leadership and Management Support Goal

4.4.3 Desirability Curves Associated with Resource Availability
Information security resource availability metrics consist of measures
associated with dedicated information security teams that support tools, training,
routine assessments, monitoring and consistent improvements in information
security at an organization. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included
all of these characteristics, with a curve that rose steadily.
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Figure 15: Desirability Curve for Resource Availability Goal

4.4.4 Desirability Curves Associated with Risk Assessment, Risk
Management, Disaster Recovery and Incidence Response
Information security risk assessment, risk management, disaster recovery and
incidence response metrics consist of measures associated with documentation and
practices explicitly named in the title as well as benchmarking against peers. Experts
determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics. Several
experts reported node 3 to be a minimally acceptable standard within healthcare
organizations.
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Figure 16: Desirability Curve for Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Disaster Recovery and
Incidence Response Goal

4.4.5 Desirability Curves Associated with Policy Documentation and
Awareness
Information security policy documentation and awareness metrics consist of
measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation, frequency of policy
review and update and understanding by organizational members of relevant
policies. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these
characteristics. Experts noted anecdotally that reaching node 3 was especially
important in healthcare environments where compliance agencies routinely review
policy documentation and use it as a measure associated with facility accreditation.
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Figure 17: Desirability Curve for Policy Documentation and Awareness Goal

4.4.6 Desirability Curves Associated with Procedure Documentation
and Awareness
Information security procedure documentation and awareness metrics
consist of measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation, frequency
of procedure review and update and understanding by organizational members of
relevant procedures. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of
these characteristics, with a curve that rose steadily.
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Figure 18: Desirability Curve for Procedure Documentation and Awareness Goal

4.4.7 Desirability

Curves

Associated

with

Technical

Standards

Documentation and Awareness
Information security technical standards documentation and awareness
metrics consist of measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation,
frequency of technical standards review and update and understanding by
organizational members of relevant standards. Experts determined the ideal state as
one that included all of these characteristics, with a curve that rose steadily.

113

Figure 19: Desirability Curve for Technical Standards Documentation and Awareness Goal

4.4.8 Desirability Curves Associated with Sanction Documentation and
Awareness
Information security sanction documentation and awareness metrics consist
of measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation, frequency of
documentation review and update and understanding by organizational members of
relevant sanctions. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these
characteristics, and there is a notable increase in desirability between nodes 2 and 3
where the level of documentation is increased.
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Figure 20: Desirability Curve for Sanction Documentation and Awareness Goal

4.4.9 Desirability Curves Associated with Communications
Information security communication metrics consist of measures associated
with channels and frequency of communication and ultimately include resources
dedicated specifically to communication related to information security. Experts
determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a
steadily rising curve.
Figure 21: Desirability Curve for Communication Goal
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4.4.10 Desirability Curves Associated with Awareness Events
Information security awareness events metrics consist of measures associated
with frequency, attendance and variety of events related to information security.
Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics,
with a steadily rising curve.
Figure 22: Desirability Curve for Awareness Events Goal

4.4.11 Desirability Curves Associated with Information Portal
Information security portal metrics consist of measures associated with
existence, content, awareness and usage related to the portal. Experts determined
the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase
at node 4 where the portal is well known to institutional members.
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Figure 23: Desirability Curve for Information Portal Goal

4.4.12 Desirability Curves Associated with Training
Information security training metrics consist of measures associated with
mode, frequency and diversity of training as well as whether some training is
required of all institutional members. Experts determined the ideal state as one that
included all of these characteristics, with a steadily rising curve.
Figure 24: Desirability Curve for Training Goal

117

4.4.13 Desirability Curves Associated with Behavioral Testing and Realtime Teaching
Information security behavioral testing and real-time teaching metrics
consist of the frequency of testing, the sharing of results related to testing and the
number of channels used for testing. Experts determined the ideal state as one that
included all of these characteristics with a steadily rising curve.
Figure 25: Desirability Curve for Behavioral Testing and Real-time Teaching

4.4.14 Desirability Curves Associated with Physical Controls
Information security physical controls metrics consist of measures associated
with degree and monitoring of physical access to technology resources. Experts
determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a
notable increase in desirability at node 3 where comprehensive physical controls
were in place.
118

Figure 26: Desirability Curve for Physical Controls Goal

4.4.15 Desirability Curves Associated with Asset Management
Information security asset management metrics consist of measures
associated with tools, processes and staffing to support full life cycle management for
both physical and virtual assets. Experts determined the ideal state as one that
included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase in desirability where
most physical and virtual assets are managed.
Figure 27: Desirability Curve for Asset Management Goal
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4.4.16 Desirability Curves Associated with Routine Security Updates
Information security routine security updates metrics consist of measures
associated with frequency of updates as aligned with defined service levels and
comprehensiveness of systems updated. Experts determined the ideal state as one
that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase at node 3 where
updates are routine even if they don’t strictly meet service level agreements.
Figure 28: Desirability Curve for Routine Security Updates Goal
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4.4.17 Desirability Curves Associated with Protection of Stored
Information and Information in Transit
Information security metrics for the protection of stored information or
information in transit consist of measures associated with tools utilized to monitor
and manage information both on-premise and in cloud-based platforms utilized by
the organization. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these
characteristics, with a consistent upward curve.
Figure 29: Desirability Curve for Protection of Stored Information and Information in Transit Goal
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4.4.18 Desirability Curves Associated with Identity, Authentication, and
Access Management and Monitoring
Information security metrics for identity, authentication and access
management and monitoring consist of the comprehensiveness of the toolset to
manage both on-premise and cloud-based systems. Experts determined the ideal
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a steadily rising curve.
Figure 30: Desirability Curve for Identity, Authentication, and Access Management and Monitoring
Goal
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4.4.19 Desirability Curves Associated with Data Loss Prevention
Information security metrics for data loss protection consist of measures
associated with tools utilized to monitor and manage data loss both on-premise and
in cloud-based platforms utilized by the organization. Experts determined the ideal
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase at node
3 where a comprehensive toolset for on-premise solutions is available.
Figure 31: Desirability Curve for Data Loss Prevention Goal

4.4.20 Desirability Curves Associated with Anti-spam and Malware
Protection
Information security metrics for anti-spam and malware protection consist of
measures related to capabilities of the tools utilized to manage both on-premise and
cloud-based platforms utilized by the organization. Experts determined the ideal
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase at node
4 where comprehensive tools are implemented for both on-premise and cloud-based
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platforms. This is unsurprising given the specific threat posed by phishers in the
current information security threat landscape.
Figure 32: Desirability Curve for Anti-spam and Malware Protection Goal

4.4.21 Desirability Curves Associated with Intrusion Detection and
Prevention
Information security metrics for intrusion detection and prevention consist of
measures associated with both tools and staffing, including support around the clock.
Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics,
with a notable increase in desirability at node 3 where the toolset is richer although
24x7 monitoring is not seen.
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Figure 33: Desirability Curve for Intrusion Detection and Prevention Goal

4.4.22 Desirability Curves Associated with Protection of Network
Information security metrics for protection of network consist of measures
associated with both tools and staffing for monitoring. Experts determined the ideal
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase in
desirability at node 3 where the toolset is more diverse although systems may not be
routinely monitored.
Figure 34: Desirability Curve for Protection of Network Goal
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CHAPTER 5: FINALIZING THE MODEL
The following section discusses the finalization of the generalizable maturity
model, beginning with expert validation of the model content and construct, followed
by expert quantification of the decision criteria importance and finally establishing
weights for model elements. The use of experts in the field of information security,
both from a variety of roles as well as diversity of organization type, was a critical
component of the development and validation of the model.
5.1 Model Validation
It is important to select outputs that reflect the desired mission outcome of the
model. Objectives, goals and outputs were originally defined based on literature and
were then validated and quantified by industry experts. Elements of the model were
validated by binary acceptance data (yes/no) and were included in the model at the
80% agreement level [234]. Appendix C shows how 5 objectives (Appendix C-1),
twenty-two goals (Appendix C-2), and associated output elements (Appendix C-3)
were validated and accepted. The validation of objectives and goals required an
iterative process. The initial validation step included 50 expert opinions and the
secondary validation step included six experts.
Figure 35 shows how the validated elements were joined to develop a
comprehensive model, linked together to develop the HDM. Five objectives fill level
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2, twenty-two goals fill level 3, level 4 output details are provided in Appendix C-3
and each goal has an associated desirability curve to complete the model.
Figure 35: Validated HDM

5.2 Quantification of model
The pairwise comparison technique was used for the quantification process
for each decision element. Judgment quantification instruments (Appendix A-4) were
designed and administered to each panel of experts to collect pairwise comparison
information. HDM © 2.0 software was used to collect pairwise comparison data. Raw
data tables are available in Appendix D. HDM software was also used to complete
inconsistency and disagreement measures.
5.3 Inconsistency
This research utilized the average standard deviation method to measure
inconsistency as calculated by the HDM 2.0© software. Inconsistencies at or above
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the tolerance threshold of 10% were further examined under the lens of research
conducted by Abbas [235], who found that the 10% threshold limit was increasingly
conservative as the number of decision elements increase from the range of three
elements to twelve elements.
Two experts demonstrated a moderate inconsistency measurement when
providing pairwise comparison judgments at the objective level of the model. Figure
36 shows that expert 8 has an inconsistency value of 0.11, and expert 24 is at the
threshold of .10.
Figure 36: Inconsistent expert data
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The decision variables in this case include the five different objective
elements: organizational support, policies and standards, awareness and training,
technical hygiene and mitigation of external threats. Abbas found the 10% threshold
to be quite conservative when experts were asked to make comparative judgment
involving 5 elements [235]. Therefore, the data for experts 8 and 24 were accepted
into the study as they were either at or near the .10 threshold.
5.4 Disagreement Analysis
While experts may disagree for many reasons as noted in Chapter 3.
Disagreement levels were below the 0.10 threshold [195][225] using the HDM 2.0©
software; therefore no further action was taken. If disagreement had been found
experts may have been asked to repeat judgement in order to ascertain whether
disagreement might decrease to acceptable levels.
5.5 Finalized HDM
Figure 37 shows the finalized validated model with decision element weights
as derived from expert feedback.
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Figure 37: Generalizable model for healthcare information security maturity

It is no surprise that the two technically focused objectives, information
security hygiene and mitigation of external threats given the generally technical
nature of the of the topic and the proliferation of tools to aid in the projection of
information. These results reinforce the technical focus of existing information
security models. This model does however provide a different perspective on the
importance of training and organization support elements, which are rarely
quantified in other information security frameworks. Further discussion is presented
in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDIES
Case studies were conducted to illustrate how the model works and to validate
model elements as to the degree which the model reflects actual performance. Data
were acquired from five healthcare organizations by means of a data collection
instrument to populate the metrics, identifying those outputs for each organization
and aligning with the respective desirability values to create a score for each case
study site. Analysis of results were presented to experts for feedback. This chapter
is organized in four sections:
Section 1 Broad description of five healthcare organization types included in case
studies and a brief introduction of each case study site with specific identification
information removed to protect confidentiality of the participant site;
Section 2 Illustration of how data was collected and used to calculate a maturity
model score for a single case study site;
Section 3 Review of performance evaluation for all case study sites including
strengths and suggested areas for improvement;
Section 4 Discussion of sensitivity analysis of model, assessing the impact of changes
at the objective level to test the robustness of the model.
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6.1 Healthcare organization selection
Healthcare organization come in many different sizes and shapes. In order to
test the model for generalizability a variety of different organization types and sizes
were selected for case study inclusion. The following organization types were
included in the case studies:
•

Critical Access Hospital – Critical Access Hospital is a designation given
to eligible rural hospitals by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). The designation is designed to increase access to
healthcare for rural communities and reduce the financial vulnerability
of these sites. Critical Access Hospitals have 25 or fewer acute care
inpatient beds, are located 35 miles from another hospital, and provide
24/7 emergency care services.

•

Stand-alone Community Hospital - Stand-alone community hospitals
are generally the sole or predominant healthcare provider in the
market they serve. They are independent and are not aligned to any
larger health system. These community hospitals are generally closely
aligned with local physician groups.

•

Integrated Delivery Network (IDN) – An integrated delivery network is
a system of healthcare facilities and providers that offer both
healthcare services as well as healthcare insurance plans to a defined
patient population which may, or may not, be a related to a specific
132

geographic area.

They vary greatly in size (number of facilities,

providers, patients served).
•

Large Healthcare System – A healthcare system is a collection of
facilities and providers, who may or may not be employed by the
healthcare facility, who work together to deliver a variety of healthcare
services. Unlike the IDN noted above the healthcare system does not
explicitly offer healthcare care insurance plans. In this case, large is
defined as greater than one hospital and over 500 inpatient beds.

•

Academic Medical Center – Academic medical centers are universities
that teach medical students and include one or more hospitals as well
as provider practice plans to provide hands-on experience to their
students as well as graduate medical education training. Academic
medical centers provide a wide range of healthcare services for
patients and often include cutting edge research capabilities.

The Chief Information Officer was contacted at each potential case study site
to ascertain their interest and ability to participate in the study. These decision
makers and experts were able to respond to the data collection instrument and in one
case asked if they could include other information security experts within their
organization in the process to ensure accuracy of response. Those additional experts
were happily included. Table 7 provides a summary of key demographics [262]
associated with each case study site for 2020.
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Table 7: Summary of Key Demographics for Case Study Sites

A more specific description of each case study site is provided below, although
the information is anonymized to protect that site’s confidentiality.
6.1.1 Critical Access Hospital (CAH)
The case study site has been rated one of the top 100 Critical Access Hospitals
in the nation by the Chartis Group many times in the past decade. Serving their rural
community for over 100 years, they are committing to ensuring those they support
thrive.
6.1.2 Stand-alone community hospital
The case study site is a community owned, non-profit community hospital. It
is characterized as a social and economic asset focused on serving its local
community. Serving more than 80,000 individuals, it is the only hospital in a 10,000
square mile area and serves as a teaching hospital.
6.1.3 Integrated Delivery Network (IDN)
The case study site is a not-for-profit network of five hospitals, numerous
clinics and health plan services serving more than 250,0000 members in their
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community.

It is characterized as a social and economic asset, as one of the

community’s largest employers and is focused on serving local communities.
6.1.4 Large health system
The case study site is a locally owned not-for-profit network of seven hospitals
and numerous clinics serving both urban and rural communities. It is characterized
by a high level of specialty care services, including a level 1 trauma center. It serves
as a key social and economic asset to the community as one of the largest employers
in the region.
6.1.5 Academic medical center
The case study site is a public non-profit serving all citizens of the state. It is
characterized not only for teaching the next generation of healthcare professionals
but also a site providing access to state-of-the-art healthcare including clinical trials.
As the largest employer in their city, they are a key economic engine for not only the
city but also the state through their tri-part mission of teaching, healing and
discovery.
6.2 Illustration case: Stand-alone community hospital (SACH)
The stand-alone community based hospital case study is used to illustrate how
the data were collected and the metrics were populated to create a score for the
health information security maturity model. The SACH was selected as the case study
because community hospitals are generally less resource rich when it comes to
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support for information security. They are vulnerable to cybercriminals as a result of
historic lack of investment in information security by healthcare organizations and
are in need of a tool that can help them prioritize their scarce resources.
The data collection approach utilized an instrument that was designed and
administered by the researcher by way of an interview with the Chief Information
Officer at the case study site. The data collection instrument is available in Appendix
F-1.
6.2.1 Maturity assessment score
The results of the maturity score for this case study are presented in Table 8
below.
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Table 8: Maturity Assessment Score for Stand-alone Community Hospital

6.2.1 Strengths and Opportunities for Improvement
The assessment provides a concise view of the strengths and opportunities for
improvement at the stand-alone community hospital. These strengths and opportunities are
presented in Table 9 below where strengths are highlighted in green, where score value as
a percent of optimal value is 75 or higher, and opportunities are highlighted in yellow where
score value as a percent of optimal value is less than 60.
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Table 9: Strengths and Opportunities for Stand-alone Community Hospital

The table highlights how the model was able to capture discrete attributes that
contribute to, or detract from ,overall information security maturity. In addition, it is
clear how much those element matter in the overall maturity score.
In this case study, the stand-alone community hospital scores well in resource
availability, sanctions documentation and awareness, training, physical controls,
routine security updates, and anti-spam and malware protection. Of note, resource
availability with an optimal value of .24, training with an optimal value of .24, routine
security updates with an optimal value of .23, and anti-spam and malware protection
with an optimal value of .25 are high value elements within the model and ultimately
lead to an improved score in overall maturity score when compared with lesser value
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elements. This value is increased further as the objective level values for technical
hygiene, associated with physical controls and routine security updates, has an
optimal value of .24. The same is true for the optimal level value for mitigation of
external threats, associated with anti-spam and malware protection, at .24.
Moving to opportunities for improvement, it is shown that the stand-alone
community hospital does not score as well in risk assessment, risk management,
disaster recovery and incident response with an optimal value of .29, procedure
documentation and awareness, with an optimal value of .24, technical standards
documentation and awareness with an optimal value of .34, information portal with
an optimal value of .10, asset management with an optimal value of .18 and intrusion
detection and prevention, with an optimal value of .29. This is less concerning as it
relates to procedure documentation and awareness and technical standards
documentation and awareness since the associated policies and standards objective
level optimal value is .14, and therefore of less overall impact to the total score. The
same is true with a low score associated with information portal given the relatively
low optimal value of .10 with and associated optimal goal value of .19 for awareness
and training. Making improvements to intrusion detection and prevention, with an
optimal value of .29 and an optimal objective value of .24 for mitigation of external
threats, asset management, with an optimal value of .18 and an optimal objective
value of .24 for technology hygiene, and risk assessment, risk management, disaster
recovery, and incident response, with an optimal value of .29 and an associated
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optimal objective level value of .19 for organizational support would be good areas of
focus to improve the overall maturity score.
These findings were presented to the local expert. The expert agreed with the
recommendations and further indicated that enhancing intrusion detection and
prevention was a current high priority program of work at the case study site in order
to improve their information security environment. The expert further disclosed that
the case study organization had been a recent victim of a cyberattack and that lack of
an established intrusion detection and prevention program was a significant factor in
the damaging impact of the event on the organization.
6.3 Comparative Analysis Across All Case Study Sites
As noted earlier a total of five case study maturity model scores were
performed. Comparing information security performance across organizations is
fairly rare given the high stakes associated with acknowledging information security
vulnerabilities. It is well known that what we measure matters, and where we
measure we have the opportunity to improve. Measurement helps us not only
identify opportunities for improvement but also permits organizations that routinely
participate in benchmarking with peers to better understand how they are doing
when compared with others.

140

A side-by-side comparison of maturity model scores, with details associated
with each element of the HDM is available in Appendix F-2. A summary of the health
information security maturity model scores is provided below in Table 10.
Table 10: Maturity Scores for Case Study Sites

It is evident from the case study maturity scores that there is great variety in
the maturity of health information security across organizations. Investment in
information security varies greatly across organizations, and it is unsurprising that
the organization that is least likely to have access to critical resources to support a
robust information security environment (Critical Access Hospital) has a lower
maturity rating than organizations that generally have greater access to resources
(Integrated Delivery Network). The scores are not intended to represent “good” or
“bad” or “winners” or “losers”. Rather they should be used to identify opportunities
of focus for utilization of scarce resources.
A closer look at the greatest strengths and most telling weaknesses of each
site, as illustrated in Table 11 below, again shows great variety across sites.
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Table 11: Key Maturity Scores for Case Study Sites

The variety shown above may be caused by several factors. Cost of some
solutions may be higher than others. Some solutions will be easier to implement than
others. Lack of frameworks which measure the importance of the factors related to
creating a mature information security environment may have led to a less focused
approach on which measures provide the greatest value. In any case, these baseline
scores provide a framework to measure performance in a quantified way going
forward. Information security choices are complex and the output of the health
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information model should not serve as a laundry list of things to do, but instead as a
tool that can be used for further analysis to prioritize high value work that could
contribute to improving overall maturity in information security. Further analysis of
the scores at each case study site allows for specific recommendation for each site.
Sharing scores with peers, if conducted in a confidential manner, could provide an
opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned. During the case study
process one site suggested the model could be used by a group of regional peers at
one of their periodic meetings to facilitate a discussion of this kind.
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Many decisions change over time as they are dependent on a given point in
time and current conditions. This is certainly true in the constantly evolving
information security landscape. As a result, the model’s validity and quality could
change in response to environment factors. In recent years the technical perspectives
of information security have changed as threats shifted from lone cyber mischief
makers to complicated and extremely skilled networks of cybercriminals. The
technologies that are used to wage cyberthreat response have changed considerably
in cost and capability as well. Organizational support too has received increasing
attention as nefarious cyber activity causes significant financial and reputational
harm, gaining the attention of organizational Boards of Directors. All these and other
factors, move like ocean waves influencing the beach of the information security
landscape.
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There are different methods that can be used to conduct sensitivity analysis.
In this case, scenario analysis is used where a change in relative importance at the
objective level of the model is tested. This type of analysis helps decision makers
understand how much the model depends on input factors [263]. In the field of
technology management, due to the generally dynamic nature of change within the
field, scenario analysis has been used to determine the potential impact of a change
of importance of objectives as a way to ensure the robustness of the model and
associated results [195][241].
Looking again at the stand-alone community hospital case study, the
calculated maturity score was used as a baseline and then five extreme scenarios
were applied to the model. In each of the five extreme scenarios, a maximum weight
was given to each respective objective level element and then the case study’s
maturity level is recalculated based on the new weight structure within the model. In
other words, one objective is given a weight of 96% and each of the other objectives
in the model are given a weight of 1%.

Table 12 below provides a visual

representation of the reallocation of weights.
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Table 12: Reallocated Model Weights for Scenario Analysis

In the case of the stand-alone community hospital, the overall maturity score
is significantly harmed when increased emphasis is placed on the policies and
standards objective. This makes sense, as the organization’s performance at the
metric level within that objective in quite poor. Their overall maturity score increases
materially under the scenario where mitigation of external threats is emphasized. A
summary of the SACH’s maturity scores under each scenario is provided in Table 13
below. The comprehensive scenario analysis results for the SACH are provided in
Appendix G.
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Table 13: Summary Results of Scenario Analysis for Stand-alone Community Hospital
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
In this chapter, the results of the model development as related to the problem
statement are discussed as well as practical implications of findings. In addition, the
generalizability of the model is analyzed. Expert feedback responses during the
model validation process support concerns identified in literature regarding severity
of threat and need for prioritization of cybersecurity strategies given limited
resources. Subject matter experts were in agreement of the validity of model.
As noted in the problem statement, an easy to use, generalizable model, that
provides a holistic set of metrics with performance scores for information security
maturity is much needed. This tool must identify the common criteria that impact the
maturity of healthcare organization’s information security environments, directly
impacting their ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
systems they rely upon to continue business operations. The directional information
provided by such a model could be used to facilitate decisions about where healthcare
organizations can best utilize their finite resources. In addition the tools will help
organizations measure their maturity, and associated effectiveness, over time.
As part of the gap analysis, research gaps 1 and 2 specifically, it was discussed
that the criteria for assessing information security in healthcare organizations is not
organized in a way that identifies the most important risk mitigation actions, nor is
there a single quantified, validated, multi-dimensional, and reusable way of assessing
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information security in healthcare organizations that produces a score. Discussion
with experts from each of the validation and quantification panels confirmed these
findings.
7.1 Research and Practical Implications
The research validated the decision criteria and relative linkages for each
criterion consistent with information gleaned from the literature review. One of the
interesting findings is that while the research shows the importance of all criteria in
the model, it specifically identifies the criteria that hold a greater level of importance,
through a higher ranked weighted value. The results also confirm that technology
solutions alone are not enough to create a mature information security environment.
In the remainder of this section, each of the top five weighted criteria will be
reviewed. Interestingly, one of the criteria within those noted as top five was
introduced to the model as a result of the expert validation and quantification
process.

This highlights the importance of expert feedback during the model

development process. Finally, it is worth noting that the model elements were finetuned during the validation and quantification process, new elements were added to
the model and clarification was provided to the definition for many elements. Table
14 provides a visual representation of all model criteria by weight, calling out the top
5, the bottom 5 and those criteria that were added to the model as a result of expert
feedback through the quantification and validation process.
148

Table 14: Model Elements by Weight

7.1.1 Top Rated Criteria – Intrusion Detection and Prevention
The most important element of the model based on expert panel quantification
is intrusion detection and prevention, and is defined as a “24x7 intrusion detection
and prevention (a.k.a. Managed Detection Response) program utilizing Security
Information and Event Management (SIEM) tools” based on both literature review as
well as expert feedback. As noted earlier, this specific element was added to the
model as a result of expert feedback. It is not surprising that this criterion ranked
149

highly as external cyber threats have grown in frequency and negative impact. The
importance of proactive cyberthreat intelligence is noted by Khan et al. [264] in their
proposal for augmented threat intelligence.
7.1.2 Top Rated Criteria – Protection of Network
The second highest rated element of the model based on expert panel
quantification is protection of network, and is defined as “technical tools that
minimize threats from outside the network (e.g. network access control, network
segmentation, firewalls, routine vulnerability scanning)” based on both literature
review as well as expert feedback. As with intrusion detection and prevention,
protection of network is focused on limiting access to an organization’s network and
further securing known vulnerabilities within the network. The importance of
network protection was highlighted in Wang’s [265] work promoting artificial
intelligence solutions in this space. The high rating received by this element is also
likely related to the recent increase in frequency and negative impact of external
actors.
7.1.3 Top Rated Criteria – Identity, Authentication, and Access
Management and Monitoring
Third on the list of highest ranking elements of the model based on expert
panel quantification is identity, authentication, and access management and
monitoring, defined as “technical tools that ensure only those that need to access
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sensitive data and systems are able to do so,” based on both literature review as well
as expert feedback. As with intrusion detection and prevention and protection of
network, identity, authentication and access management and monitoring is focused
on limitation of access to organizational information systems. Unlike the two highest
rated criteria, this element provides for segregation of access at the individual system
level in addition to minimizing access to the organization at the global level. In this
way, access to sensitive data such as protected health information (PHI) is further
limited. While interest in limiting access at the system level is not unique to
healthcare organizations it is especially important at healthcare organizations due to
the increased risk associated with those particular data types, thus the importance of
this criteria as rated by experts is understandable.

The importance of identity

management as part of a larger cybersecurity strategy is noted in the work of Khan et
al. [266] as they explored novel solutions to this vexing challenge through use of
blockchain technologies.
7.1.4 Top Rated Criteria – Anti-spam and Malware Protection
Rated fourth on the list of highest ranking elements of the model based on
expert panel quantification is anti-spam and malware protection, defined as
“technology that minimalize incoming spam and mitigates threat of malware
infection,” based on both literature review as well as expert feedback. Anti-spam and
malware protection has become increasingly important as a result of both the
proliferation and maturity of phishing activity.

Anti-spam tools identify and
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quarantine known malicious incoming email, preventing organizational end users
from ever being exposed to those threats. One expert reported that “97% of all email
coming into their organization was captured by their anti-spam tool”, meaning only
3% of all incoming email was valid and delivered to end users. Even so, some
malicious email gets through and malware protection software fills this gap. The
combination of tools serves as a strong barrier between bad actors and organizational
end users. Anti-spam and malware tools retain important positions in the maturity
of information security environments [267]. In addition these tools are generally
more mature and less costly than some tools associated with information security
which may serve as another reason why this element ranked highly in importance
within the model.
7.1.5 Top Rated Criteria – Behavioral Testing and Real-time Teaching
The fifth highest rated element of the model based on expert panel
quantification is behavioral testing and real-time teaching, and is defined as “active
attempts to test work force member's compliance behavior (e.g. phishing education
tools and USB drive drops)” based on both literature review as well as expert
feedback. The literature identified organization members as a significant threat to
information security within organizations. Tools and processes that facilitate active
learning for organizational members about common threat vectors such as phishing,
when used consistently, have been shown to greatly influence organizational member
behavior. Real-time feedback is a strong reinforcing mechanism and provides an
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interactive experience that is well suited to a larger strategy associated with training
and awareness. Utilization of behavioral testing tools has increased dramatically in
healthcare organizations in recent years as the benefit of these tools has been seen to
provide quantitative positive change in user response to phishing.

Anti-phishing

tools are generally inexpensive relative to other information security investments so
they provide a high value proposition to healthcare organizations. Skula et al. [268]
note the importance of interactive education as a mitigation to the human threat of
phishing in information security.

This high value proposition is likely a key

contributor to the high ranking received by this element within the model.
7.2 Generalizability
Expert feedback validated the generalizable model as a valid and reasonable
approach to aid decision makers in evaluation of priority setting for information
security resources allocation. As noted earlier, a group of experts with diverse
experience coming from a variety of healthcare organization types contributed to the
model development, validation and quantification, specifically:
•

Experts were either chief information officers, chief privacy officers or
chief information security officers. Each of these roles provides a
unique perspective to information security maturity and relative
importance of specific criteria within the model.
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•

Experts represented a broad variety of healthcare organization types,
not only large and small but diverse in terms of the communities they
serve (e.g. urban, rural). These diverse organizations also provide a
variety of services to their communities, some providing health
insurance plans, others providing specialty clinical services, still others
providing access to clinical trials. Even home-based healthcare care
services are provided by some.

•

The use of experts in development of desirability curves allows for the
model to be reused without the need for secondary review by subject
matter experts at the conclusion of each assessment.

•

During conversations with experts many indicated that this model may
be used by any type of healthcare organization. One expert asked the
researcher to facilitate the utilization of the model to develop maturity
scores within a peer-based healthcare organization forum, in order for
those participating organizations to share maturity models scores with
one another in an effort to share best practices. Still another expert
suggested the model could easily be used by those outside of
healthcare, specifically in academic settings, as the basic premise of
information security remains fairly constant across industries.

It is important to note that while the model has been validated and is reusable,
it will need to be periodically refreshed in order to ensure that it remains relevant.
154

7.3 Feedback from Experts and Other Considerations
Feedback from experts related to the conduct of this study was uniformly
positive. In many cases experts expressed the sentiment “this is much needed” and
“extremely important for healthcare organizations”, one expert went so far as to say
“I think you have nailed this!” As noted earlier, more than one expert suggested that
facilitation of the assessment in small peer-based group settings was desirable and
could result in productive peer-based conversations that could not only improve
information security maturity at a specific organization, but also develop a
community of interest, encouraging information sharing which would promote long
term improvement in information security for the greater group.
The experts were derived from diverse healthcare organizations – academic
medical centers, community hospitals, critical access hospitals, integrated delivery
networks, and large hospital systems.

In addition, they contributed diverse

perspectives to model development as chief information officers, chief privacy
officers and chief information security officers. While the model was validated and
quantified specifically by experts with healthcare information security knowledge,
experts specifically noted that the model might be generalizable to other industry
sectors as most information security threats are consistent across sectors.
This research was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2020
and early 2021. This was a period of both significant change in healthcare
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organizations in the United States as well as elevated cyber risk as illustrated by the
joint announcement issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Health and Human Services [269] in the Fall of 2020. Healthcare
organizations were transitioning those employees who could work from home to do
so, taking their work computers with them or using personal devices to access
healthcare organizations’ networks. They were also rapidly deploying digital
healthcare capabilities in order to meet critical community healthcare needs at a
time when many patients could not physically come to traditional healthcare
locations. In addition, many healthcare organizations were setting up large scale
clinical operations for the delivery of vaccines in non-traditional locations (e.g.
stadium and airport parking lots). These major shifts in technology delivery and
utilization, created at speed by technology professionals, also produced new and
non-traditional risks for healthcare organizations [270].
Healthcare organizations onboarded many new staff to meet the increased
demand for healthcare services. These new employees or contractors were likely
unfamiliar with the information security culture within the healthcare organizations
they were joining. Many may have been unfamiliar with the concept of information
security at all and needed to be trained. Finally, as the pandemic persisted
healthcare workers became increasingly stressed and exhausted, This exhaustion
and stress could quite easily lead to lack of attention on required information
security precautions.
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The culmination of new technology, new employees and increased fatigue on
existing employees certainly has the potential to threaten the information security
maturity within healthcare organizations specifically. Jalali et al. [271] confirm a
need for healthcare delivery organizations to ensure the safety of patient
information especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. This rapidly changing
environment combined with an increased cyber threat may have influenced the
engagement of experts in the development of the model. For some experts, it
provided an opportunity for them to be a part of helping create solutions for the
healthcare community at large. For other experts it created an impediment in their
ability to participate as their attention was keenly focused on solving specific
problems at their home institutions and they did not have time to participate in this
research. It is also possible that the environment for information security in
healthcare during the pandemic influenced not only what elements of the
information security maturity model were included in the model but also the
importance of certain criterion. This dynamic created an environment of very
engaged experts who provided feedback at a time which may have been pivotable in
information security, creating a relevant and up-to-date model.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter will focus on addressing the research goal, gaps and questions
and discuss contributions to research and the practice of health information security.
In addition, the limitations of the research as well as future research opportunities
will be reviewed.
8.1 Conclusions and Contributions
The objective of this research is to develop a framework for assessing
information security maturity within healthcare organizations in the United States.
Initiation of this research began with a comprehensive literature review of the
information security environment for healthcare organizations followed by a further
investigation of cyber security frameworks and metrics. As a result of this work, an
initial hierarchical decision model was created which consisted of elements which
have an impact on information security maturity within healthcare organizations.
This fundamental model was then validated, finalized, and quantified by information
security experts in the healthcare field. Desirability curves were created through the
help of experts to extend the model. Five case studies were then conducted to
evaluate the model’s performance against expected outcomes and to confirm the
generalizability of the model. Finally the model was tested by scenario analysis to
ascertain the model’s sensitivity to extreme changes at the objective level of the
model.
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By creating a maturity model for information security in healthcare
environments, this research contributes to the existing body of knowledge on
technology management maturity assessments in the healthcare industry, as well as
maturity models in support of information security. Specifically, as noted in the
literature review, more information is needed on the ways that healthcare
organizations measure, monitor, and optimize their information security
environments.

The literature review further noted a lack of structured,

comprehensive and usable assessment tools for healthcare organizations in
measuring their performance so they could prioritize scarce resources and share best
practices related to information security among peers. This research provides a
multi-criteria tool which has been quantified and validated for repeat use in multiple
healthcare organization types which produces a score. The maturity model may also
provide insight into the importance of the human element of information security.
The model supports improved decision making at the institutional level by
helping organizations better under the maturity of their information security
environments. This model is a cost effective solution which is easy to administer,
minimizing the need for third-part resources or extensive human resources to
maintain.

The healthcare information security maturity model will help

organizations make better decisions about where to apply their scarce resources in
order to improve their information security environments. This model may be
especially useful at small or less mature healthcare organizations due to the low level
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of effort required to complete an institutional assessment.

Using the model

healthcare organizations will be able to deploy information security programs that
will improve the integrity of data as well as the reliability of information systems,
thereby improving their information security compliance and minimizing the risk of
both internal and external threats. The potential to improve information security
within the healthcare industry is vast and a successful maturity model will not only
improve information security environments, potentially savings hundreds of millions
of dollars, it might also literally save lives.
The model may also be used to share best practices across healthcare
organizations regardless of the type of organization. There has been growing interest
in the healthcare community to share, confidentially with peers, some level of
information about the information security environments within respective
organizations.

A major provider of electronic records began the conduct of a

confidential information security benchmark activity in 2018 which allows some
healthcare information to learn more about the tools and staffing levels of their peers
in a way that masks the individual organizations contributing to the survey. This
exercise did not produce a score of any kind, but it illustrates a willingness on the part
of healthcare organizations to share more about their information security in a
trusted environment. As the cybersecurity threat has increased, many organizations
are more willing, and even eager, to share best practices and lessons learned in
confidential forums. While this may seem a minor shift, it has led to the development
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of a number of communities of interest both inside and outside of healthcare,
nationally and regionally. These communities build upon the trusted relationships of
information technology professionals, and sometimes include partnership with
federal agencies. It is evident that where cybersecurity used to be a cloak-and-dagger
exercise, it has become a team sport as organizations learn that they are better
prepared to fight the cybersecurity battle informed by the knowledge and experience
of a broader community.
Table 15 shows how this research has addressed the gaps identified in the
literature review.
Table 15: Addressing Research Gaps
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Table 16 shows how the research has addressed the research questions posed
earlier in this dissertation.
Table 16: Addressing Research Questions

In summary, the research offers contribution to both the research body of
knowledge as well as provides practical tools for healthcare organizations in
evaluating and improving their information security maturity.
8.2 Risks and Limitations
Most research comes with limitations and potential risks. This research is no
exception to that principle.
The first limitation of this research is associated with the use of expert panels.
While a broad variety of experts were utilized in the conduct of this research, experts
are subject to the same human biases we all have.

They may be inconsistent or

disagreement may be found among experts. In order to protect against this specific
risk, the model was tested to identify either disagreement or inconsistency. In
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addition some of the data was collected through verbal interaction to minimize
confusion related to complexity of some research concepts.
The second limitation of this research is that the model was validated and
quantified solely by healthcare experts. While it was found to be generalizable across
healthcare organizations it may not be viable as a model to support information
security maturity in other organization types (e.g. entertain companies).
The HDM model methodology itself is vulnerable to limitations when there is
a difference of more than one criterion under different goals. As the number of
criteria within a given goal becomes larger the relative value of those particular
criteria may be diminished in value in the overall construct of the model.

For

example, say one objective with a model value of .20 had three supporting goals and
another objective, which also had a model value of .20, but had five supporting goals.
The goals associated at the objective level would still only contribute to a combined
.20 value in the model. This could lead to the development of a model which does not
accurately reflect the true individual criterion values. In order to mitigate this risk
the health information security maturity model had either four or five criteria
associated with each objective within the model for a gap of no more than one
element across each respective objective.
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8.3 Future Research
A primary output of this research is the creation of a generalizable information
security maturity model for healthcare organizations. While created solely with
healthcare experts, many foundational elements related to information security are
not necessarily industry specific. The model may be more broadly generalizable to a
variety of industries. Exploration of this opportunity could lead to either creation of
new maturity models that are industry specific or it could determine that the existing
model is more broadly generalizable than tested during the current research study.
If this line of research were pursued, further study could compare the resulting
models and analyzing similarities or differences.
The healthcare industry is subject to change, sometimes rapid change. If
threat vectors significantly change, or the overall landscape of information security
changes it could impact the validity of the model. Routine updates of the model are
likely necessary and may yield new findings which contribute to the overall body of
knowledge associated with healthcare information security.
The model is ultimately designed to help organizations prioritize their
resources in order to improve their maturity scores and resulting information
security environment. Studies of individual sites or a larger group of sites over time,
say over a three year period utilizing an unchanged model, would be of value to
determine whether the model is meeting the desired objective of improving maturity
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scores. In addition, the maturity score over time might be studied along with other
measures such as number of breaches or number of security incidents to determine
if a change in score impacts breach or incident activity levels. If the model were
utilized by enough healthcare organizations of varying types and sizes, trends might
be identified by organization type or size. In order to facilitate this outcome, process
documentation would have to be created to guide research assistants to conduct the
questionnaire activity and a centralized repository for scoring data would need to be
created and maintained. Finally, a study comparing outcomes for those organizations
that use the information security maturity model and those that don’t, as measured
by information security breach or incident level, could be conducted.
While not deeply explored in this study, there may be value in extending the
model to include categories of performance as are found in the HIMSS Analytics
Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model [113] and discussed in Chapter 2. The
value of this extension would be the creation of descriptors of maturity levels, as
opposed to just a numerical score. There might also be interest in creating a
certification process associated with reaching certain performance categories.
As mentioned previously, at least one expert requested assistance with
assessment of the health information security maturity model to a larger peer-based
group of healthcare organizations. For example, a single day in-person seminar could
begin with an orientation to the model, followed by a facilitated completion of
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questionnaire, analysis of individual sites as well as a group analysis, review of
findings and then an interactive guided discussion. If structured properly, this
exercise could mitigate concerns related to expert self-assessment at the individual
site level. Conduct of this activity, in a structured way, either as a single event or over
time, may produce new learnings and contributions both to the literature as well as
to operational improvements.
There is potential to use the model as a foundation for the development of an
education roadmap for cyber security professionals either within healthcare or
outside of healthcare, if the model is found to be more broadly generalizable than
demonstrated by the current research. The need for information security specialists
is high and current educational programs largely focus on technology solutions alone.
This research has demonstrated that technology solutions alone are not enough to
create mature information security environments. A comprehensive educational
program that includes the human element of information security could be quite
valuable.

166

REFERENCES
[1]

Brailer, David J. “Economic Perspectives on Health Information Technology.”
Business Economics 40, no. 3 (2005): 6–14.
https://doi.org/10.2145/20050301.

[2]

“Text - H.R.1 - 111th Congress (2009-2010): American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.” 2010. Congress.gov. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/1/text.

[3]

“Medicare and Medicaid Promoting Interoperability Program Basics | CMS.”
n.d. Www.cms.gov. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.cms.gov/regulations-andguidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/basics.html.

[4]

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. 2017. “HIPAA for
Professionals.” HHS.gov. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html.

[5]

HHS ONC. 2015. “Guide to Privacy and Security of Electronic Health
Information.” Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/privacy/privacy-andsecurity-guide.pdf.

[6]

“U.S. Department of Health & Human Services - Office for Civil Rights.” n.d.
Ocrportal.hhs.gov. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach.

[8]

Office for Civil Rights (OCR). 2019. “Resolution Agreements.” HHS.gov.
Accessed July 16, 2021. https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/compliance-enforcement/agreements/index.html.

167

[9]

“HIMSS Healthcare Cybersecurity Survey.” 2020. www.himss.org. Accessed
July 16, 2021. https://www.himss.org/resources/himss-healthcarecybersecurity-survey.

[10]

Smith, Richard E. 2021. Elementary Information Security. Burlington, Ma:
Jones & Bartlett Learning.

[11]

“More Small Businesses Hit by Cyber Attacks.” n.d. GOV.UK. Accessed July 16,
2021. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/more-small-businesses-hitby-cyber-attacks.

[12]

OPM. 2015. “Cybersecurity Incidents.” U.S. Office of Personnel Management.
2015. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/.

[13]

Volz, Aruna Viswanatha and Dustin. 2021. “WSJ News Exclusive | FBI
Director Compares Ransomware Challenge to 9/11.” Wall Street Journal, June
4, 2021, sec. Politics. https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-director-comparesransomware-challenge-to-9-11-11622799003.

[14]

“The Most Prominent Cyber Threats Faced by High-Target Industries.” 2016.
Blog.trendmicro.com. January 26, 2016. http://blog.trendmicro.com/themost-prominent-cyber-threats-faced-by-high-target-industries.

[15]

Morgan, Steve. n.d. “Top 5 Industries at Risk of Cyber-Attacks.” Forbes.
Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/05/13/list-of-the-5most-cyber-attacked-industries/#280fa13f715e.

[16]

“Why Cybercriminals Attack Healthcare More than Any Other Industry.”
2016. Naked Security. April 26, 2016.
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/04/26/why-cybercriminals-attackhealthcare-more-than-any-other-industry.
168

[17]

United States Federal Bureau of Investigation .“2019 Internet Cyber Crime
Report.” Accessed November 3, 2020.
https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2019_IC3Report.pdf

[18]

Ransbotham, Sam, and Sabyasachi Mitra. 2009. “Choice and Chance: A
Conceptual Model of Paths to Information Security
Compromise.” Information Systems Research 20 (1): 121–39.
https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1080.0174.

[19]

Kayworth, Tim, and Dwayne Whitten. 2010. “Effective Information Security
Requires a Balance of Social and Technology Factors.” Ssrn.com. 2010.
https://doi.org/.

[20]

Werlinger, Rodrigo, Kirstie Hawkey, and Konstantin Beznosov. 2009. “An
Integrated View of Human, Organizational, and Technological Challenges of
IT Security Management.” Edited by Steven M. Furnell. Information
Management & Computer Security 17 (1): 4–19.
https://doi.org/10.1108/09685220910944722.

[21]

Offner, K. L., E. Sitnikova, K. Joiner, and C. R. MacIntyre. 2020. “Towards
Understanding Cybersecurity Capability in Australian Healthcare
Organisations: A Systematic Review of Recent Trends, Threats and
Mitigation.” Intelligence and National Security 35 (4): 556–85.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1752459.

[22]

Culbertson, Nick. n.d. “Council Post: Increased Cyberattacks on Healthcare
Institutions Shows the Need for Greater Cybersecurity.” Forbes. Accessed
July 16, 2021.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/06/07/increasedcyberattacks-on-healthcare-institutions-shows-the-need-for-greatercybersecurity/?sh=71d7f60e5650.

169

[23]

Box, Debra, and Dalenca Pottas. 2014. “A Model for Information Security
Compliant Behaviour in the Healthcare Context.” Procedia Technology 16:
1462–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.protcy.2014.10.166.

[24]

Agrawal, Alka, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Abdullah Baz, Hosam Alhakami,
Wajdi Alhakami, Rajeev Kumar, and Raees Ahmad Khan. 2020. “Evaluating
the Security Impact of Healthcare Web Applications through Fuzzy Based
Hybrid Approach of Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Analysis.” IEEE Access 8:
135770–83. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3010729.

[25]

"2008 HIMSS Analytics Report: Security Of Patient Data," 2008. Accessed
January 15, 2017.
http://www.mmc.cm/views/Kroll_HIMSS_Study_April2008.pdf.

[26]

“(PDF) a Survey of Factors Influencing People’s Perception of Information
Security.” n.d. ResearchGate. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221096519_A_Survey_of_Factors
_Influencing_People.

[27]

Guo, Ken H., Yufei Yuan, Norman P. Archer, and Catherine E. Connelly. 2011.
“Understanding Nonmalicious Security Violations in the Workplace: A
Composite Behavior Model.” Journal of Management Information Systems 28
(2): 203–36. https://doi.org/10.2753/mis0742-1222280208.

[28]

“Malware 101 - Viruses | sans Institute.” n.d. Www.sans.org. Accessed July 16,
2021. http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/malware101-viruses-32848.

170

[29]

Perlroth, Nicole, and David E Sanger. 2017. “Hackers Hit Dozens of Countries
Exploiting Stolen N.S.A. Tool.” The New York Times, May 12, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-national-healthservice-cyberattack.html.

[30]

Tully, Jeff, Jordan Selzer, James P. Phillips, Patrick O’Connor, and Christian
Dameff. 2020. “Healthcare Challenges in the Era of Cybersecurity.” Health
Security 18 (3): 228–31. https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2019.0123.

[31]

Nast, Condé. n.d. “The Untold Story of a Cyberattack, a Hospital and a Dying
Woman.” Wired UK. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ransomware-hospital-deathgermany#:~:text=The%20untold%20story%20of%20a%20cyberattack%2C
%20a%20hospital%20and%20a%20dying%20woman.

[32]

Deal, T E, and Allen A Kennedy. 2002. Corporate Cultures : The Rites and
Rituals of Corporate Life. New York: Basic Books.

[33]

Wiant, Terry L. 2005. “Information Security Policy’s Impact on Reporting
Security Incidents.” Computers & Security 24 (6): 448–59.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2005.03.008.

[34]

Urbaczewski, Andrew, and Leonard M. Jessup. 2002. “Does Electronic
Monitoring of Employee Internet Usage Work?” Communications of the
ACM 45 (1). https://doi.org/10.1145/502269.502303.

[35]

Jones, Andy. 2008. “Catching the Malicious Insider.” Information Security
Technical Report 13 (4): 220–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.istr.2008.10.008.

[36]

Johnson, M. Eric, and Eric Goetz. 2007. “Embedding Information Security into
the Organization.” IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine 5 (3): 16–24.
https://doi.org/10.1109/msp.2007.59.
171

[37]

Rotvold, Glenda. 2008. "How to Create a Security Culture in Your
Organization," The Information Management Journal.

[38]

Bulgurcu, Burcu, Hasan Cavusoglu, and Izak Benbasat. 2010. “Information
Security Policy Compliance: An Empirical Study of Rationality-Based Beliefs
and Information Security Awareness.” MIS Quarterly 34 (3): 523.
https://doi.org/10.2307/25750690.

[39]

“Online Trust Alliance (OTA).” n.d. Internet Society. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/documents/ota201
5-bestpractices.pdf.

[40]

Schultz, Eugene. 2005. “The Human Factor in Security.” Computers &
Security 24 (6): 425–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2005.07.002.

[41]

Albarrak, A.. “Evaluation of Users Information Security Practices at King Saud
University Hospitals.” Global Business and Management Research: An
International Journal 3 (2011): 1.

[42]

Beaudry, and Pinsonneault. 2005. “Understanding User Responses to
Information Technology: A Coping Model of User Adaptation.” MIS
Quarterly 29 (3): 493. https://doi.org/10.2307/25148693.

[43]

Gaunt, N. 2000. “Practical Approaches to Creating a Security
Culture.” International Journal of Medical Informatics 60 (2): 151–57.
https://doi.org/10.1016/s1386-5056(00)00115-5.

[44]

Herath, Tejaswini, and H.R. Rao. 2009. “Encouraging Information Security
Behaviors in Organizations: Role of Penalties, Pressures and Perceived
Effectiveness.” Decision Support Systems 47 (2): 154–65.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2009.02.005.

172

[45]

Lacey, David. 2010. “Understanding and Transforming Organizational
Security Culture.” Edited by Steven M. Furnell. Information Management &
Computer Security 18 (1): 4–13.
https://doi.org/10.1108/09685221011035223.

[46]

McIntosh, Barry. 2011. “An Ethnographic Investigation of the Assimilation of
New Organizational Members into an Information Security Culture.” CCE
Theses and Dissertations, January.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd/240/.

[47]

Probst, Christian W. 2010. Insider Threats in Cyber Security. New York:
Springer.

[48]

Li, Jingquan, and Michael J. Shaw. 2008. “Electronic Medical Records, HIPAA,
and Patient Privacy.” International Journal of Information Security and
Privacy 2 (3): 45–54. https://doi.org/10.4018/jisp.2008070104.

[49]

Möller, Sebastian, Noam Ben-Asher, Klaus-Peter Engelbrecht, Roman Englert,
and Joachim Meyer. 2011. “Modeling the Behavior of Users Who Are
Confronted with Security Mechanisms.” Computers & Security 30 (4): 242–56.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2011.01.001.

[50]

Brady, James. 2010. “An Investigation of Factors That Affect HIPAA Security
Compliance in Academic Medical Centers.” CCE Theses and Dissertations,
January. https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd/100/.

[51]

Ernest Chang, Shuchih, and Chin‐Shien Lin. 2007. “Exploring Organizational
Culture for Information Security Management.” Industrial Management &
Data Systems 107 (3): 438–58.
https://doi.org/10.1108/02635570710734316.

173

[52]

D’Arcy, John, Anat Hovav, and Dennis Galletta. 2009. “User Awareness of
Security Countermeasures and Its Impact on Information Systems Misuse: A
Deterrence Approach.” Information Systems Research 20 (1): 79–98.
https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1070.0160.

[53]

Warkentin, Merrill, Allen C Johnston, and Jordan Shropshire. 2011. “The
Influence of the Informal Social Learning Environment on Information
Privacy Policy Compliance Efficacy and Intention.” European Journal of
Information Systems 20 (3): 267–84. https://doi.org/10.1057/ejis.2010.72.

[54]

White, Garry. 2009. “STRATEGIC, TACTICAL, & OPERATIONAL
MANAGEMENT SECURITY MODEL.” Spring Journal of Computer Information
Systems 71.
http://130.18.86.27/faculty/warkentin/SecurityPapers/Leigh/White2009_J
CIS49_3_ManagementandSecurity.pdf.

[55]

Bunker, Guy. 2012. “Technology Is Not Enough: Taking a Holistic View for
Information Assurance.” Information Security Technical Report 17 (1-2): 19–
25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.istr.2011.12.002.

[56]

Cannoy, Sherrie Drye, and A. F. Salam. 2010. “A Framework for Health Care
Information Assurance Policy and Compliance.” Communications of the
ACM 53 (3): 126–31. https://doi.org/10.1145/1666420.1666453.

[57]

Vroom, Cheryl, and Rossouw von Solms. 2004. “Towards Information
Security Behavioural Compliance.” Computers & Security 23 (3): 191–98.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2004.01.012.
Thomson, Kerry-Lynn, and Rossouw von Solms. 2005. “Information Security

[58]

Obedience: A Definition.” Computers & Security 24 (1): 69–75.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2004.10.005.

174

[59]

Pahnila, Seppo, Siponen, Mikko, and Mahmood, Adam. 2007. "Employees'
Behaviour Toward IS Security Policy Compliance," in 40th Annual Hawaii
International Conference on Systems Sciences, Honolulu.

[60]

Corriss, Laura. 2010. "Information security governance: Integrating security
into the organizational culture," in Governance of Technology Information
and Policy, 26th annual Computer Security Applications Conference, West
Point, New York.

[61]

Weber, B., B. Alcaro, and V. Ciotti. 2001. “Avoiding HIPAA Hype: Preparing for
HIPAA Affordably.” Healthcare Financial Management: Journal of the
Healthcare Financial Management Association 55 (8): 62–65.
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11499283/.

[62]

Myyry, Liisa, Mikko Siponen, Seppo Pahnila, Tero Vartiainen, and Anthony
Vance. 2009. “What Levels of Moral Reasoning and Values Explain Adherence
to Information Security Rules? An Empirical Study.” European Journal of
Information Systems 18 (2): 126–39. https://doi.org/10.1057/ejis.2009.10.

[63]

Karjalainen, Mari, and Mikko Siponen. 2011. “Toward a New Meta-Theory for
Designing Information Systems (IS) Security Training Approaches.” Journal of
the Association for Information Systems 12 (8): 518–55.
https://doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00274.

[64]

Chen, Charlie, Shaw, Ruey-Shiang, & Yang, Samuel. 2010. "Mitigating
Information Security Risks By Increasing User Security Awareness: A Case
Study of An Information Security Awareness System," Information
Technology, Learning and Performance Journal 16 (3).

[65]

Veiga, Adéle da, and Nico Martins. 2015. “Improving the Information Security
Culture through Monitoring and Implementation Actions Illustrated through
a Case Study.” Computers & Security 49 (March): 162–76.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.12.006.

[66]

Shaw, R.S., Charlie C. Chen, Albert L. Harris, and Hui-Jou Huang. 2009. “The
Impact of Information Richness on Information Security Awareness Training
175

Effectiveness.” Computers & Education 52 (1): 92–100.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compedu.2008.06.011.
[67]

Puhakainen, and Siponen. 2010. “Improving Employees’ Compliance through
Information Systems Security Training: An Action Research Study.” MIS
Quarterly 34 (4): 757. https://doi.org/10.2307/25750704.

[68]

Leach, John. 2003. “Improving User Security Behaviour.” Computers &
Security 22 (8): 685–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-4048(03)00007-5.

[69]

Parsons, Kathryn, Agata McCormac, Marcus Butavicius, Malcolm Pattinson,
and Cate Jerram. 2014. “Determining Employee Awareness Using the Human
Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q).” Computers &
Security 42 (May): 165–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2013.12.003.

[70]

Van Niekerk, J.F., and R. Von Solms. 2010. “Information Security Culture: A
Management Perspective.” Computers & Security 29 (4): 476–86.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2009.10.005.

[71]

Ruighaver, A.B., S.B. Maynard, and S. Chang. 2007. “Organisational Security
Culture: Extending the End-User Perspective.” Computers & Security 26 (1):
56–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2006.10.008.

[72]

Posey, Clay, Rebecca J. Bennett, and Tom L. Roberts. 2011. “Understanding
the Mindset of the Abusive Insider: An Examination of Insiders’ Causal
Reasoning Following Internal Security Changes.” Computers & Security 30 (67): 486–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2011.05.002.

[73]

Spears, and Barki. 2010. “User Participation in Information Systems Security
Risk Management.” MIS Quarterly 34 (3): 503.
https://doi.org/10.2307/25750689.

176

[74]

Smith, Winchester, Bunker, and Jamieson. 2010. “Circuits of Power: A Study
of Mandated Compliance to an Information Systems Security ‘de Jure’
Standard in a Government Organization.” MIS Quarterly 34 (3): 463.
https://doi.org/10.2307/25750687.

[75]

Bowen, Pauline, Joan Hash, and Mark Wilson. 2006. “Information Security
Handbook: A Guide for Managers.” Www.nist.gov, December.
https://www.nist.gov/publications/information-security-handbook-guidemanagers.

[76]

HIPAA. 2019. “Healthcare Data Breach Statistics.” HIPAA Journal. 2019.
Accessed July 16, 2021. https://www.hipaajournal.com/healthcare-databreach-statistics/.

[77]

“Cost of a Data Breach Report 2020 2 Contents.” Accessed July 16, 2021. n.d.
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/RZAX14GX.

[78]

Box, Debra, and Dalenca Pottas. 2013. “Improving Information Security
Behaviour in the Healthcare Context.” Procedia Technology 9: 1093–1103.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.protcy.2013.12.122.

[79]

“16th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, PACIS 2012, Ho Chi
Minh City, Vietnam, 11-15 July 2012 - Researcher Publication.” n.d.
Researchr.org. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://researchr.org/publication/pacis-2012.

[80]

Alumaran, Saleh, Giampaolo Bella, and Feng Chen. 2015. “Culture Dimensions
of Information Systems Security in Saudi Arabia National Health
Services.” International Journal of Computer and Information Engineering 9
(2): 510–14. https://publications.waset.org/10000522/culture-dimensionsof-information-systems-security-in-saudi-arabia-national-health-services.

177

[18]

Mansur Hasib. 2014. Impact of Security Culture on Security Compliance in
Healthcare in the USA. S.L.: Createspace Independent P.

[82]

Maurer, Cara C., Pratima Bansal, and Mary M. Crossan. 2011. “Creating
Economic Value through Social Values: Introducing a Culturally Informed
Resource-Based View.” Organization Science 22 (2): 432–48.
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0546.

[83]

Pendleton, Marcus, Garcia-Lebron, Richard, Cho, Jin-Hee, Xu, Shouhuai. 2016.
“A Survey on Security Metrics,” ACM Computing Surveys, 49(4): 1-35.

[84]

Andress, Jason. 2015. The Basics of Information Security : Understanding the
Fundamentals of InfoSec in Theory and Practice. Waltham, Ma: Syngress ;
Amsterdam.

[85]

It Governance Institute. 2006. Information Security Governance : Guidance for
Boards of Directors and Executive Management. Rolling Meadows. Ill.: It
Governance Institute.

[86]

Saleh, Mohamed S., and Abdulkader Alfantookh. 2011. “A New
Comprehensive Framework for Enterprise Information Security Risk
Management.” Applied Computing and Informatics 9 (2): 107–18.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aci.2011.05.002.

[87]

Venter, H.S, and J.H.P Eloff. 2003. “A Taxonomy for Information Security
Technologies.” Computers & Security 22 (4): 299–307.
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-4048(03)00406-1.

[88]

Shamala, Palaniappan, Rabiah Ahmad, and Mariana Yusoff. 2013. “A
Conceptual Framework of Info Structure for Information Security Risk
Assessment (ISRA).” Journal of Information Security and Applications 18 (1):
45–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2013.07.002.

[89]

Haufe, Knut, Ricardo Colomo-Palacios, Srdan Dzombeta, Knud Brandis, and
Vladimir Stantchev. n.d. “Security Management Standards: A
178

Mapping.” Procedia Computer Science 100: 755–61. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.academia.edu/29737963/Security_Management_Standards_A_
Mapping.
[90]

Yasasin, Emrah, Julian Prester, Gerit Wagner, and Guido Schryen. 2020.
“Forecasting IT Security Vulnerabilities – an Empirical Analysis.” Computers
& Security 88 (January): 101610.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101610.

[91]

Ifenthaler, Dirk, and Marc Egloffstein. 2019. “Development and
Implementation of a Maturity Model of Digital Transformation.” TechTrends,
November. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11528-019-00457-4.

[92]

Brooks, Patti, Omar El-Gayar, and Surendra Sarnikar. 2015. “A Framework
for Developing a Domain Specific Business Intelligence Maturity Model:
Application to Healthcare.” International Journal of Information
Management 35 (3): 337–45.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2015.01.011.

[93]

Carvalho, João Vidal, Álvaro Rocha, and António Abreu. 2019. “Maturity
Assessment Methodology for HISMM - Hospital Information System Maturity
Model.” Journal of Medical Systems 43 (2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10916018-1143-y.

[94]

Thomas, Louise, and Joseph M. Woodside. 2016. “Social Media Maturity
Model.” International Journal of Healthcare Management 9 (1): 67–73.
https://doi.org/10.1080/20479700.2015.1101940.

[95]

ISACA.. 2012. Cobit 5 : For Information Security. Rolling Meadows, Il.

[96]

ISO - International Organization for Standardization. 2019. “ISO/IEC
27000:2018.” ISO. February 4, 2019.
https://www.iso.org/standard/73906.html.
179

[97]

Keller, Nicole. 2018. “Framework Documents.” NIST. February 5, 2018.
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/framework.

[98]

“Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
Framework, Version 1.0.” 1999. Cmu.edu. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=13473.

[99]

“HITRUST Alliance | HITRUST CSF | Information Risk Management.” 2021.
HITRUST Alliance. July 15, 2021. https://hitrustalliance.net/producttool/hitrust-csf/?gclid=CjwKCAjw3MSHBhB3EiwAxcaEu3Y7ENt8zDSHAffetQACAzA1If6YRDvLrr0qeoVQebXoU1taLfwHRoCAqsQAvD_BwE.

[100] Sepúlveda Estay, Daniel A., Rishikesh Sahay, Michael B. Barfod, and Christian
D. Jensen. 2020. “A Systematic Review of Cyber-Resilience Assessment
Frameworks.” Computers & Security 97 (October): 101996.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2020.101996.
[101] Van Niekerk, J.F., and R. Von Solms. 2010. “Information Security Culture: A
Management Perspective.” Computers & Security 29 (4): 476–86.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2009.10.005.
[102] Da Veiga, A., and J.H.P. Eloff. 2010. “A Framework and Assessment
Instrument for Information Security Culture.” Computers & Security 29 (2):
196–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2009.09.002.
[103] Hajny, Jan, Sara Ricci, Edmundas Piesarskas, Olivier Levillain, Letterio
Galletta, and Rocco De Nicola. 2021. “Framework, Tools and Good Practices
for Cybersecurity Curricula.” IEEE Access 9: 94723–47.
https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3093952.
[104] Chowdhury, Noman H., Marc T.P. Adam, and Timm Teubner. 2020. “Time
Pressure in Human Cybersecurity Behavior: Theoretical Framework and
180

Countermeasures.” Computers & Security 97 (October): 101963.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2020.101963.
[105] Bodin, Lawrence D., Lawrence A. Gordon, and Martin P. Loeb. 2005.
“Evaluating Information Security Investments Using the Analytic Hierarchy
Process.” Communications of the ACM 48 (2): 78–83.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1042091.1042094.
[106] Nazareth, Derek L., and Jae Choi. 2015. “A System Dynamics Model for
Information Security Management.” Information & Management 52 (1): 123–
34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2014.10.009.
[107] Liu, Zhaoxi, Wei Wei, Lingfeng Wang, Chee-Wooi Ten, and Yeonwoo Rho.
2021. “An Actuarial Framework for Power System Reliability Considering
Cybersecurity Threats.” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 36 (2): 851–64.
https://doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2020.3018701.
[108] Gordon, Lawrence A., Martin P. Loeb, and Lei Zhou. 2020. “Integrating Cost–
Benefit Analysis into the NIST Cybersecurity Framework via the Gordon–
Loeb Model.” Journal of Cybersecurity 6 (1).
https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyaa005.
[109] Lee, In. 2021. “Cybersecurity: Risk Management Framework and Investment
Cost Analysis.” Business Horizons, February.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2021.02.022.
[110] Solic, Kresimir, Hrvoje Ocevcic, and Marin Golub. 2015. “The Information
Systems’ Security Level Assessment Model Based on an Ontology and
Evidential Reasoning Approach.” Computers & Security 55 (November): 100–
112. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.08.004.

181

[111] M. Zaki, V. Sivakumar, S. Shrivastava, K. Gaurav," 2021. Third International
conference on intelligent communication technologies and virtual mobile
networks.
[112] Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil Gupta, Michael Mylrea, and Hirak Patangia. 2020.
“Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical
Paradigm: Enhanced Prioritized Gap Analysis.” Future Generation Computer
Systems 105 (April): 410–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2019.12.018.
[113] “(PDF) a Framework for Comparing Different Information Security Risk
Analysis Methodologies.” n.d. ResearchGate. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228866471_A_framework_for_co
mparing_different_information_security_risk_analysis_methodologies.
[114] “Dependable Computing - EDCC 2020 Workshops | SpringerLink.” n.d.
Link.springer.com. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-030-58462-7.pdf.
[115] Benz, Michael, and Dave Chatterjee. 2020. “Calculated Risk? A Cybersecurity
Evaluation Tool for SMEs.” Business Horizons 63 (4): 531–40.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2020.03.010.
[116] Karabacak, Bilge, and Ibrahim Sogukpinar. 2005. “ISRAM: Information
Security Risk Analysis Method.” Computers & Security 24 (2): 147–59.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2004.07.004.
[117] Feng, Nan, and Minqiang Li. 2011. “An Information Systems Security Risk
Assessment Model under Uncertain Environment.” Applied Soft Computing 11
(7): 4332–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asoc.2010.06.005.
[118] Gusmão, Ana Paula Henriques de, Lúcio Camara e Silva, Maisa Mendonça
Silva, Thiago Poleto, and Ana Paula Cabral Seixas Costa. 2016. “Information
Security Risk Analysis Model Using Fuzzy Decision Theory.” International
182

Journal of Information Management 36 (1): 25–34.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2015.09.003.
[119] Aliyu, Aliyu, Leandros Maglaras, Ying He, Iryna Yevseyeva, Eerke Boiten,
Allan Cook, and Helge Janicke. 2020. “A Holistic Cybersecurity Maturity
Assessment Framework for Higher Education Institutions in the United
Kingdom.” Applied Sciences 10 (10): 3660.
https://doi.org/10.3390/app10103660.
[120] Rea-Guaman, Angel Marcelo, Jezreel Mejía, Tomas San Feliu, and Jose A.
Calvo-Manzano. 2020. “AVARCIBER: A Framework for Assessing
Cybersecurity Risks.” Cluster Computing, January.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-019-03034-9.
[121] Swanson, Marianne, and National Institute Of Standards And Technology
(U.S. 2003. Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems.
Gaithersburg, Md: U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, National Institute Of Standards
And Technology ; Washington, D.C.
[122] “(PDF) the Adoption of Information Security Management Standards: A
Literature Review.” n.d. ResearchGate. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260019491_The_Adoption_of_In
formation_Security_Management_Standards_A_Literature_Review.
doi:10.4018/978-1-60566-326-5.ch006
[123] Vroom, Cheryl, and Rossouw von Solms. 2004. “Towards Information
Security Behavioural Compliance.” Computers & Security 23 (3): 191–98.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2004.01.012.
[124] Saint-Germain, René. 2005. “Information Security Management Best Practice
Based on ISO/IEC 17799 the International Information Security Standard
Provides a Framework for Ensuring Business Continuity, Maintaining Legal
Compliance, and Achieving a Competitive Edge.” Undefined. 2005.
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Information-Security183

Management-Best-Practice-Based-SaintGermain/53f16a5a62e2bac36fea38158c1e8af80fac683a.
[125] Alter, Steven, and Susan A. Sherer. 2004. “A General, but Readily Adaptable
Model of Information System Risk.” Communications of the Association for
Information Systems 14. https://doi.org/10.17705/1cais.01401.
[126] Jansen, Wayne. 2009. “Directions in Security Metrics Research.” Csrc.nist.gov.
April 30, 2009. https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/7564/final.
[127] W Krag Brotby. 2009. Information Security Management Metrics : A Definitive
Guide to Effective Security Monitoring and Measurement. Boca Raton: Crc
Press.
[128] Sohrabi Safa, Nader, Rossouw Von Solms, and Steven Furnell. 2016.
“Information Security Policy Compliance Model in Organizations.” Computers
& Security 56 (February): 70–82.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.10.006.
[129] Kotulic, Andrew G., and Jan Guynes Clark. 2004. “Why There Aren’t More
Information Security Research Studies.” Information & Management 41 (5):
597–607. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2003.08.001.
[130] Black, Paul E., Karen Scarfone, and Murugiah Souppaya. 2008. “Cyber
Security Metrics and Measures.” Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology
for Homeland Security, November.
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470087923.hhs440.
[131] Da Veiga, Adéle, and Nico Martins. 2015. “Information Security Culture and
Information Protection Culture: A Validated Assessment
Instrument.” Computer Law & Security Review 31 (2): 243–56.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2015.01.005.
184

[132] “4 – SMART Metrics — HowTo.comMetrics.” n.d. Howto.drkpi.ch. Accessed
July 16, 2021. http://howto.drkpi.ch/smart-benchmarking/.
[133] Lean Healthcare Exchange, “SMART Metrics.” Accessed March 26, 2018.
http://www.leanhealthcareexchange.com/smart-metrics/.
[134] Siponen, Mikko. 2006. “Information Security Standards Focus on the
Existence of Process, Not Its Content.” Communications of the ACM 49 (8): 97.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1145287.1145316.
[135] “Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model (EMRAM) | HIMSS.” 2021.
Www.himss.org. January 20, 2021. http://www.himssanalytics.org/emram.
[136] “European Hospitals EMRAM Maturity Overview.” n.d.
https://na.eventscloud.com/file_uploads/0cf548ab2f4eaeafd0a6b4ce615f03
99_Hoyt_Session_1_European_Hospitals_EMRAM_Maturity_Overview_CIOSu
mmit.pdf.
[137] “News | HIMSS.” 2019. Www.himss.org. October 24, 2019.
http://www.himss.org/news/himss-survey-finds-increased-efficienciesclinical-staff-quality-performance-most-frequently-cited.
[138] Shah, Kieran, Clifford Lo, Michele Babich, Nicole W Tsao, and Nick J Bansback.
2016. “Bar Code Medication Administration Technology: A Systematic
Review of Impact on Patient Safety When Used with Computerized
Prescriber Order Entry and Automated Dispensing Devices.” The Canadian
Journal of Hospital Pharmacy 69 (5): 394–402.
https://doi.org/10.4212/cjhp.v69i5.1594.
[139] “Adoption Model for Analytics Maturity.” 2017. HIMSS Analytics - North
America. January 10, 2017. https://www.himssanalytics.org/amam.

185

[140] “Standards enhance protection against cybercrime.” Accessed July 10, 2021.
http://www.rsm.nl/about-rsm/news/detail/1433-standards-enhanceprotection-against-cybercrime.
[141] “ISO Survey of Global Certificates Shows 3% Growth.” 2015. IIOC. September
22, 2015. https://iioc.org/corporate-news/iso-survey-of-global-certificatesshows-3-growth/.
[142] Spears, Janine L. n.d. “A Holistic Risk Analysis Method for Identifying
Information Security Risks.” Security Management, Integrity, and Internal
Control in Information Systems, 185–202. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-31167-x_12.
[143] Willison, Robert, and Mikko Siponen. 2009. “Overcoming the
Insider.” Communications of the ACM 52 (9): 133.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1562164.1562198.
[144] Siponen, Mikko, and Anthony Vance. 2010. “Neutralization: New Insights into
the Problem of Employee Information Systems Security Policy
Violations.” MIS Quarterly 34 (3): 487–502.
https://doi.org/10.2307/25750688.
[145] “(R. Rastogi, R. Von Solms) Information Security Service Culture Information Security for End-Users.” n.d. Www.jucs.org. Accessed July 16,
2021.
http://www.jucs.org/jucs_18_12/information_security_service_culture.
[146] Zafar, Humayun, and Jan Guynes Clark. 2009. “Current State of Information
Security Research in IS.” Communications of the Association for Information
Systems 24. https://doi.org/10.17705/1cais.02434.
[147] D’Arcy, John, and Anat Hovav. 2008. “Does One Size Fit All? Examining the
Differential Effects of IS Security Countermeasures.” Journal of Business
Ethics 89 (S1): 59–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9909-7.
186

[148] Ashenden, Debi. 2008. “Information Security Management: A Human
Challenge?” Information Security Technical Report 13 (4): 195–201.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.istr.2008.10.006.
[149] Rabii, Anass, Saliha Assoul, Khadija Ouazzani Touhami, and Ounsa Roudies.
2020. “Information and Cyber Security Maturity Models: A Systematic
Literature Review.” Information & Computer Security ahead-of-print (aheadof-print). https://doi.org/10.1108/ics-03-2019-0039.
[150] Anderson, Kent. 2007. “Convergence: A Holistic Approach to Risk
Management.” Network Security 2007 (5): 4–7.
https://doi.org/10.1016/s1353-4858(07)70033-8.
[151] Frayssinet Delgado, Maurice, Doris Esenarro, Francisco Fernando Juárez
Regalado, and Mónica Díaz Reátegui. 2021. “Methodology Based on the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework as a Proposal for Cybersecurity Management in
Government Organizations.” 3C TIC: Cuadernos de Desarrollo Aplicados a Las
TIC 10 (2): 123–41. https://doi.org/10.17993/3ctic.2021.102.123-141.
[152] Syafrizal, Melwin, Siti Rahayu Selamat, and Nurul Azma Zakaria. 2020.
“Analysis of Cybersecurity Standard and Framework
Components.” International Journal of Communication Networks and
Information Security (IJCNIS) 12 (3).
https://www.ijcnis.org/index.php/ijcnis/article/view/4817.
[153] “Incorporating Multiple Criteria in HTA: Methods and Processes.” 2011.
Www.ohe.org. March 1, 2011.
https://www.ohe.org/publications/incorporating-multiple-criteria-htamethods-and-processes.
[154] Marsh, Kevin, Maarten IJzerman, Praveen Thokala, Rob Baltussen, Meindert
Boysen, Zoltán Kaló, Thomas Lönngren, et al. 2016. “Multiple Criteria
187

Decision Analysis for Health Care Decision Making—Emerging Good
Practices: Report 2 of the ISPOR MCDA Emerging Good Practices Task
Force.” Value in Health 19 (2): 125–37.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2015.12.016.
[155] Langemeyer, Johannes, Erik Gómez-Baggethun, Dagmar Haase, Sebastian
Scheuer, and Thomas Elmqvist. 2016. “Bridging the Gap between Ecosystem
Service Assessments and Land-Use Planning through Multi-Criteria Decision
Analysis (MCDA).” Environmental Science & Policy 62 (August): 45–56.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.02.013.
[156] Adunlin, Georges, Vakaramoko Diaby, and Hong Xiao. 2014. “Application of
Multicriteria Decision Analysis in Health Care: A Systematic Review and
Bibliometric Analysis.” Health Expectations 18 (6): 1894–1905.
https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.12287.
[157] Drake, Julia I., Juan Carlos Trujillo de Hart, Clara Monleón, Walter Toro, and
Joice Valentim. 2017. “Utilization of Multiple-Criteria Decision Analysis
(MCDA) to Support Healthcare Decision-Making FIFARMA, 2016.” Journal of
Market Access & Health Policy 5 (1).
https://doi.org/10.1080/20016689.2017.1360545.
[158] Mühlbacher, Axel C., and Anika Kaczynski. 2015. “Making Good Decisions in
Healthcare with Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis: The Use, Current Research
and Future Development of MCDA.” Applied Health Economics and Health
Policy 14 (1): 29–40. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-015-0203-4.
[159] Nutt, David J, Leslie A King, and Lawrence D Phillips. 2010. “Drug Harms in
the UK: A Multicriteria Decision Analysis.” The Lancet 376 (9752): 1558–65.
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(10)61462-6.
[160] Diaby, Vakaramoko, Ron Goeree, Jeffrey Hoch, and Uwe Siebert. 2014. “MultiCriteria Decision Analysis for Health Technology Assessment in Canada:
Insights from an Expert Panel Discussion.” Expert Review of
188

Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research 15 (1): 13–19.
https://doi.org/10.1586/14737167.2015.965155.
[161] Marsh, Kevin, Tereza Lanitis, David Neasham, Panagiotis Orfanos, and Jaime
Caro. 2014. “Assessing the Value of Healthcare Interventions Using MultiCriteria Decision Analysis: A Review of the
Literature.” PharmacoEconomics 32 (4): 345–65.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40273-014-0135-0.
[162] Ou, Yang, Yu-Ping, Shieh, How-Ming, Tzeng, Gwo-Hshiung. 2009. “A VIKOR
Technique Based on DEMATEL and ANP for Information Security Risk
Control Assessment.” International Journal of Information Technology &
Decision Making 08 (02): 267–87.
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219622009003375.
[163] Ou Yang, Yu-Ping, How-Ming Shieh, and Gwo-Hshiung Tzeng. 2013. “A VIKOR
Technique Based on DEMATEL and ANP for Information Security Risk
Control Assessment.” Information Sciences 232 (May): 482–500.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2011.09.012.
[164] Lo, Chi-Chun, and Wan-Jia Chen. 2012. “A Hybrid Information Security Risk
Assessment Procedure Considering Interdependences between
Controls.” Expert Systems with Applications 39 (1): 247–57.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2011.07.015.
[165] El-Gayar, Omar F., and Brian D. Fritz. 2010. “A Web-Based Multi-Perspective
Decision Support System for Information Security Planning.” Decision
Support Systems 50 (1): 43–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2010.07.001.

189

[166] AouniBelaı̈d, and Ossama Kettani. 2001. “Goal Programming Model: A
Glorious History and a Promising Future.” European Journal of Operational
Research 133 (2): 225–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(00)002940.
[167] Sussex, Jon, Pierrick Rollet, Martina Garau, Claude Schmitt, Alastair Kent, and
Adam Hutchings. 2013. “A Pilot Study of Multicriteria Decision Analysis for
Valuing Orphan Medicines.” Value in Health 16 (8): 1163–69.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2013.10.002.
[168] Aldlaigan, Abdullah H., and Francis A. Buttle. 2002. “SYSTRA‐SQ: A New
Measure of Bank Service Quality.” International Journal of Service Industry
Management 13 (4): 362–81.
https://doi.org/10.1108/09564230210445041.
[169] Gerdsri, Pisek, and Dundar F. Kocaoglu. 2007. “Technology Policy Instrument
(TPI): A Decision Model for Evaluating Emerging Technologies for National
Technology Policy - Research Framework.” IEEE Xplore. August 1, 2007.
https://doi.org/10.1109/PICMET.2007.4349478.
[170] Saaty, Thomas L. 2008. “Decision Making with the Analytic Hierarchy
Process.” International Journal of Services Sciences 1 (1): 83.
https://doi.org/10.1504/ijssci.2008.017590.
[171] Kodali, Rambabu, and Subhash Chandra. 2001. “Analytical Hierarchy Process
for Justification of Total Productive Maintenance.” Production Planning &
Control 12 (7): 695–705. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537280010024045.
[172] Coates, Joseph F. 2010. “The Future of Foresight—a US
Perspective.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 77 (9): 1428–37.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2010.07.009.

190

[173] Calof, Jonathan, and Jack Smith. 2009. “The Integrative Domain of Foresight
and Competitive Intelligence and Its Impact on R&D Management.” R&D
Management 40 (1): 31–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679310.2009.00579.x.
[174] Fordham, Richard, and M Ba. n.d. “Volume 4, Number 2.” Accessed July 16,
2021. http://www.bandolier.org.uk/painres/download/whatis/pbma.pdf.
[175] Edwards, Rhiannon Tudor, Joanna M Charles, Sara Thomas, Julie Bishop,
David Cohen, Sam Groves, Ciaran Humphreys, Helen Howson, and Peter
Bradley. 2014. “A National Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis
(PBMA) of Health Improvement Spending across Wales: Disinvestment and
Reinvestment across the Life Course.” BMC Public Health 14 (1).
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-14-837.
[176] Roy, Bernard. 1991. “The Outranking Approach and the Foundations of
Electre Methods.” Theory and Decision 31 (1): 49–73.
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134132.
[177] Figueira, José Rui, Salvatore Greco, Bernard Roy, and Roman Słowiński. 2012.
“An Overview of ELECTRE Methods and Their Recent Extensions.” Journal of
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 20 (1-2): 61–85.
https://doi.org/10.1002/mcda.1482.
[178] Roy, Bernard, and Daniel Vanderpooten. 1997. “An Overview on ‘the
European School of MCDA: Emergence, Basic Features and Current
Works.’” European Journal of Operational Research 99 (1): 26–27.
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(96)00379-7.
[179] S. K. Amponsah. 2012. “Logistic Preference Function for Preference Ranking
Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluation (PROMETHEE) Decision

191

Analysis.” African Journal of Mathematics and Computer Science Research 5
(6). https://doi.org/10.5897/ajmcsr12.011.
[180] Hyde, Kylie, Holger R. Maier, and Christopher Colby. 2003. “Incorporating
Uncertainty in the PROMETHEE MCDA Method.” Journal of Multi-Criteria
Decision Analysis 12 (4-5): 245–59. https://doi.org/10.1002/mcda.361.
[181] Miettinen, Kaisa. 2012. “Survey of Methods to Visualize Alternatives in
Multiple Criteria Decision Making Problems.” OR Spectrum 36 (1): 3–37.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-012-0297-0.
[182] Goswami, Shankha Shubhra. 2020. “Outranking Methods: Promethee I and
Promethee II.” Foundations of Management 12 (1): 93–110.
https://doi.org/10.2478/fman-2020-0008.
[183] Goetghebeur, MM, M Wagner, H Khoury, R Levitt, LJ Erickson, and D Rindress.
2008. “PMC50 EVIDENCE ANDVALUE: IMPACT on DECISION MAKING—the
EVIDEM FRAMEWORK and POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS.” Value in Health 11
(3): A183–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1098-3015(10)70584-2.
[184] Thokala, P. 2012. “PRM60 Operationalising Multiple Criteria Decision
Analysis for Health Technology Assessment.” Value in Health 15 (4): A169.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2012.03.915.
[185] Xu, Zeshui. 2005. “On Method for Uncertain Multiple Attribute Decision
Making Problems with Uncertain Multiplicative Preference Information on
Alternatives.” Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making 4 (2): 131–39.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10700-004-5869-2.
[186] Panda, Monalisa, and Alok Kumar Jagadev. 2018. “TOPSIS in Multi-Criteria
Decision Making: A Survey.” IEEE Xplore. September 1, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDSBA.2018.00017.

192

[187] Lin, Kuo-Sui. 2019. “A New Distance Measure for MCDM Problem Using
TOPSIS Method.” IEEE Xplore. December 1, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1109/iCMLDE49015.2019.00015.
[188] Shih, Hsu-Shih, Huan-Jyh Shyur, and E. Stanley Lee. 2007. “An Extension of
TOPSIS for Group Decision Making.” Mathematical and Computer
Modelling 45 (7-8): 801–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2006.03.023.
[189] Alessio Ishizaka, and Philippe Nemery. 2013. Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis :
Methods and Software. Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley.
[190] International Conference on Multiple Criteria Decision Making, Theodor J
Stewart, and Robin C Van den Honert, eds. 1998. Trends in Multicriteria
Decision Making: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Multiple
Criteria Decision Making, Cape Town, South Africa, January 1997. Open
WorldCat. Berlin; New York: Springer-Verlag.
https://www.worldcat.org/title/trends-in-multicriteria-decision-makingproceedings-of-the-13th-international-conference-on-multiple-criteriadecision-making-cape-town-south-africa-january-1997/oclc/39360544.
[191] “(PDF) an Analysis of Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methods.” n.d.
ResearchGate. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275960103_An_analysis_of_mult
i-criteria_decision_making_methods.
[192] Gerdsri, N., and D.F. Kocaoglu. 2003. “An Analytical Approach to Building a
Technology Development Envelope (TDE) for Roadmapping of Emerging
Technologies: A Case Study of Emerging Electronic Cooling Technologies for
Computer Servers.” IEEE Xplore. July 1, 2003.
https://doi.org/10.1109/PICMET.2003.1222817.

193

[193] Martino, Joseph P. 1993. “Forecasting and Management of
Technology.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 43 (3-4): 383–84.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-1625(93)90064-e.
[194] Cantrill, J. A., B. Sibbald, andBuetow, S. . 1996. “The Delphi and Nominal
Group Techniques in Health Services Research.” International Journal of
Pharmacy Practice 4 (2): 67–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.20427174.1996.tb00844.x.
[195] Phan, Kenny. 2013. “Innovation Measurement: A Decision Framework to
Determine Innovativeness of a Company.” Dissertations and Theses, May.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1017.
[196] Gibson, Elizabeth, Tugrul U. Daim, and Marina Dabic. 2019. “Evaluating
University Industry Collaborative Research Centers.” Technological
Forecasting and Social Change 146 (September): 181–202.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2019.05.014.
[197] Meelen, Toon, and Jacco Farla. 2013. “Towards an Integrated Framework for
Analysing Sustainable Innovation Policy.” Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management 25 (8): 957–70.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2013.823146.
[198] Saaty, Thomas L. 1984. “The Analytic Hierarchy Process: Decision Making in
Complex Environments.” Quantitative Assessment in Arms Control, 285–308.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-2805-6_12.
[199] Cetindamar, Dilek, Tugrul U. Daim, Berna Beyhan, and Nuri Başoğlu, eds.
2013. Strategic Planning Decisions in the High Tech
Industry. Www.springer.com. London: Springer-Verlag.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9781447148869.
194

[200] Daim, Tugrul U., Byung-Sung Yoon, John Lindenberg, Robert Grizzi, Judith
Estep, and Terry Oliver. 2018. “Strategic Roadmapping of Robotics
Technologies for the Power Industry: A Multicriteria Technology
Assessment.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 131 (June): 49–66.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.06.006.
[201] Khalifa, Rafaa I., and Tugrul U. Daim. 2021. “Project Assessment Tools
Evaluation and Selection Using the Hierarchical Decision Modeling: Case of
State Departments of Transportation in the United States.” Journal of
Management in Engineering 37 (1): 05020015.
https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000858.
[202] “Logistics Service Provider Selection Decision Making for Healthcare
Industry Based on a Novel Weighted Density-Based Hierarchical Clustering.”
2021. Advanced Engineering Informatics 48 (April): 101301.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aei.2021.101301.
[203] Sheikh, Nasir J., Kiyoon Kim, and Dundar F. Kocaoglu. 2016. “Use of
Hierarchical Decision Modeling to Select Target Markets for a New Personal
Healthcare Device.” Health Policy and Technology 5 (2): 99–112.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2015.12.001.
[204] Chan, Leong, and Tugrul Daim. 2017. “A Research and Development Decision
Model for Pharmaceutical Industry: Case of China.” R&D Management 48 (2):
223–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/radm.12285.
[205] Pereira, Cristiano Gonçalves, Joao Ricardo Lavoie, Edwin Garces, Fernanda
Basso, Marina Dabić, Geciane Silveira Porto, and Tugrul Daim. 2019.
“Forecasting of Emerging Therapeutic Monoclonal Antibodies Patents Based
on a Decision Model.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 139
(February): 185–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.11.002.

195

[206] Hogaboam, Liliya, and Tugrul Daim. 2018. “Technology Adoption Potential of
Medical Devices: The Case of Wearable Sensor Products for Pervasive Care in
Neurosurgery and Orthopedics.” Health Policy and Technology 7 (4): 409–19.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2018.10.011.
[207] Lavoie, Joao Ricardo, Tugrul Daim, and Elias G. Carayannis. 2021.
“Technology Transfer Evaluation: Driving Organizational Changes through a
Hierarchical Scoring Model.” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,
1–15. https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2020.3042452.
[208] Daim, Tugrul U., ed. 2016. Hierarchical Decision Modeling: Essays in Honor of
Dundar F. Kocaoglu. Www.springer.com. Springer International Publishing.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319185576.
[209] Giadedi, Abdulhakim. 2020. “A Scoring Model to Evaluate Offshore Oil
Projects: Case of Eni and Mellitah Oil & Gas.” Dissertations and Theses,
September. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.7473.
[210] Rahman, Nayem, Tugrul Daim, and Nuri Basoglu. 2021. “Exploring the
Factors Influencing Big Data Technology Acceptance.” IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management, 1–16.
https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2021.3066153.
[211] Garces, Edwin, Daim, Tugrul. 2021. “Evaluating R&D Projects in Regulated
Utilities: the case of Power Transmission Utilities.” IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management, 2021.
[212] Khanam, Momtaj, and Tugrul Daim. 2021. “A Market Diffusion Potential
(MDP) Assessment Model for Residential Energy Efficient (EE) Technologies
in the U.S.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 144 (July): 110968.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2021.110968.

196

[213] Barham, Husam, and Tugrul Daim. 2020. “The Use of Readiness Assessment
for Big Data Projects.” Sustainable Cities and Society 60 (September): 102233.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2020.102233.
[214] Lavoie, Joao Ricardo, and Tugrul Daim. 2020. “Towards the Assessment of
Technology Transfer Capabilities: An Action Research-Enhanced HDM
Model.” Technology in Society 60 (February): 101217.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.101217.
[215] Abotah, Remal, and Tugrul U. Daim. 2017. “Towards Building a Multi
Perspective Policy Development Framework for Transition into Renewable
Energy.” Sustainable Energy Technologies and Assessments 21 (June): 67–88.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seta.2017.04.004.
[216] Neshati, Ramin, and Tugrul U. Daim. 2017. “Participation in Technology
Standards Development: A Decision Model for the Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) Industry.” The Journal of High Technology
Management Research 28 (1): 47–60.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hitech.2017.04.004.
[217] Iskin, Ibrahim, and Tugrul U. Daim. 2016. “An Assessment Model for Energy
Efficiency Program Planning in Electric Utilities: Case of Northwest
U.S.” Sustainable Energy Technologies and Assessments 15 (June): 42–59.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seta.2016.03.002.
[218] Wang, Bing, Dundar F. Kocaoglu, Tugrul U. Daim, and Jiting Yang. 2010. “A
Decision Model for Energy Resource Selection in China.” Energy Policy 38
(11): 7130–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.07.031.
[219] Chen, Hongyi, and Dundar F. Kocaoglu. 2008. “A Sensitivity Analysis
Algorithm for Hierarchical Decision Models.” European Journal of Operational
Research 185 (1): 266–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.12.029.
197

[220] “Assessment of Technology Adoption Potential of Medical Devices: Case of
Wearable Sensor Products for Pervasive Care in Neurosurgery and
Orthopedics - ProQuest.” n.d. ww.proquest.com. Accessed July 16, 2021.
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2030566122?pqorigsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true.
[221] Fink, A, J Kosecoff, M Chassin, and R H Brook. 1984. “Consensus Methods:
Characteristics and Guidelines for Use.” American Journal of Public Health 74
(9): 979–83. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.74.9.979.
[222] McKenna, Hugh P. 1994. “The Delphi Technique: A Worthwhile Research
Approach for Nursing?” Journal of Advanced Nursing 19 (6): 1221–25.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2648.1994.tb01207.x.
[223] Hasson, Felicity, Sinead Keeney, and Hugh McKenna. 2000. “Research
Guidelines for the Delphi Survey Technique.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 32
(4): 1008–15. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2648.2000.t01-1-01567.x.
[224] “What Is a Security Expert?” n.d. (ISC)2 Blog. Accessed July 16, 2021.
http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2015/02/what-is-a-security-expert.html.
[225] Tran, Thien. 2000. “Strategic Evaluation of University Knowledge and
Technology Transfer Effectiveness,” January.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1059.
[226] Goodman, Claire M. 1987. “The Delphi Technique: A Critique.” Journal of
Advanced Nursing 12 (6): 729–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.13652648.1987.tb01376.x.
[227] Okoli, Chitu, and Suzanne D. Pawlowski. 2004. “The Delphi Method as a
Research Tool: An Example, Design Considerations and
Applications.” Information & Management 42 (1): 15–29.
https://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/976864/.
198

[228] Knol, Anne B, Pauline Slottje, Jeroen P van der Sluijs, and Erik Lebret. 2010.
“The Use of Expert Elicitation in Environmental Health Impact Assessment: A
Seven Step Procedure.” Environmental Health 9 (1).
https://doi.org/10.1186/1476-069x-9-19.
[229] Dalkey, Norman, and Olaf Helmer. 1963. “An Experimental Application of the
DELPHI Method to the Use of Experts.” Management Science 9 (3): 458–67.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.3.458.
[230] Preble, John F. 1984. “The Selection of Delphi Panels for Strategic Planning
Purposes.” Strategic Management Journal 5 (2): 157–70.
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250050206.
[231] Akins, Ralitsa B, Homer Tolson, and Bryan R Cole. 2005. “Stability of
Response Characteristics of a Delphi Panel: Application of Bootstrap Data
Expansion.” BMC Medical Research Methodology 5 (1).
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-5-37.
[232] “Cleland, David I. And Dundar F. Kocaoglu Engineering Management,
McGraw-Hill, 1981 (CK) | Engineering | System.” n.d. Scribd. Accessed July 16,
2021. https://www.scribd.com/document/308713942/Cleland-David-I-andDundar-F-Kocaoglu-Engineering-Management-McGraw-Hill-1981-CK.
[233] Kocaoglu, Dundar. “Hierarchical decision modeling – a participative approach
to technology planning, in Proceedings of International Congress on
Technology & Technology Exchange: Technology & the World Around Us, 1984,
pp. 481–482.
[234] Portland State University, Department of Engineering and Technology
Management. “HDM Software.”
[235] Abbas, Mustafa. 2016. “Consistency Analysis for Judgment Quantification in
Hierarchical Decision Model.” Dissertations and Theses, March.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.2695.
199

[236] “Encyclopedia of Quantitative Risk Analysis and Assessment | Wiley.” n.d.
Wiley.com. Accessed August 16, 2020. https://www.wiley.com/enus/Encyclopedia+of+Quantitative+Risk+Analysis+and+Assessment-p9780470035498.
[237] Sheskin, David J. 2007. Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical
Procedures. Boca Raton, Fl: Chapman & Hall/Crc.
[238] Bartko, John J. 1976. “On Various Intraclass Correlation Reliability
Coefficients.” Psychological Bulletin 83 (5): 762–65.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.83.5.762.
[239] Shrout, Patrick E., and Joseph L. Fleiss. 1979. “Intraclass Correlations: Uses in
Assessing Rater Reliability.” Psychological Bulletin 86 (2): 420–28.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.86.2.420.
[240] Gibson, Elizabeth. 2016. “A Measurement System for Science and Engineering
Research Center Performance Evaluation.” Dissertations and Theses,
November. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.3276.
[241] Estep, Judith. 2017. “Development of a Technology Transfer Score for
Evaluating Research Proposals: Case Study of Demand Response
Technologies in the Pacific Northwest.” Dissertations and Theses, February.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.5363.
[242] Kostoff, Ronald N. 2006. “Systematic Acceleration of Radical Discovery and
Innovation in Science and Technology.” Technological Forecasting and Social
Change 73 (8): 923–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2005.09.004.
[243] Geisler, Eliezer. 2002. “The Metrics of Technology Evaluation: Where We
Stand and Where We Should Go from Here.” International Journal of
Technology Management 24 (4): 341.
https://doi.org/10.1504/ijtm.2002.003060.
200

[244] Martin, Ben R. 2010. “The Origins of the Concept of ‘Foresight’ in Science and
Technology: An Insider’s Perspective.” Technological Forecasting and Social
Change 77 (9): 1438–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2010.06.009.
[245] Lynn, Mary R., Eve L. Layman, and Sheila P. Englebardt. 1998. “Nursing
Administration Research Priorities.” The Journal of Nursing Administration 28
(5): 7–11. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005110-199805000-00002.
[246] Jones, J., and D. Hunter. 1995. “Qualitative Research: Consensus Methods for
Medical and Health Services Research.” BMJ 311 (7001): 376–80.
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.311.7001.376.
[247] Gerdsri, Nathasit. 2005. “An Analytical Approach on Building a Technology
Development Envelope (TDE) for Roadmapping of Emerging Technologies.”
Dissertations and Theses.
[248] Merrick, Jason R. W., J. Rene van Dorp, and Amita Singh. 2005. “Analysis of
Correlated Expert Judgments from Extended Pairwise
Comparisons.” Decision Analysis 2 (1): 17–29.
https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.1050.0031.
[249] Meyer, Mary A., and Jane M. Booker. 1987. Eliciting and Analyzing Expert
Judgment: A Practical Guide. Amazon. https://www.amazon.com/ElicitingAnalyzing-Expert-Judgment-Probability/dp/0898714745.
[250] Handcock, Mark S., and Krista J. Gile. 2011. “Comment: On the Concept of
Snowball Sampling.” Sociological Methodology 41 (1): 367–71.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9531.2011.01243.x.
[251] “The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods.” 2008.
http://www.yanchukvladimir.com/docs/Library/Sage%20Encyclopedia%2
0of%20Qualitative%20Research%20Methods-%202008.pdf.
201

[252] Lappas, Theodoros, Kun Liu, and Evimaria Terzi. 2009. “Finding a Team of
Experts in Social Networks.” Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining - KDD ’09.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1557019.1557074.
[253] Center for Internet Security (CIS. Accessed April 4, 2021.
https://www.cisecurity.org/.
[254] HealthITSecurity. 2021. “Scripps Reports Data Theft, EHR Back Online, but
Global Outages Persist.” HealthITSecurity. June 1, 2021.
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/attack-updates-scripps-health-ehr-backonline-global-outages-persist.
[255] “Does Your Board Really Understand Your Cyber Risks?” 2020. Harvard
Business Review. September 1, 2020. https://hbr.org/2020/09/does-yourboard-really-understand-your-cyber-risks.
[256] Tsiakis, Theodosios, and George Stephanides. 2005. “The Economic Approach
of Information Security.” Computers & Security 24 (2): 105–8.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2005.02.001.
[257] Vance, Anthony, Mikko T. Siponen, and Detmar W. Straub. 2020. “Effects of
Sanctions, Moral Beliefs, and Neutralization on Information Security Policy
Violations across Cultures.” Information & Management 57 (4): 103212.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2019.103212.
[258] Guo, Ken H., and Yufei Yuan. 2012. “The Effects of Multilevel Sanctions on
Information Security Violations: A Mediating Model.” Information &
Management 49 (6): 320–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2012.08.001.
[259] Li, Ling, Li Xu, Wu He, Yong Chen, and Hong Chen. 2016. “Cyber Security
Awareness and Its Impact on Employee’s Behavior.” Lecture Notes in Business

202

Information Processing, 103–11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-499444_8.
[260] “What Is Enterprise Information Portal (EIP)? - Definition from Techopedia.”
n.d. Techopedia.com.
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/13775/enterprise-informationportal-eip.
[261] Albrechtsen, Eirik, and Jan Hovden. 2010. “Improving Information Security
Awareness and Behaviour through Dialogue, Participation and Collective
Reflection. An Intervention Study.” Computers & Security 29 (4): 432–45.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2009.12.005.
[262] “American Hospital Directory - Advanced Search.” 2019. Ahd.com. 2019.
https://www.ahd.com/search.php.
[263] Saltelli, A., S. Tarantola, and K. P.-S. Chan. 1999. “A Quantitative ModelIndependent Method for Global Sensitivity Analysis of Model
Output.” Technometrics 41 (1): 39–56.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00401706.1999.10485594.
[264] Khan, Tanveer, Masoom Alam, Adnan Akhunzada, Ali Hur, Muhammad Asif,
and Muhammad Khurram Khan. 2019. “Towards Augmented Proactive
Cyberthreat Intelligence.” Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing 124
(February): 47–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpdc.2018.10.006.
[265] Wang, Yaosheng. 2020. “Network Information Security Risk Assessment
Based on Artificial Intelligence.” Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1648
(October): 042109. https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1648/4/042109.
[266] Khan, Saifull ah, Akanksha Jadhav, Indraje et Bharadwaj, Mayukh Rooj, and
Sandeep Shiravale. 2020. “Blockchain and the Identity Based Encryption
Scheme for High Data Security.” 2020 Fourth International Conference on
203

Computing Methodologies and Communication (ICCMC), March.
https://doi.org/10.1109/iccmc48092.2020.iccmc-000187.
[267] Lee, Shinho, Jung, Wookhyun, Lee Seohyun, and Tak Kim, Eui. 2020.
"Malware Response Naming Scheme for Security Control Service," 2020
International Conference on Information and Communication Technology
Convergence (ICTC) pp. 1549-1552.
[268] Skula, Bohacik and Zabovsky. 2020. "Use of Different Channels for User
Awareness and Education Related to Fraud and Phishing in a Banking
Institution," 2020 18th International Conference on Emerging eLearning
Technologies and Applications (ICETA), pp. 606-612.
[269] FBI & HHS. “Joint cyber advisory: Activity targeting the healthcare and public
sector.” Accessed July 10, 20201. https://uscert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20302A_Ransomware%20_Activity_Targeting_the_Healthcare_and_Public_Healt
h_Sector.pdf,
[270] Culbertson, Nick. n.d. “Council Post: Increased Cyberattacks on Healthcare
Institutions Shows the Need for Greater Cybersecurity.” Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/06/07/increasedcyberattacks-on-healthcare-institutions-shows-the-need-for-greatercybersecurity/?sh=1c991b35650d.
[271] Jalali, Mohammad S, Adam Landman, and William J Gordon. 2020.
“Telemedicine, Privacy, and Information Security in the Age of COVID19.” Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, December.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jamia/ocaa310.

204

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Research Instruments
Appendix A-1: Invitation Letter
Good Morning,
I am writing to request your assistance. I am a PhD student in Engineering and Technology
Management Department (ETM) at Portland State University (PSU). I am also a peer as Chief
Information Officer at Oregon Health & Science University.
I am conducting my dissertation research entitled “Healthcare Information
Security Maturity Model”. As part of my research, I am forming expert panels to help me
validate and quantify my research model. I have identified you as an expert in the field. Your
knowledge, background, experience, and expertise will be very helpful for my research.
If you agree to participate in this research, a consent form will be sent to you for signature. After
I receive the signed form, I will send you web-based data collection instruments for you to
provide your response. You will be asked to participate in 1-3 surveys. The surveys vary in
length taking from 3 to 15 minutes each. All questions are multiple choice or ranking of items,
no open-ended questions. To access the survey, you will be asked for an email address. This will
be to assure no one takes the assessment twice and it is also where a free copy of your survey
results will be emailed. You do not have to use your work or business email address. Your
information will only be utilized for this research and will never be seen, sold, given to, or
utilized outside this research (so no spam or unsolicited emails). No personally identifiable
information will be utilized and your answers to the survey will be combined with every other
participant.
Thank you in advance for considering my request for assistance. If you have any questions or
concerns, please feel free to contact me at any time, my contact information is listed below.
Bridget Barnes Page
PhD Student
Engineering and Technology Management Department (ETM) Portland State University (PSU)
Chief Information Officer
Oregon Health & Science University
Phone: 503-702-7866
Email: pagebridget@outlook.com
barnesbr@ohsu.edu
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Appendix A-2: Consent Form
Consent to Participate in Research
Project Title:

Healthcare Information Security Maturity Model

Researcher:

Bridget Barnes Page
Department of Engineering Management
Portland State University

Researcher Contact:

pagebridget@outlook.com or barnesbr@ohsu.edu
(503) 702-7866

You are being asked to take part in a research study. The box below highlights key information
about this research for you to consider when making a decision whether or not to participate.
Carefully review the information provided on this form. Please ask questions about any of the
information you do not understand before you decide to participate.

Key Information for You to Consider
•

Voluntary Consent. You are being asked to volunteer for a research study. It is
up to you whether you choose to participate or not. There is no penalty if you
choose not to participate or discontinue participation.
• Purpose. The purpose of this research is to develop a multi-criteria-based
measuring approach to be used in evaluating the maturity of Health Information
Security at healthcare organizations.
• Duration. It is expected that your participation will last 20-50 minutes for
responding to the research questionnaire. The questionnaires will be sent to you
once or twice between March and August 2020.
• Procedures and Activities. You will be asked to validate or quantify the
perspective, criteria, or desirability metrics listed in the research model.
• Risks. There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts of your participation.
• Benefits. Some of the benefits that may be expected include facilitation of
follow up research or application or research model on your organization.
•
Alternatives. Participation is voluntary, the only alternative is to choose not to
participate.

What happens if I agree to participate?
If you agree to be in this research, your participation will include serving as one of the experts
within one or two expert panels, which will help validate and quantify the research model. You
may also be asked to participate as an expert to provide insight for a case study. We will tell you
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about any new information that may affect your willingness to continue participation in this
research.

What happens to the information collected?
Information collected for this research will be used to validate and quantify the research model
or will be used for case study analysis. The information and analytical results will be
documented in a PhD dissertation, which will be accessible from the university or from academic
databases. Your identifiable information, such as your name, will be kept confidential.

How will my privacy and data confidentiality be protected?
We will take measures to protect your privacy including keeping your name and identifiable
information hidden. Despite these precautions, we can never fully guarantee the confidentiality
of all study information. Individuals and organizations that conduct or monitor this research
may be permitted access to inspect research records. This may include private information.
These individuals and organizations include [the Institutional Review Board that reviewed this
research.

What if I want to stop participating in this research?
Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, but if you do,
you may stop at any time. You have the right to choose not to participate in any study
activity or completely withdraw from participation at any point without penalty or loss
of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Your decision whether or not to
participate will not affect your relationship with the researchers or Portland State
University.
Will I be paid for participating in this research?
You will not be paid for participating in this research.
Who can answer my questions about this research?
If you have questions, concerns, or have experienced a research related injury, contact the
research team at:
Bridget Barnes Page
(503) 702-7866
pagebridget@outlook.com or barnesbr@ohsu.edu

Who can I speak to about my rights as a research participant?
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The Portland State University Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) is overseeing this research. The
IRB is a group of people who independently review research studies to ensure the rights and
welfare of participants are protected. The Office of Research Integrity is the office at Portland
State University that supports the IRB. If you have questions about your rights, or wish to speak
with someone other than the research team, you may contact:
Office of Research Integrity
PO Box 751
Portland, OR 97207-0751
Phone: (503) 725-5484
Toll Free: 1 (877) 480-4400
Email: psuirb@pdx.edu

Consent Statement
I have had the opportunity to read and consider the information in this form. I have asked any
questions necessary to make a decision about my participation. I understand that I can ask
additional questions throughout my participation.
By signing below, I understand that I am volunteering to participate in this research. I
understand that I am not waiving any legal rights. I have been provided with a copy of this
consent form. I understand that if my ability to consent for myself changes, either I or my legal
representative may be asked to provide consent prior to me continuing in the study.
I consent to participate in this study.

Name of Adult Participant

Signature of Adult Participant

Date

Researcher Signature (to be completed at time of informed consent)
I have explained the research to the participant and answered all of his/her questions. I
believe that he/she understands the information described in this consent form and
freely consents to participate.
Name of Research Team Member

Bridget Barnes Page

Signature of Research Team Member

Date

3/2/21
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Appendix A-3: Example of web based validation instrument

Complete instrument is available from the author.
209

Appendix A-4: Web based judgment quantification instrument

The full instrument is available from the author.
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Appendix A-5: Table of research instruments

211

Appendix B: Expert Panels
Appendix B-1: Expert Panel Configuration
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Appendix B-2: Expert Background

213

Appendix B-3: Expert Panel Assignments

214

Appendix C: Validation Data
Appendix C-1: Validation Data at Level 2 (Objective)

215

Appendix C-2: Validation Data for Level 3 (Goals)

216

Appendix C-3: Validation Data for Level 4 (Outputs)

217

218

219

Appendix D: Quantification Data Collection Instrument and Data
Appendix D-1: Quantification of Level 2 (Objectives)*

* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column
to protect anonymity
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Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) *
Appendix D-2-1: Organizational Support Goal

* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column
to protect anonymity
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Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) *
Appendix D-2-2: Policies & Standards Goal

* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column
to protect anonymity
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Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) *
Appendix D-2-3: Training & Awareness Goal

* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column
to protect anonymity
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Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) *
Appendix D-2-4: Technical Hygiene Goal

* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column
to protect anonymity
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Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) *
Appendix D-2-5: Mitigation of External Threat Goal

* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column
to protect anonymity
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Appendix D-3: Quantification Data Entry and Analysis Tool
The HDM 2.0 © software is used to quantify the expert data. This figure below
shows the interface that experts used to conduct the pair-wise comparison for the
Organizational Support objective (as an example).
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Appendix E: Desirability Curves Data Collection Tool & Data
Appendix E-1: Desirability Curve Data Collection Instrument (limited sample for
technical hygiene)

Bridget Barnes

Information Security Maturity Model in Healthcare
Organizations in the United States
Thank you for participating in evaluating my research model as a subject matter expert.
My research goal is to create a maturity model for information security in healthcare
organizations. This model would provide a framework by which healthcare organizations
may:
• Assess their information security maturity from multiple perspectives to
increase self-awareness; and
• Provide insight on strengths and weaknesses related to specific risk mitigation
criteria in order to best focus limited resources to improve information
security within their organizations.
_____________________________________________________________________________

During this part of the data collection, your assessment of each criterion in the
model will be used to develop desirability curves, quantifying the elements
associated with information security maturity.
________________________________________________________________________
An illustration of the model is provided below:
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_______________________________________________________________
Objective description:

Please enter your name:
Name
Last Name
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Information Security Technical Hygiene

Please provide a metric score from 0 (least favorable state) to 100 (most
favorable state) for each possible state noted.
Physical Controls
What level of physical controls are established at organization?

The full instrument is available from the author.
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Appendix E-2: Desirability Curve Definition and Values
Table E-2-1: Organizational Support – Governance

Table E-2-2: Organizational Support – Leadership & Management Support
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Table E-2-3: Organizational Support – Resource Availability

Table E-2-4: Organizational Support – Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Disaster
Recovery and Incident Response
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Table E-2-5: Policies and Standards – Policy Documentation and Awareness

Table E-2-6: Policies and Standards – Procedure Documentation and Awareness
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Table E-2-7: Policies and Standards – Technical Standards Documentation and
Awareness

Table E-2-8: Policies and Standards – Sanctions Documentation and Awareness
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Table E-2-9: Training & Awareness – Communications

Table E-2-10: Training & Awareness – Awareness Events
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Table E-2-11: Training & Awareness – Informational Portal

Table E-2-12: Training & Awareness – Training
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Table E-2-13: Training & Awareness – Behavioral Testing and Real-time Teaching

Table E-2-14: Technical Hygiene – Physical Controls

T

236

able E-2-15: Technical Hygiene – Asset Management

Table E-2-16: Technical Hygiene – Routine Security Updates
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Table E-2-17: Technical Hygiene – Protection of Stored Info & Info in Transit

Table E-2-18: Technical Hygiene – Identity, Authentication and Access Management
& Monitoring
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Table E-2-19: Mitigation of External Threats – Data Loss Prevention

Table E-2-20: Mitigation of External Threats – Anti-spam and Malware Protection
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Table E-2-21: Mitigation of External Threats – Intrusion Detection & Prevention

Table E-2-22: Mitigation of External Threats – Protection of Network
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Appendix F: Case Study Data
Appendix F-1:

Data Collection Instrument

Healthcare Information Security Maturity Model – Case Study Interview
Thank you for agreeing to serve as a case study for the healthcare information security
maturity model which I have developed with the help of subject matter experts from across the
country.
Over the next 30 minutes I will ask you a series of questions related to each information
security goal within the model. The comprehensive model is provided below to provide context for the
assessment.

You will be asked to rate your organization along a spectrum of maturity for each goal within
the model by answering the question noted below. As we move through the levels noted below you
can think of them as advancing – i.e., level “c” is more advanced than level “a”, level “e” is more
advanced than level “c”. Please select the BEST answer for your organization, understanding that no
answer may be exactly perfect in representing your organization.
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The first set of questions relate to Organizational Support for information security:
Governance
What level of governance for information security is established at your organization?
a) There is no governance related to information security at organization.
b) The organization has a limited governance structure related to information security, with
some defined policies, roles and responsibilities.
c) The organization has well established policies related to information security as well as
defined roles and responsibilities.
d) The organization has well established information security governance which includes
routine monitoring and measurement of performance associated with a defined strategic
plan.
e) The organization has a comprehensive governance structure which includes aligning
information security strategies to business objectives.
Leadership and management support
What level of leadership and management support for information security is available at
organization?
a) Organizational management and leadership is uninterested in or unaware of information
security policies, practices, performance.
b) Organization leaders and managers have some awareness of the need for information
security and understand their role in supporting information security through policies and
practices.
c) Organizational leaders and managers act as model for expectations of behavior related to
information security best practices.
d) Organizational leaders and managers are actively engaged in information security
governance process, policy and procedures, ensuring alignment with business objectives.
e) Organizational leadership at the highest level receive routine updates regarding information
security performance across the organization and provide support for information security
through dedication of resources and personal behaviors.
Resource availability
What level of access to resources for information security are available at organization?
a) There are no specific resources dedicated to information security at organization.
b) There are a few resources available to support information security at the organization, but
there are no resources dedicated exclusively to information security.
c) The organization has a dedicated information security team that provides support for
information security tools.
d) The organization has a dedicated information security team that supports operational
information security tools, provides information security training to organizational
members and conducts routine information security assessments.
e) There are robust resources committed to information security which allow not only
maintenance and monitoring of existing system but also consistent improvement in
information security posture of the organization.
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Risk assessment, risk management plan, disaster recovery and incident response
What level of risk assessment, risk management, disaster recovery and incident response
plans for information security are available at organization?
a) The organization does not conduct information security risks assessments or have an
information security risk management plan.
b) The organization conducts infrequent risk assessments and has not developed a risk
management plan for information security.
c) The organization conducts routine risk assessments and has developed a risk management
plan for information security.
d) The organization conducts routine risk assessment and has a risk management plan for
information security that is actively monitored and managed. The organization also has a
disaster recovery and/or incident response plan.
e) The organization conducts routine risk assessments, has a risk management plan for
information security that is actively monitored and engages with national standards
organizations to benchmark performance against others. The organization also has a
disaster recovery and/or incident response plan.
The next set of questions relate to Policies & Standards for information security:
Policy documentation and awareness
What level of policy documentation and awareness related to information security is
established at organization?
a) The organization has no policy documentation related to information security.
b) The organization has some documentation related to information security policies.
c) The organization has well documented policies related to information security but they are
not well known to organizational members.
d) The organization has a comprehensive set of information security policies which are
regularly updated and well understood by members of the organization.
Procedure documentation and awareness
What level of information security procedure documentation and awareness is established at
organization?
a) The organization has no procedure documentation related to information security.
b) The organization has some documentation related to information security procedures.
c) The organization has well documented procedures related to information security but they
are not well known to organizational members.
d) Organization has a comprehensive set of information security procedures which are
regularly updated and well understood by members of the organization.
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Technical standard documentation and awareness
What level of information security procedure documentation and awareness is established at
organization?
a) The organization has no technical standards documentation related to information security.
b) The organization has some documentation related to information security technical
standards.
c) The organization has well documented technical standards related to information security
but they are not well known to organizational members.
d) Organization has a comprehensive set of technical standards related to information security
which are regularly updated and well understood by members of the organization.
Sanction documentation and awareness
What level of sanction documentation and awareness related to information security is
established at organization?
a) The organization has no documentation or awareness related to sanctions that may be
implemented as a result of non-compliance with information security policies.
b) The organization has some documentation related to sanctions that may be implemented as
a result of non-compliance with information security policies.
c) The organization has completed documentation of sanctions that may be implemented as a
result of non-compliance with information security policies but they are not well known to
organizational members or are not implemented in an equitable way.
d) The organization has well documented and broadly known sanctions guidance associated
with information security policy violations. The defined sanctions are believed to be fair by
organizational members and are applied equitably by the organization.
The next set of questions relate to Awareness & Training for information security:
Communications
What level of information security communications are established at organization?
a) The organization does not communicate information about information security threats or
expectations.
b) The organization provides limited or inconsistent communication related to information
security threats and expectations.
c) The organization provides regular communication through a single channel (e.g., employee
newsletter) related to information security threats and expectations.
d) The organization provides regular communication through multiple print or digital channels
(e.g. newsletters, posters, blogs) but does not create forums for in-person delivery of
information related to information security threats and expectations.
e) The organization has dedicated communication resources for information security that
create and deliver content about the current state of information security, changes to
information security threats, tools, policies and procedures. Communication is delivered on
a regular basis through multiple communication channels including print, digital and inperson delivery.
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Awareness events
What level of information security awareness events are established at organization?
a) The organization does not host information security awareness events.
b) The organization hosts limited (e.g. small group) or inconsistent security awareness events.
c) The organization hosts regular security awareness events that are not well known or
attended by organizational members.
d) The organization hosts regular security awareness events that are well attended by small
groups of organizational members.
e) The organization hosts regular security awareness events. Some events are uniquely
designed to appeal to discrete stakeholder types (e.g., web-developers) and others are large
security awareness events which are well attended by large numbers of organizational
members.
Information portal
What level of an information security portal is established at organization?
a) The organization does not have a digital presence/portal focused on information security as
part of a broader communication toolkit.
b) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides limited information (e.g. only
minimal information regarding information security policies).
c) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides comprehensive information
related to information security policies, procedures, sanctions, and tools, but is not well
known to organizational members.
d) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides comprehensive information
related to information security policies, procedures and tools, which is well known to
organizational members
e) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides comprehensive information
related to information security policies, procedures and tools, and where to get additional
help or ask questions. The portal is frequently visited and seen as a valuable resource by
organizational members.
Training
What level of information security training is established at organization?
a) The organization provides no training related to information security threats or
expectations.
b) The organization provides a single, annual, online training related to information security
threats and expectations which is optional.
c) The organization provides annual online training related to information security threats and
expectations which is mandatory for all organizational members.
d) The organization provides annual online training related to information security threats and
expectations which is mandatory for all organizational members. In addition, the
organization provides small group training upon request.
e) The organization provides a combination of computer-based training, small group training,
and one-on-one training upon request related to information security threats, expectations
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and best practices. The organization proactively identifies individuals and/or groups who
may need additional ad-hoc training and provides those services regularly. At least one
annual training is required of all organizational members.
Behavioral testing and real-time teaching
What level of information security behavioral testing and real-time teaching is established at
organization?
a) The organization provides no behavioral testing or real-time teaching related to information
security threats or expectations.
b) The organization provides limited or inconsistent behavioral testing or real-time teaching
related to information security threats and expectations.
c) The organization provides consistent behavioral testing or real-time teaching related to
information security threats and expectations through a single channel (e.g. phishing) but
does not share results broadly or shames those organizational members who perform
poorly.
d) The organization provides consistent behavioral testing or real-time teaching related to
information security threats and expectations through multiple channels (e.g. phishing, USB
drops) but does not share results broadly or shames those organizational members who
perform poorly.
e) The organization regularly and frequently tests members compliance with information
security policies, procedures, best practices. Tests are conducted through a variety of
delivery mechanisms (e.g. phishing tests, USB drops). Results of individual tests are shared
with individual organizational members in real-time privately to avoid blaming/shaming
and encourage learning. Organizational members who repeatedly fail behavioral tests are
offered personal coaching. Organization wide performance related to behavioral compliance
is shared broadly with all members to increase awareness and associated compliance.
The next set of questions relate to Technical Hygiene for information security:
Physical Controls
What level of physical controls are established at organization?
a) The organization has no physical controls that limit access to technology infrastructure
and/or confidential information.
b) The organization has some physical controls that limit access to technology infrastructure
and/or confidential information (e.g., locked doors in some locations, badge access to highly
sensitive areas).
c) The organization has comprehensive physical controls that limit access to technology
infrastructure and/or confidential information.
d) The organization has comprehensive physical controls that limit access to technology
infrastructure and/or confidential information which are actively monitored by information
security or public safety professionals.
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Asset Management
What level of asset management for physical and virtual technology assets is established at
organization?
a) The organization has no tools, processes or staffing to provide asset management
capabilities for physical and virtual technology assets (hardware and software).
b) The organization has some tools, process or staffing to support limited asset management
capabilities for physical and virtual technology assets (hardware and software).
c) The organization has tools, processes, and staffing to support asset management for most
but not all physical and virtual technical assets (hardware and software).
d) The organization has comprehensive tools, processes and staffing to support full life cycle
management related to all physical and virtual technology assets (hardware and software).
Routine security updates
What level of routine information security updating is established at organization?
a) The organization does not perform routine information security patching/updating.
b) The organization performs periodic information security patching/updating and may have
technical tools which aid in identifying required patching.
c) The organization performs routine information security patching and updating and has
technical tools which aid in identifying required patching, but often fails to meet patching
updates as frequently as defined in service level agreements or policies or is unable to patch
all software, end points, servers, operating systems, bio-medical devices.
d) The organization has a robust information security patching/updating process in place with
defined roles and responsibilities to patch all systems and devices across the enterprise.
Information security patching/updating is completed as defined in service level agreements
or policies.
Protection of Stored Information and Information in Transit
What level of projection of stored information and information in transit is established at
organization?
a) The organization has no technical tools to support protection of stored information and
information in transit.
b) The organization has some tools to support protection of stored information and
information in transit.
c) The organization has comprehensive tools to support stored information and information in
transit for applications and systems that are on-premise.
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information
security professionals to support protection of stored information and information in transit
for applications and systems that are on-premise as well as cloud-based platforms.
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Identity/Authentication/Access Management and Monitoring
What level of identity, authentication, access management and access monitoring is
established at organization?
a) The organization has no technical tools to support identity, authentication or access
management and monitoring.
b) The organization has some tools to support authentication and access management
capabilities.
c) The organization has some tools to support identity, authentication and access management
capabilities.
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information
security professionals to support identity, authentication and access management in both
on-premise and cloud-based platforms.
The next set of questions relate to Mitigation of External Threats for information security:
Data Loss Protection
What level of data loss protection is established at organization?
a) The organization has no technical tools to support data loss protection.
b) The organization has some tools to support data loss protection.
c) The organization has comprehensive tools to support data loss protection for applications
and systems that are on-premise.
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information
security professionals to support data loss protection for applications and systems that are
on-premise as well as cloud-based platforms.
Anti-spam and malware protection
What level of anti-spam and malware protection is established at organization?
a) The organization has no technical tools to provide anti-spam or malware protection
capabilities.
b) The organization has some tools to support anti-spam protection capabilities.
c) The organization has some tools to support both anti-spam and malware protection
capabilities.
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information
security professionals to support both anti-spam and malware protection in both onpremise and cloud-based platforms.
Intrusion detection and prevention
What level of intrusion detection and prevention is established at organization?
a) The organization has no technical tools to provide intrusion detection and prevention
capabilities.
b) The organization has some tools to support intrusion prevention capabilities.
c) The organization has some tools to support both intrusion prevention and intrusion
detection capabilities.
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d) The organization has comprehensive tools and staffing to support a 24x7 Intrusion detection
and prevention (a.k.a. Managed Detection Response) program utilizing a Security
Information and Event Manage system.
Protection of network
What level of network protection is established at organization?
a) The organization has no technical tools to support network protection capabilities.
b) The organization has a limited set of tools to support network protection capabilities (e.g.,
firewalls, network access control).
c) The organization has both basic and some advanced tools to support network protection
capabilities (e.g., firewalls, network access controls, routine vulnerability scanning, network
segmentation).
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information
security professionals to support protection of network.
We have now reached the conclusion of the maturity model-based questions.
Can you share with me what key next steps your organization plans to move forward with or that you
would like to implement to improve your information security posture?
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Appendix F-2 Summary of case study scores
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Appendix G: Sensitivity Scenario Data
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Appendix H: Acronyms
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